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Insight In Problem Solving: Developing A Neural Network Theoretical Account 
Of The Processes Involved In Attaining Insight 
Karen A. Roberts BA BSocSci(Hons) 
Insight has enjoyed the reputation of an elusive phenomenon in psychology and 
insight problems are very difficult to solve. Only very specific hints concerning 
their solution have been found to significantly increase the number of problem 
solvers who are able to solve insight problems. The result of this has been to 
suggest that insight does not exist, that it is a mysterious phenomenon, or that it is 
an aspect of problem solving which we have so far failed to understand. Insight in 
problem solving is investigated from the perspective that the phenomenon needs 
explanation and it is argued that, while insight has been operationally defined and a 
clear set of key empirical findings have been established, the conceptual explanation 
of insight has been largely ignored. It is suggested that a conceptual account of 
insight is needed so that this aspect of cognitive processing can be incorporated into 
the main body of cognitive research on problem solving. The current tension in 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology is examined and it is argued that writing 
a conceptual account of insight in neural network theoretical terms will not only 
advance our understanding of insight, but will also reflect on the debate in cognitive 
theory. This is a result of its status as an aspect of problem solving and as a 
phenomenon which symbolic theory has so far failed to offer a clear explanation 
for. A conceptual account of insight in neural network terms is advanced which 
offers a comprehensive account of the key empirical findings on insight. It is 
suggested that insight can be understood as the recognition of a pattern to insight 
problems. Predictions derived from the theory suggest that overcoming the effects 
of past learning, employing conceptual transfer, and fostering expertise at insight 
problem solving will significantly facilitate insightful problem solution. These 
predictions are submitted to experimental testing with 152 participants who are 
required to solve the nine-dot problem. Facilitation was measured in terms of time 
to solution and the number of participants who correctly solved insight problems. 
·l analyses revealed no significant differences in the number of participants who 
successfully solved the nine-dot problem following interventions to overcome the 
effects of past learning (X< 1>
2 = 2,087, p > 0,05), or to facilitate conceptual transfer 
2 (X<J> = 3,542, p > 0,05). Pearson's correlation coefficient revealed no significant 
correlation in ability to solve insight problems, offering no support for the 
prediction that it is possible to display expertise at insight problem solving. The 
findings are not interpreted as a rejection of the viability of the neural network 
account of insight in problem solving due to the limited number of participants who 
were able to solve the nine-dot problem in the facilitated and unfacilitated 
conditions. It is suggested that the neural network account of insight needs further 
investigation and that the conceptual account offers the most comprehensive account 
of insight to date. 
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A JOYFUL FASCINATION WITH COGNITIVE 
PROCESSING: THESIS OVERVIEW 
1.1. A joyful fascination with cognitive processing 
This thesis emerges out of a joyful fascination with the fact that, not only do people 
breathe, eat, walk and talk, they actually think! Is it not amazing that there is 
something going on inside your head right now as you read these words, perhaps 
hear them in your head, reflect on them, compare them to your own experience and 
decide that the writer is in the throes of some bizarre, thesis induced mania! You 
could communicate all of these thoughts and attempt to express the subjective 
experience of thinking without having the slightest idea of where these thoughts are 
located, how you have them, or how you express them. You can use them to hold a 
conversation with your mother, write a shopping list, grade a student's essay, or 
solve complex and difficult problems. 
There are many, many people who can accomplish these feats, these truly amazing 
feats. These accomplishments have been accorded a mystical status, particularly 
when people display skills which they cannot explain, such as occurs in the solution 
of insight problems. Such accomplishments are amazing, but they are only mystical 
because we cannot yet explain comprehensively the process by means of which they 
are accomplished. There cannot be something mystical about a process which 
everyone can follow. This thesis hopes to take one tiny, tottering step toward 
demystifying one aspect of cognitive processing - insight in human problem solving 
- and reducing it to the sphere of the truly amazing. 
1. 2. A tiny. tottering step 
The aim of this chapter is to briefly detail why and how this tiny, tottering step will 
be taken. This will be achieved by: 
1. Briefly detailing the long-standing tradition of interest in cognition 
and cognitive processing, and thus demonstrating the relevance 
tradition accords this thesis topic; 
2. Framing this thesis against the backdrop of the disciplines of cognitive 
science and cognitive psychology, the two research disciplines 
primarily interested in cognitive processing; 
3. Highlighting the current theoretical upheaval within these disciplines 
and the resultant need for work which positions itself within the divide 
between symbolic theory and neural network theoryi, the two major 
theoretical frameworks used to explain cognitive processing in 
cognitive science and cognitive psychology; 
4. Drawing attention to the central place of research on problem solving 
in this upheaval, and the paucity of our knowledge concerning the 
processes involved in one fascinating aspect of problem solving -
insight; 
5. Posing the writer's contention that re-writing processes such as insight 
in terms of neural network theory is not only necessary with respect to 
the theoretical debate in cognitive science and cognitive psychology, 
but is also potentially highly beneficial for advancing our 
understanding of the processes involved in insight; 
6. Finally, outlining the chapter structure of this thesis, by means of 
which a neural network theory of insight will be advanced, and by 
means of which its central tenets will be tested. 
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1.2.1. Interest in cognitive processing 
It is difficult to define exactly what we mean by the terms cognition and cognitive 
processing, without framing them in terms of a particular theoretical approach to the 
study of mind. Thus, for the purposes of this overview, Bechtel and Abrahamsen's 
(1991) broad definition of cognition as a range of mental processing, which includes 
reasoning, memory, language, perception, and motor control, will be accepted. To 
define the mental or cognitive processing involved in these cognitive activities, 
would once more require a descent to the level of a particular theoretical approach 
to the study of these activities. As one of the primary aims of this thesis is to 
question the sweeping terms in which traditional approaches to cognition have 
written such mental activities, by highlighting the potential of re-writing cognitive 
processing in alternate terms, such theoretically biased definitions must be avoided 
at this stage. 
Cognition and cognitive processing have fascinated philosophers for centuries. As 
Leiber (1991) points out, it was Aristotle and Plato who offered the fundamental 
questions and debates with which researchers studying cognition concern themselves 
today. Researchers in psychology have been conducting the scientific study of 
human behaviour, and of mind, for approximately the last hundred years. 
More recently, this interest in cognition and cognitive processing has become 
common to philosophers, psychologists, linguists, computer scientists, 
neuroscientists, biologists, mathematicians, and statisticians, amongst others. This 
broad interest has led to the development of an umbrella discipline or, in terms used 
by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991), an active cross-disciplinary research cluster, 
which embraces this pursuit. This umbrella discipline is known as Cognitive 
Science, and it is comprised of the sub-disciplines of psychology, computer science 
(or, more specifically, artificial intelligence), linguistics, philosophy, and 
neuroscience. It therefore seems necessary that a thesis which concerns itself with 
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the study of some aspect of cognitive processing, should reflect on its position 
relative to the endeavours of cognitive science. 
Definitions of cognitive science appear to be fairly uniform. Stillings, Weisler, 
Chase, Feinstein, Garfield and Rissland (1995) define cognitive science as the 
science of the mind, and assert that cognitive scientists seek to understand such 
phenomena as perception, thought, memory, language comprehension, learning, 
and other mental phenomena. The nature of the mind is accepted as being 
computational or information processing. This important feature of the orientation 
of cognitive science, its conception of the mind as an information processing 
system, is echoed in Kaplan and Simon's (1989) definition of cognitive science as 
the study of intelligent behaviour or intelligent systems, with particular reference to 
intelligent behaviour as computation. It would appear that the development of the 
digital computer not only resulted in what has become perhaps the dominant 
conception of the nature of mind, but also led to the founding of an entire research 
discipline. 
Before briefly considering the impact of the digital computer on theories of mind, it 
seems important to highlight the fact that researchers in psychology concerned 
themselves with the nature of cognition and cognitive processing long before the 
advent of the computer age. Barsalou (1992) delineates concisely the course which 
this study has followed. It began in the late 19th century with the introspectionists, 
who attempted to describe the content and composition of conscious experience 
systematically, as well as the psychophysicists, who were concerned with describing 
the systematic relations between conscious experience and physical information in 
the environment. Thus, interest in human thought has an established tradition 
within psychology, which pre-dates its subsumption under the rubric of cognitive 
science and which operated outside of the realms of information processing. 
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This tradition continued with the Gestalt psychologists in the early 20th century, 
though a concurrent theoretical development - Behaviourism - was to dominate 
psychology from approximately 1910 to 1950, and interest in human thought ceased 
during this time. It re-emerged with the advent of Cognitivism in psychology 
during the late 1950's, and Chomsky's critique of the behaviourist position on 
learning, advances in information theory, and the computer metaphor, all helped 
lead to the cognitive revolution and the "overthrow" of behaviourism. Indeed, the 
advent of cognitivism could be seen as a Kuhnian shift in paradigm, since which 
interest in cognition has been here to stay. 
Led l:Jy a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look 
in new places. Even more important, during revolutions scientists 
see new and different things when looking with familiar 
instruments in places where they have looked before. It is rather 
as if the professional community has been suddenly transported to 
another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light 
and joined l:Jy unfamiliar ones as well. 1 
(Kuhn, 1962, p.lll). 
It could certainly be argued that the shift from behaviourism to cognitivism 
constitutes such a revolution. 
1.2.2. Cognitive psychology or cognitive science? 
Now that the scope of cognitive science, and the lengthier tradition of cognitive 
study within psychology has been outlined, it seems necessary to position this thesis 
in terms of these research pursuits. 
1lt is interesting that this shift in paradigm sounds very similar to the operation of insight as the 
recognition of a new pattern of relationships. The reader is referred to chapters two and four for an 
explication of insight, and insight as pattern recognition. 
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This is a cognitive psychology thesis, and not a cognitive science thesis. This 
distinction is very important. First of all, cognitive psychology forms part of 
cognitive science and, arguably, no one discipline can accomplish the goals of 
cognitive science. Second, the goals of cognitive science and cognitive psychology 
overlap, but are distinct. Cognitive science seeks to develop machine intelligence, 
and is thus interested in developing cognitive architectures (which are computer 
based) that simulate human intelligence. Within this global framework, cognitive 
psychology seeks to determine what theoretical understandings of the mind apply to 
human behaviour. As Lycan (1990) points out, the question for cognitive 
psychology is: given that a computer can do X, Y, and Z, does it do so in the same 
manner as human beings? It would be impossible for one thesis to address this 
entire question, and therefore this thesis will tackle one aspect of human behaviour: 
insight in problem solving. Once we have considered the two major, competing 
conceptions of computation, and have outlined the choice of insight in problem 
solving, it will be evident that this is a cognitive psychology thesis, which assumes 
its place under the general banner of research in cognitive science. 
1.2.3. Symbolic theory versus neural network theory 
Let us now return to a consideration of the impact of the development of the digital 
computer on theories of mind, and the clear position this provides for this thesis. 
The development of the digital computer clearly led to the dominant conception of 
cognition in terms of the operation of computer hardware and computer software -
symbolic theory. [Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) and Lycan (1990), offer 
convincing evidence for the domination of symbolic theory. Also, Posner's (1989) 
tome on cognitive science includes only one chapter which does not couch cognition 
in terms of symbolic theory.] In these terms, the brain is likened to the hardware, 
and the mind is framed in terms of the software, which operates by means of the 
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rule-based manipulation of symbols which have their own semantics and syntactics, 
as does a computer programme. 
Recently, cognitive science (and in particular its sub-branches of philosophy and 
cognitive psychology) has had to contend with a theoretical framework which 
threatens to challenge symbolic theory for its supremacy in explaining cognitive 
processing. Indeed, this challenge has been issued in such strong terms that appeals 
to a further Kuhnian paradigmatic shift are being issued. (See for instance Bechtel 
& Abrahamsen, 1991). Although the concept of Neural Network processing (the 
notion that cognition operates on massively connected networks of elementary units 
that represent objects of thought in some way, by means of their differential 
relationships and primacies in awareness) has a well-established pedigree2, it is only 
recently that neural network theory has enjoyed renewed research interest. This 
interest is of such magnitude that important features on the face of cognition are 
rapidly being re-written in neural network terms. It seems far too early, however, 
to accept the proposition that this upheaval represents a Kuhnian shift in paradigm, 
and this is certainly not the position adopted within this thesis. Instead, the 
proposition endorsed by this thesis, is that it is only by re-writing cognitive 
phenomena in terms of neural network theory, that we can begin to assess the 
soundness of this theoretical framework. After all, it is not feasible to assert that 
neural network theory should replace symbolic theory as a conception of cognitive 
phenomena until its account of these phenomena has been written and evaluated. 
1.2.4. The place of problem solving and insight 
One area of cognition that is at the forefront of the sparring match between 
symbolic theory and neural network theory, is human problem solving. As Newell 
2
The origins of neural network theory can arguably be seen in associationism as a component of 
behaviourism, and can clearly be traced as far back as McCulloch and Pitts (1943) paper on cognitive 
architectures modelled on the network of neurons in the brain, as Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) 
illustrate. 
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and Simon (1972) point out, for any theory of cognition to be taken seriously, it 
must be able to account for the empirically well-established features of human 
problem solving. To further echo this sentiment, Clark (1989) points out that 
problem solving and scientific creativity (both of which are closely linked to the 
main topic of study for this thesis - insight) are areas which symbolic theory has 
claimed as its own. Of substantial significance in this theoretical debate is the clear 
indication that neural network theory is enjoying great success in offering a 
theoretical explanation of problem solving, debateably, greater success than 
symbolic theory (see for instance Peng & Reggia, 1989; Lesser, 1991; Ye & 
Salvendy, 1991). This, surely, is crucial to the continued development of a rival 
theory - why should researchers expend valuable research time and money on a 
theory which cannot offer a more comprehensive account of consistently observed 
empirical findings than the currently spoken theoretical framework? 
One aspect of problem solving which symbolic theory has so far not been able to 
offer an adequate explanation of, is insight. There is a large group of problems 
which, it is widely accepted, can only be solved by the application of a process 
dubbed insight. However, a consideration of the literature clearly reveals that there 
is no clear consensus concerning what insight is, how it happens, what 
circumstances precipitate or inhibit insightful problem solution, why there are 
individual differences in the application and experience of insight, what processes 
are utilised in manifesting insight or, indeed, whether insight actually exists as a 
distinct cognitive process. 
1.2.5. The need to re-write insight in terms of neural network theory 
For work that wishes to position itself within the divide between symbolic theory 
and neural network theory, what better area of investigation could there be than one 
which falls within the rubric of a traditionally highly important aspect of cognitive 
theorising, and which has been so poorly accounted for by established theory? 
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What is most intriguing, is the fact that Simon and Kaplan (1989) identify the origin 
of network models with Hebb' s proposal of a conceptual nervous system - the same 
work within which he offers a tentative position on insight (see Hebb, 1949). A 
further intriguing link between neural network theory and insight, lies in the fact 
that insight originates in Gestalt psychology, and a useful synthesis has been 
proposed between Gestalt psychology and neural network theory. What also makes 
the re-writing of insight within neural network terms such an exciting prospect, is 
the potential which this framework has to offer a process level explanation of 
insight, and it is precisely the cognitive processing involved in insight which is so 
poorly understood. 
Neural network theory has been enthusiastically embraced for two main reasons: its 
biological plausibility and its capability of using a parallel hardware environment to 
conceptualise cognitive processing on a scale remotely similar to human cognition 
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). It embodies the potential for closer approximation 
of the human mind than we have, until now, enjoyed. Another exciting feature of 
neural network theory, particularly in the area of insight where the explanation of 
the phenomenon is so unclear, is the possibility of a process explanation at the level 
of the microstructure of cognition. In other words, the theory embodies the 
promise of detailing exactly the cognitive processes that could be involved in 
attaining insight. 
This is especially promising when one considers that people who display insight 
cannot express verbally how they achieved insight. The process seems to be 
beyond words; in fact, verbalising during insight problem solving actually impedes 
insight (Stanley, Mathews, Buss & Kotler-Cope, 1989; Schooler, Ohlsson & 
Brooks, 1993). When one considers that symbols are essentially linguistic 
structures, the re-writing of insight in neural network terms appears to be a 
particularly profitable pursuit, not only for our understanding of insight (and this 
alone would be a worthwhile venture), but also in terms of illuminating the current 
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theoretical sparring match in cognition. As Clark (1989) states, the symbolic model 
of the mind can be characterised as just the mind's own talk, its explanation of what 
it is doing. This talk explains much, but not how the mind accomplishes what it 
does. Neural network theory, as a process level explanation of the mind's work, 
has the potential to offer an explanation of the manner in which cognitive processes 
such as insight are achieved. We can only begin to assess the importance of this 
explanation once prominent features on the face of cognition have been re-written in 
terms of neural network theory. 
In terms of the statement that this is a cognitive psychology thesis, this dissertation 
must address the issue of whether a neural network theoretical account (an 
alternative to the traditional symbolic form of computation) of the processing 
involved in attaining insight, offers a viable account of the manner in which a 
human problem solver displays reaches a problem solution by insight. In this way, 
the question for cognitive psychology posed in section 1.2.2. (whether the manner 
in which a computer processes information is the same as the manner in which a 
human processes information), can, on one small count, be addressed. 
The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to attempt a re-writing of insight in problem 
solving in terms of neural network theory. To clearly illuminate this model of 
insight, attention will be focused on one particular insight problem which has 
clearly been more extensively researched and written about than any other - the so-
called nine dot problem3• To offer support for this conception of insight in problem 
solving, some of the central tenets of this neural network postulation of insight will 
3ln the nine-dot problem, the problem solver is presented with three straight rows of three dots, and is 
instructed to connect all nine dots with only four straight lines, without lifting their pen from the paper. 
Most problem solvers attempt to connect all of the dots by staying within the boundaries suggested by 
the square shape of the problem presentation, not realising that the rest of the space on the page is also 
available for drawing lines. It is only by extending the length of the lines beyond this boundary that 
the problem can be solved, and the problem solver generally realises that this boundary is self-imposed 
before the problem is solved. This realisation is thought to occur by insight. Please refer to appendix 
l for a copy of the nine-dot problem and its solution. 
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be subjected to an empirical test with human problem solvers. The viability of a 
neural network theoretical account of insight can then be examined. 
1.2.6. Chapter structure 
In developing this model, Chapter 2: Staking Out Insight, will review literature on 
insight in problem solving, and will demonstrate the surprisingly clear and 
consistent nature of the key empirical findings, despite the poor definitions and 
serious gaps in our current theoretical understanding of insight in problem solving. 
It will be argued, however, that the literature clearly suggests that insight is the 
process (or processes) by means of which a problem whose formulation is 
ambiguous, and for which only the non-obvious conceptualisation is appropriate, is 
solved. In support of this, it will also be demonstrated that the literature on 
insightful problem solving clearly suggests that recognition of this non-obvious 
conceptualisation is paramount, and that the application of the important concept of 
expertise in problem solving, has not been clearly applied to insight and should thus 
be explored. 
Chapter 3: The Divide Between Symbolic Theory and Neural Network Theory, will 
explore the tensions between the two major theoretical explanations of cognitive 
processing, will explore the tension between the symbolic and neural network 
theories of cognition, and will compare and contrast the two theoretical 
frameworks. This will serve to position this enterprise within the field of debate 
between these two theories, as well as within the re-writing of cognitive phenomena 
in neural network terms. The viability of a neural network theoretical account of 
insight will also be considered. 
Chapter 4: A Neural Network Theoretical Model of Insight in Problem Solving, 
represents the development of a neural network explanation of insight in problem 
solving, with particular reference to the well-utilised nine dot problem. It will be 
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posited that a neural network model of insight in problem solving is particularly 
worthy of investigation. An attempt will be made to demonstrate that this 
theoretical model can account for the key empirical findings in insightful problem 
solving, and it will be suggested that this theoretical model is perhaps more 
comprehensive than any conception of insight in problem solving posed to date. 
Some predictions concerning the performance of human problem solvers made by 
the central tenets of this model will also be outlined, and a means of testing them 
will be suggested. 
Chapter 5: Method, will outline the experiment which tested the predictions 
generated by the theoretical explanation of insight in neural network terms. The 
experiment is an independent groups design, with six levels of the independent 
variable. This empirical test involves exposing 152 participants to various problem 
solving tasks which the theoretical model predicts will facilitate solution of a target 
insight problem. This target insight problem is the nine-dot problem. 
Chapter 6: Results, details the findings concerning the human test of predictions 
made by the neural network model of insight. These results demonstrate the 
surprising finding that only 14,02% of participants were able to solve the target 
nine-dot problem following facilitation, and that none of the facilitation conditions 
led to a significant increase in correct solutions over the unfacilitated problem 
solving conditions. 
Chapter 7: Discussion, explores the implications posed by these findings and will 
suggest that, although the findings do not support the neural network theoretical 
model of insight, they cannot be used to refute it. This argument will be based on a 
theoretical and methodological evaluation of the human test. Conclusions regarding 
the viability of the neural network account of insight will be drawn, and suggestions 
will be made for further research. 
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;There is some debate concerning the appropriate terms to describe these theoretical approaches to 
characterising cognition. In using symbolic theory, the writer refers to the traditional, information 
processing, computer metaphor of cognition. By so doing, the writer concurs with Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen's ( 1991) conclusion that this theory is epitomised by its approach to cognition as symbol 
manipulation. The choice of the term neural network theory is less clear cut, though it is selected on 
the basis that it is more appropriate than the alternatives. The term connectionism is too broad, 
covering associationism as it is understood in behaviourist terms. Parallel distributed processing refers 
too specifically to a particular architecture for modelling cognition, in which representations are not 
only processed in parallel, but are also distributed. Finally, the term neural networks can be 
understood at a purely biological level. Thus, the term neural network theory is chosen, to suggest a 
structure of the mind that has its origins in the physical structure of the brain, but is taken to refer to a 
theoretical understanding of the operation of mind that extends beyond the purely biological level. 
The reader is referred to chapter 3 for an explication of the neural network theoretical position. These 




STAKING OUT INSIGHT 
The persistent lack of a mechanism for insight, linked with the 
charge that the notion of insight is somehow supernatural, has 
shackled researchers who would explore this most important of 
cognitive processes. . . . We don't yet understand insight. But to 
say that we do not yet understand is quite different from saying 
that the phenomenon is caused by divine intervention or, perhaps 
worse, that there is no phenomenon. 
Metcalfe (1995, p.x) 
As this chapter will illustrate, the above quotation clearly captures the current state 
of research exploring insight in problem solving: the process (or processes) by 
means of which insight is achieved have yet to be explicated, and researchers in the 
field adopt three distinct approaches to the study of insight. 
There are those researchers who adopt the premise that no special process which 
can be characterised as insight exists, and that insight is merely a normal part of 
some species of problem solving. This premise, however, seems to emerge from a 
particular theoretical orientation toward cognition and, more specifically, from an 
emphasis on learning theory. A second approach adopted with respect to the study 
of insight could be viewed as the mystification of insight. From this perspective, 
insight is seen as a phenomenon which defies explanation and there is a tendency to 
hold that insight can only be displayed by a select group of intellectually superior 
individuals. This point of view emerges from a particular interpretation of the 
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original Gestalt perspective on insight, and seems to be adopted only by some 
researchers in creativity and scientific discovery in more recent times. A final 
orientation toward the study of insight can be discerned amongst those researchers 
who believe that insight does exist, that it is displayed during the solution of a 
particular class of problems, and that it is a cognitive process which is currently 
inadequately explained. A critical review of literature on insight in problem 
solving, which constitutes the work of this chapter, suggests that the first two 
approaches mentioned above be dismissed, and that the third approach to insight be 
adopted. 
2.2 Staking out insight 
An integrated review of the literature on insight in problem solving is difficult to 
conduct, for several reasons. First, although three basic approaches to the study of 
insight can be identified, they are by no means unitary. Researchers who can be 
grouped together on the basis of their general approach to the study of insight, still 
utilise distinctly different formulations of insight. In particular, those researchers 
who believe that insight exists as a process which we have just not managed to 
explain as yet (the third approach mentioned above) differ widely in their 
conception and definition of insight. This leads us to the second reason for the 
difficulty in conducting an integrated review of the literature on insight: 
researchers adopt a variety of definitions of insight, most of which are theoretically 
impoverished. In fact, a case will be made that these definitions should be viewed 
as purely operational1• A further difficulty faced when integrating this literature, is 
that insight has a very chequered career. Its popularity has waxed and waned with 
the theoretical upheavals experienced within psychology, and with the various 
theoretical conceptions within which problem solving has been studied. There has 
1Although her work is not used directly, the distinction between the operational and theoretical 
elaboration of insight is similar to Hornstein's (1988) contention that intelligence has been 
operationally defined within psychology, but that its theoretical explanation has been seriously 
ignored. 
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been no consistent perspective from which insight has been viewed, probably 
because the processes underlying insight are so poorly understood. 
These difficulties must be reflected within this review of literature on insight. To 
accomplish this, the review will be divided into several sections which deal with 
distinct aspects of the literature on insight, rather than conducting a review in any 
sort of date or study chronology. Structuring the review in this way will also 
demonstrate why this thesis works within the approach to insight which 
characterises it as a part of problem solving which we do not yet understand, as 
well as demonstrating why it is argued that the definitions of insight in the literature 
are poor and should only be accepted operationally. It will also make clear the 
reasons for suggesting that the explanations of insight in the literature are 
theoretically impoverished, as well as the reasons for proposing that the key 
empirical findings are sufficiently clear and consistent to support a theoretical 
explication of insight, 
A review of insight in problem solving must begin with a consideration of problem 
solving in general before distinguishing insight as characteristic of a particular type 
of problem solving. Thus: 
1. a very brief historical overview of problem solving will be conducted, 
and; 
2. definitions and the scope of research on problem solving will be 
explored. 
3. Insight as a special type of problem solving distinct from insight 
characterised as intuition, creativity, or scientific discovery, will then 
be considered, and; 
4. a brief historical overview of insight will be conducted. 
5. Definitions of, and theoretical explanations for insight will then be 
explored; 
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6. Following this, the key empirical findings concerning insight in 
problem solving, with particular reference to empirical findings based 
on the well-researched nine-dot problem, will be outlined. 
7. Methodological considerations raised by these studies will be 
considered, and;. 
8. the perspective on insight which can be drawn from this integrated 
review, and which will then be utilised as a basis for the development 
of a theoretical perspective on insight, will be outlined as a conclusion 
to this chapter. 
This review will not be exhaustive - it does not have to be - but it does have to be 
comprehensive enough to reveal the extent of our knowledge concerning insight in 
problem solving. The body of research on this topic is not vast, and this is perhaps 
a further indication of the limited extent of our knowledge concerning the processes 
involved in insight. 
2.2.1. A brief historical overview of problem solving 
Historical overviews of research on a topic tend to lay bare the influence of 
theoretical assumptions, and thus allow us to choose with care our perspective on 
that topic. This overview of research on problem solving will be no different. 
The history of research on problem solving can be understood in terms of a 
pendulum swing between the two conceptions of problem solving Anderson (1993) 
identifies within the literature. The first conception is that the cognitive activities 
involved in problem solving can be understood in terms of principles of cognition 
which are far more general than problem solving; in terms of learning theory, 
perhaps, where obstacles are overcome by trial and error. The second is that 
problem solving is fundamental to all higher level cognition. 
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Learning experiments involving cats escaping from puzzle boxes, were conducted 
by Thorndike (1898, in Anderson, 1993) at about the same time as the birth of 
modern psychology. Thorndike concluded that the cats did not display any 
behaviour which could be characterised as problem solving, and that there was 
merely a learned strengthening of correct responses. Thus, early psychology 
viewed problem solving and learning as one and the same. 
The pendulum carried out its reverse swmg with Gestalt psychologists such as 
Kohler (1927), Ellis (1938), Maier (1940) and Duncker (1945), who considered 
problem solving to be one of the most prominent features of consciousness and its 
explanation to be one of the most important tasks facing psychology. 
Behaviourism saw problem solving consumed once more by learning theory, and it 
was only with the rise of cognitivism that problem solving celebrated its existence 
once more. This resulted in the authoritative work on problem solving: Newell 
and Simon's 1972 tome. Since then, problem solving has enjoyed a central place in 
cognitive science with the assertion that offering a comprehensive account of its 
features should be the goal of any credible theory of the mind's activity (Newell & 
Simon, 1972). 
2.2.2. Defining problem solving and outlining its scope 
Many researchers in problem solving seem to believe that individuals reading their 
research papers understand exactly what problem solving is, as they do not bother 
to define the central concept with which they are working. It could be suggested 
that they must, therefore, be utilising a layperson's definition of problem solving, 
one which any reader would understand. It cannot be because they assume a type of 
unified field theory toward the study of problem solving, if we accept van Lehn's 
(1989) proposal that there is no coherent theory of problem solving. While it is true 
that there appears to be no coherent theory of problem solving, viable theoretical 
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explications have been developed, and there is substantial agreement concerning 
operational definitions and the scope of problem solving. 
Frequent reference will be made in this chapter to the distinction between 
theoretical explanations and operational definitions, a distinction illustrated by 
Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991). They define a theoretical explanation, as the 
definition of a term at an abstract or conceptual level. An operational definition, on 
the other hand, is the meaning assigned to a term at the level of the empirical 
conditions or operations needed to measure it. The operational definition, 
therefore, renders a concept measurable. 
2.2.2.1. Toward a unital)' definition of problem solving 
A lay view of problem solving could be that it is the resolution of something that is 
difficult to deal with, or that constitutes some kind of impediment to progress. This 
suggests that a wide range of activity could be characterised as problem solving, 
and that people could be solving problems in much of their everyday tasks. This 
view is echoed by van Lehn (1989) who endorses what has become the traditional 
cognitive science perspective, in the statement that virtually any human activity 
could be viewed as problem solving. 2 Van Lehn, however, distinguishes this 
activity from the tasks studied in problem solving research. These tasks take 
minutes or hours to perform and are made up of externally observable actions, as 
well as a verbal protocol. The verbal protocol represents the problem solver's talk 
as they work, and is seen to represent an internal sequence of actions. Thus, the 
definition of problem solving is constrained by time and by its multi-step nature. 
This verbalisable, serial processing falls within the rubric of symbolic theory, and 
represents part of the traditional position on problem solving in cognitive science. 
2This could be seen as support for the notion that traditional cognitive science and symbolic theory 
constitute folk psychology. This notion is explored in chapter 3. 
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It characterises the approach adopted by much research on problem solving. This 
can be seen in Kotovsky and Simon (1990), Carlson, Khoo and Yaure (1990), 
Carlson and Yaure (1990), Elio and Scharf (1990) and Priest and Lindsay (1992), a 
few examples of researchers whose work has been published in a variety of 
prestigious cognitive psychology journals. This demonstrates the widespread 
acceptance of this approach. 
Of course, one cannot hope to reflect the symbolic perspective on problem solving, 
nor indeed define problem solving regardless of theoretical framework, without 
considering Newell and Simon's (1972) conception of problem solving. In their 
view, problem solving is the activity of intelligent adults who are confronted by a 
desired object and do not know immediately what series of actions to perform to 
acquire it. 
What is most interesting, is that the conception of problem solving formulated 
within neural network, connectionist, and parallel distributed processing research 
concurs with Newell and Simon's definition (see for instance Peng & Reggia, 1989; 
Lesser, 1991; Zualkernan & Johnson, 1992). The difference between these two 
perspectives lies in the theoretical conception of the cognitive processing involved 
in reaching problem solution and, to a lesser degree, in what is considered to be the 
appropriate province of research in problem solving. 
There is thus agreement in the literature concerning an operational definition of 
problem solving, as well as many of the features of problem solving and why they 
occur (as we will see more clearly in the following section). The concept has been 
explicated beyond an operational definition in terms of problem solution, but there 
are still differences in the theoretical definitions of problem solving. However, 
both the symbolic and neural network theoretical perspectives on problem solving 
have been fairly well developed, as we will consider in more detail in chapter three. 
What is important to note here, is that research in problem solving is unitary at the 
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operational level and has also seen the development of viable theoretical 
explanations to account for its phenomena. As we will see in sections 2.2.5 and 
2. 2. 8, this is not the case with insight. 
2.2.2.2. Some comments on the scope of problem solving 
It now seems appropriate to consider what is regarded as the province of research in 
problem solving - by sketching an outline of the scope of problem solving - before 
moving on to distinguish insight as a special type of problem solving. 
The most fitting place to begin an outline of the scope of problem solving is 
probably with Newell and Simon's (1972) work. They suggest that problem solving 
research should focus on short tasks, that it should be concerned mainly with 
performance, only a little with learning, and not at all with development, and that it 
should focus on the integrated activities that lead to problem solution. This brief 
seems to have been followed for more than 20 years in the research literature. 
Within this framework for problem solving, Newell and Simon also suggest that 
there are three main tasks covered by problem solving: chess, symbolic logic, and 
cryptarithmetic. This conception of the scope of problem solving has been 
expanded to cover such tasks as puzzle problems (see for e.g., Kotovsky & Simon, 
1990; Falk, 1992; Anderson, 1993), geometrical problems (see Metcalfe & 
Wiebe, 1987}, incremental problems (in Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987), logico-deductive 
problems (Best, 1990; Billman & Shaman, 1990; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1990; 
Rips, 1990), physics problems (Hardiman, Dufresse & Mestre, 1989; Elio & 
Scharf, 1990; Robertson, 1990}, and insight problems (Kaplan & Simon, 1990). 
Some indication of the expansion of scope is given by this list, though it is probably 
far from comprehensive. 
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Newell and Simon (1972) also suggest that problems of moderate difficulty are most 
appropriate for study. This has certainly not remained the case and the 
consideration of how people solve difficult problems has led to the study of 
differences in expert and novice problem solving, as well as a renewal of interest in 
insight problems. As van Lehn (1989) points out, the study of expert - novice 
differences dominated work on problem solving in the 1980's. (for some indication 
of the progress achieved here see, Elio & Scharf, 1990; Priest & Lindsay, 1992). 
A list of other features of problem solving which have been the subject of intense 
research since 1972, will serve to complete this very brief outline of the scope of 
this research are. Apart from a consideration of expertise, modem research on 
problem solving has concerned itself with questions concerning the use of domain 
specific knowledge (e.g., Ross, Ryan & Tenpenny, 1989; Bassok, 1990; Carlson 
& Yaure, 1990), transfer of knowledge from one problem or context to another 
(Ross & Kennedy, 1990; Reed & Bolstad, 1991; Gorrel, 1993,), the use of 
analogies (see, Novick & Holyoak, 1991), the use of heuristics (Durnin, 1991), 
incubation (Smith & Blankenship, 1991), and the difference between problem 
solving in knowledge rich and knowledge lean domains (e.g., Siegler, 1989). It is 
apparent from this list that the scope of problem solving has expanded greatly since 
the early 1990's and that it has seen the application of diverse concepts from 
cognitive theory. 
2.2.3 Distinguishing insight as a special type of problem solving 
Now that problem solving has been defined and its scope has been outlined, it 
becomes necessary to distinguish what we mean by insight in problem solving as 
opposed to insight as it is used in other contexts. This will involve delimiting the 
concept of insight as it is used in this thesis. 
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The most common use of the term insight in psychology, is to refer to insight 
achieved within the therapeutic context. This is not the conception of insight 
referred to here, and the discussion of insight in this thesis cannot be applied to the 
therapeutic context. 
Insight within psychology can also be take!} to imply intuition, creativity, and 
scientific discovery, as well as insight in problem solving. The final implication is 
the one investigated by this thesis. Intuition is not usually regarded to be within the 
realm of mainstream psychology. Creativity implies something novel (Martindale, 
1981}, whereas insight is unusual, but is not necessarily original. Scientific 
discovery is the concept closest to the formulation of insight endorsed by this thesis. 
It incorporates the shifts of paradigm referred to in chapter one and involves the 
reconception of known information (Jabri, 1988, 1991; Lamb, 1991). However, 
insight in problem solving is preferred as a topic of investigation for several 
reasons. 
First of all, it could be argued that much of scientific discovery depends on 
creativity and, as has already been highlighted, creativity and insight are different. 
Secondly, there is an established research tradition which investigates insight in 
problem solving and, although there has been some systematic research conducted 
on scientific discovery (e.g., Lamb, 1991}, no such claim can be made for insight in 
the context of discovery. The proposal of a viable theoretical model for a 
phenomenon must be based on a reasonably clear set of key empirical findings. 
This is possible for insight in problem solving, but not for scientific discovery. 
Finally, there are also severe methodological difficulties in studying scientific 
discovery. Almost anyone can potentially display insight in problem solving for a 
researcher to study, but moments of breakthrough in scientific thinking are reserved 
for individuals regarded as gifted scientists, whose sudden conceptual leaps are 
often not obligingly displayed for laboratory replication. This also suggests that 
insight in problem solving and insight in scientific discovery are different, and thus 
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that the application of findings obtained on scientific discovery, for instance, cannot 
be extended to insight. 
For these reasons, this thesis concerns itself with insight as a special type of 
problem solving. Van Lehn (1989) provides a neat conception of this. He suggests 
that, if problems are multi-step tasks in which no one step is critical, insight 
problems are multi-step tasks in which only some steps are crucial and difficult. 
The formulation of insight developed in this thesis does not agree with this position 
entirely, as it does not endorse the connotation that problem solving involves serial 
processing. However, the distinction does convey the manner in which insight is 
delimited for this undertaking. To more clearly distinguish insight as a special type 
of problem solving, a very brief historical overview of this topic is required as well 
as a more detailed consideration of definitions. 
2.2.4. A brief historical overview of insight in problem solving 
It is to be expected that the popularity of research in insight would wax and wane 
with interest in problem solving, particularly as we have confined ourselves here to 
a consideration of insight in problem solving. There are, however, certain 
interesting differences in the historical fortunes of these two research areas. These 
historical differences can, once more, be seen in the light of shifts in theoretical 
perspectives within psychology. 
Where research in problem solving can be traced back to the origins of modern 
psychology, this is not the case with the concept of insight. As Mayer (1995) points 
out, the theory of associationism (very briefly that the mind comprises pre-
established associations between ideas and that thinking one idea causes an 
individual to think another idea) dominated the conception of problem solving 
around the turn of the century. He therefore suggests that researchers such as 
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Thorndike would not have allowed any space for concepts such as insight within 
their research3• 
Interest in insight in problem solving can be traced back to Gestalt psychologists 
such as Kohler (1927), Petermann (1932), Maier and Schneirla (1935), Ellis (1938), 
Duncker (1945), and Kohler (1947). Insight, as defined by Gestalt psychology, was 
taken to be one of the central features of the Gestalt perception of human and animal 
mental functioning. Indeed, Ellis (1938) considered the mapping of the processes 
involved in insight to be one of the most important research tasks in psychology. 
The dominance of behaviourism squashed the central place insight had enjoyed 
within psychology and even Kohler (1947), though he still insisted that there was 
more to human psychology and thus more to insight than stimulus response 
learning, conceded that questions concerning the nature of insight no longer seemed 
to have a place within psychology. 
It seems inevitable, though, that with the substantial interest in problem solving 
provoked by cognitivism, the unresolved debate concerning the existence of insight 
should surface once more. The most vociferous voices in this era are those of 
Robert Weisberg, Joseph Alba, and Roger Dominowski (e.g., Weisberg & Alba, 
1981a, 1981b; Dominowski, 1981). From approximately 1980 onwards, more 
work on insight seems to have been conducted than in the previous 65 years. Most 
of the work conducted in the last fifteen years seems to accept the existence of 
insight as a process that we still need to explain. This will be more clearly 
illustrated in the following section, where definitions of insight used in the literature 
will be examined and where theoretical explanations of insight in the literature will 
be reviewed. 
3While it is true that the theory of associationism cannot account for insight- because presentation of a 
problem will always cause the same response and, therefore, novelty is not really possible- the 
tendency to learn associations between particular concepts can account for some of the features of 
insight (such as fixation), as we will see in chapter 4. 
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2.2.5. Definitions of insight. theoretical explanations. and the case of 
operationalism 
The task of this section of the review of literature on insight in problem solving is 
to consider definitions and theoretical explanations of insight offered by researchers 
working within the three approaches to the study of insight, identified in section 
2.1. It may seem strange to consider definitions and theoretical explanations of a 
concept before reviewing the empirical findings of studies on insight. There are, 
however, two reasons for doing so. 
First of all, though researchers can be divided into different groups on the basis of 
the assumptions they endorse in their approach to insight, assumptions which are 
clearly tied to the definitions of and theoretical explanations for insight which they 
offer, they are united by the key empirical findings they present. As will be 
demonstrated, the empirical findings are consistent regardless of the underlying 
approach to insight. Where differences are offered within the literature they can be 
accounted for by interpretation or methodological considerations. To illuminate this 
for the reader, it is necessary to consider the definitions and theoretical explanations 
within each approach before proceeding to a unified summary of the key empirical 
findings on insight in problem solving. 
The second reason for structuring the review of literature on insight in this way, is 
because there are very few differences between the definitions and the theoretical 
explanations offered for insight. What is meant by this is that there is no clear 
distinction between what has been offered as a definition of insight (which one 
would expect to be operational in nature) and the theoretical or conceptual 
explication of insight. The argument which will be presented here is that 
explanations of insight are theoretically impoverished, that the exploration of insight 
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at the conceptual level is not sound, and that only an operational definition of 
insight can be accepted from the literature. 
Now that the reasons for structuring this section in the shape that the reader will 
now find it have been made clear, a review of the definitions and theoretical 
explanations of insight within the three approaches can be conducted. A case will 
also be made for dismissing the first two approaches as unfeasible and for 
positioning the theoretical and empirical work of this thesis clearly within the third 
approach to insight: namely, that insight does exist as a process which as yet 
remains unexplained. 
2.2.5.1. Insight? What insight? 
Researchers whose work has been grouped together here, share the perspective that 
insight as a special process does not exist and that the term itself is useless. This is 
most clearly demonstrated by the work of Weisberg and Suls (1973), who avoid 
using the term insight altogether, even though they present a series of experiments 
investigating what they refer to as Duncker's candle problem. This problem is later 
referred to by Weisberg and Alba (1981a) as one of the typical so-called insight 
problems. The remaining work positioned here explicitly states that insight does 
not exist and that further use of the term is pointless (Weisberg & Alba, 1981a, 
1981b, 1982; Lamb, 1991; Weisberg, 1992, 1995). 
This assertion concerning the futility of pursuing insight is supported in two ways 
[and this is most clearly evident in Weisberg and Alba (1981a) where they present 
their findings from a series of ten experiments]. The first of these is by defining an 
insight problem instead of defining insight, and the second is by adopting a 
particular theoretical approach to the study of these problems based on learning 
theory. 
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Insight problems can be defined as: difficult; problems which seem to require the 
application of a particular type of past experience, but in fact cannot be solved by 
the application of this experience; and as problems which are only solved when 
appropriate past experience is brought to bear on them (Weisberg & Alba, 1981a). 
This definition is used within the literature to argue that the so-called insight 
problems are merely slightly different to the norm, but are solved by the same 
processes as those involved in any form of problem solving. These are taken to be 
the application of past experience (my emphasis) in a step by step fashion, within 
the boundaries of particular problem conceptions. In other words, when presented 
with a problem, the problem solver draws on past experience to categorise the 
problem and then works systematically through his/her knowledge to reach a 
solution. If a solution does not occur, past experience is consulted to see whether 
the original categorisation is in fact correct and, if there is a suspicion that it is not, 
an alternative categorisation is applied and explored on the basis of past experience, 
in a systematic manner. 
What we see here, in this explanation of the solution of insight and other problems, 
is a borrowing of concepts from Newell and Simon's (1972) concept of problem 
solving (the notion of problem domains and the serial search through that problem 
space, which we will explore in section 2.2.5.3), within a formulation of problem 
solving that clearly rests on learning theory. Thus, problems are solved only by the 
application of past experience. 
As we saw in the historical overview of problem solving, this approach belongs to 
the conception of problem solving as explained by far more general principles of 
cognition, and which has its origins in behaviourism. If this conception has no 
place for insight it also has no real place for the study of problem solving at all. 
The importance which we have seen so many researchers since 1972 accord to 
problem solving as a fundamental aspect of human cognition suggests that we 
cannot take this approach seriously. Added to this, is the fact that no explanation is 
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given of the manner in which past experience is selected, applied, and analysed, in 
which alternative past experience is selected, applied, and analysed, or in which 
conclusions concerning the initial problem are drawn. Also, Metcalfe (1986b) has 
provided strong evidence which suggests that insightful problem solving does not 
occur by means of the step by step application of past experience. This explanation 
of insight based on past experience is clearly theoretically impoverished, and does 
no more than support the definition of an insight problem. 
In conclusion, the approach to insight which suggests the term be abandoned, rests 
on a theoretical approach which can never account comprehensively for the features 
of problem solving and which can therefore not be endorsed for the purposes of this 
thesis. What it does provide, however, is an operational definition of insight. 
Insight problems are clearly defined, and we can therefore identify problems that 
can be placed in this class. The solution of these problems must be achieved by 
whatever processes are required to display insight, as we have clearly rejected the 
notion that insight does not exist. The solution of one of these problems therefore 
provides us with an operational definition of insight. 
2.2.5.2. A mystical phenomenon 
It seems rather strange to accord space within a psychology thesis to any conception 
of cognitive processing phrased in mystical terms. The inclination is to dismiss 
such a claim out of hand. However, this approach to the study of insight must be 
accorded some space for three reasons. First of all, this approach is what 
characterises the Gestalt perspective on insight and it was, after all, the Gestalt 
psychologists who pioneered research in problem solving. Secondly, Kohler (1947) 
has asserted that the claim to a mystical or supernatural phenomenon was not what 
he intended. Finally, this conception of insight continues to be given voice amongst 
researchers in more recent times. Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano and Yaniv 
(1995) define insight as seeing and understanding the inner nature of things (like 
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problems) clearly, especially by intuition. Intuition is taken to be the immediate 
knowing of something without the conscious use of reasoning. The mystical 
conception of insight has also recently been endorsed by researchers interested in 
creativity and scientific discovery, albeit only in their claims that insight is the 
province of great scientific and creative minds. This renders insight a seemingly 
mystical and supernatural feat (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer, 1995). 
Therefore, let us briefly consider Gestalt definitions and theoretical explanations for 
insight. 
Dominowski (1981) highlights the fact that Gestalt psychologists have referred to 
insight as a mystical process which somehow precedes solution to a difficult 
problem and, indeed, this is one of the main criticisms Weisberg and Alba (1981a) 
level at the use of the term insight. While there does not appear to be a clear 
statement in the Gestalt literature that insight is mystical, it is true that even when 
refuting the claim that Gestaltists had rendered insight mystical, Kohler (1947) 
makes his re-definition of insight mysterious. Here, he defines insight as the direct 
awareness of determination, where determination refers to the state of one part of a 
whole being caused by its position within and relation to that whole. This is not 
dissimilar to his 1927 definition of insight as the appearance of a complete solution 
with reference to the whole lay-out of the field, a definition endorsed by Tsai 
(1981a, 1981b), where insight is defined as the perception of relationships between 
parts of a complex field leading to a sudden solution to a problem. These 
definitions are more clearly framed in problem solving terms by Scheerer (1963) 
who defines insight as the proper perception of the requirements of a problem r 
leading to a subjective aha! experience and problem solution, and Gardner (1978) 
who defines insight as an aha! experience, or a sudden hunch leading to an elegant 
solution to a problem. 
The theoretical explanation offered by Gestalt psychologists for insight is poor. 
The manner in which determination is recognised, in which perception of the whole 
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field is achieved, in which proper perception of the requirements of the problem are 
reached, and indeed the means by which a solution is reached, are all left 
unexplained. This conception of insight may rest on the vital recognition that the 
whole operates at a level beyond the functioning of its parts, but this entire process 
remains mysterious. To suggest that this process is considered mystical or 
supernatural must, however, represent a subjective interpretation, as this is not 
clearly suggested by the Gestalt literature. 
What we can draw from this literature, is further support for our operational 
definition of insight in terms of problem solution. If proper perception of the 
problem must occur before insight can be displayed, it means that there must be a 
tendency to first adopt an improper perception. Thus, these problems lead the 
problem solver to first view them in one way, a manner in which solution is not 
possible, before they are viewed in a manner from which solution is possible. This 
is very similar to the operational definition derived in section 2.2.5.1. 
2.2.5.3. Insight ... to be explained 
The work which is grouped here may represent different conceptions of insight, but 
it does share the fundamental assumption that insight as a cognitive process does 
exist and that it still needs to be properly explained. There is also a general feeling 
that an account of the processes involved in insight should be sought amongst 
theories of cognitive processing embraced by cognitive psychology and cognitive 
science, in particular from aspects of symbolic theory. This is probably a result of 
the dominant position symbolic theory has enjoyed in cognitive science. It will be 
demonstrated, by considering definitions and theoretical explanations of insight 
provided by the work reviewed here, that the explanations offered from within this 
perspective have so far proved to be inadequate. This is not to suggest that a 
symbolic theoretical account of insight has been properly written - it has not. 
However, it will be strongly suggested that this theoretical conception of cognition 
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is not the best place to begin an explanation of insight, given the nature of the key 
empirical findings on insight and given that the strengths and weaknesses of 
symbolic theory do not render it particularly amenable to a conception of insight (as 
we will see in chapter three). 
Three definitions of insight are evident in the work grouped here. All three utilise 
the same theoretical conception of insight, one which does little to advance the 
formulation of insight beyond the operational level. The first of these definitions is 
most clearly operational: insight is the process by means of which insight problems 
are solved (Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b, Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Schooler, Ohlsson 
& Brooks, 1993). Insight has also been defined as the cognitive processes involved 
in the subjective aha! experience during problem solving (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; 
Davidson, 1995). This definition is also clearly measurable and the processes 
involved in insight are left unexplained. The third definition of insight rests on 
James's (1890, in Lockhart, Lamon & Gick, 1988) notion of sagacity. 
Sagacity is interpreted as the skill of constructing or selecting appropriate 
representations (of problem formulations in this case), and thus insight is defmed as 
the achievement of a problem solution following an initial failure of sagacity 
(Lockhart, Lamon & Gick, 1988; Gick & Lockhart, 1995). This defmition of 
insight is also clearly measurable. It also alludes to the conceptual definition of 
insight utilised by researchers placed in this group. As well as proposing a 
definition of insight in terms of problem solution, this definition also refers to the 
conceptual definition of insight - that insight can be understood in terms of problem 
representations. Let us now consider the extent of this theoretical conception of 
insight. 
It has been repeatedly stated in the literature that we know very little concerning the 
processes involved in achieving insight (e.g., Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Metcalfe, 
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1995). Even amongst work which assumes that insight can be explained, little real 
theoretical advance has occurred. 
Traditional theories of cognitive processing have been drawn on to suggest that, 
when confronted with an insight problem, problem solvers select a problem domain 
or representation based on the formulation of the problem. This problem space is 
then systematically worked through in a serial fashion, in an attempt to solve the 
problem. When the solution is not found within this representation (remember that 
this must happen by definition) the problem solver casts around for an alternative 
representation and begins the solution attempt once more. A period of incubation 
may precede selection of the correct problem space. Following the selection of the 
problem representation which contains the solution, the obviousness of this solution 
strikes the problem solver with such force that it is experienced as an aha! 
experience. This conception of insight is most clearly stated by Kaplan and Simon 
(1990). 
If this conception is examined more closely, however, it does little to further the 
explanation of insight beyond the operational level. The processes involved in 
selecting, searching, and changing representation, as well as assessing possible 
problem solutions, remain unexplained. Suggestions such as the switch of 
representation depending on dissatisfaction with the current representation and 
appropriate cues to guide the search for a new representation (Kaplan & Simon, 
1990) do not really advance our understanding of the manner in which insight is 
achieved. What we see here is an elaboration of the definition of insight - it is 
selecting a correct problem representation after first selecting an inappropriate one. 
It is accepted that this has occurred when the problem is solved. 
It is possible to offer a counter argument here. This argument would suggest that 
the detailed explanation of cognitive processes is not the goal of symbolic theory 







describe the manner in which semantic rules govern cognition. Surely what we 
have seen as an explanation of insight from within symbolic theory does not even 
accomplish this. Stating that insight involves the selection of an appropriate 
problem representation by means of a search constrained by perceptual cues of the 
problem, hints provided by the experimenter, prior knowledge belonging to the 
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problem solvers, and heuristics hardly lays bare the rule-based fashion in which 
cognition operates. Also, if it is possible to achieve an explanation of the processes 
involved in cognitive processing, why should we not attempt to do so? This 
explanation seems particularly worthy of pursuit, as it could provide us with the 
potential to teach more people to think insightfully. 
In conclusion, we have seen that three approaches have been adopted to the study of 
insight, two of which seem unacceptable (the notion that insight does not exist and 
the notion that insight is a mystical process). The approach which suggests that 
insight is a process which is potentially explainable is the only one which seems 
compatible with an attempt to understand insight. All three approaches have 
provided us with an operational definition of insight, one which is stated at the level 
of the insight problem. In these terms insight can be operationally defined as the 
process (or processes) by means of which problems whose formulation is 
ambiguous, and for which only the non-obvious conceptualisation is appropriate, 
are solved. It will be the work of chapter four to propose a theoretical explanation 
of the process of insight. Before doing so, it is necessary to outline the key 
empirical findings concerning insight. It is on the basis of these findings that 
researchers have proposed the existence of insight as a cognitive process, and it is 
for these findings which a theoretical explanation of insight will have to account. 
2.2.6. Empirical findings 
It has already been suggested that the key empirical findings on insight in problem 
solving are consistent across the three approaches to defining and explaining insight 
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theoretically, and that the findings will therefore be integrated in this review. Most 
of the empirical findings reported here are based on experiments conducted with the 
nine-dot problem. This is because it has been the most well-researched of all of the 
insight problems, as well as forming the focus of the debate that saw the renewal of 
interest in insight in the 1980's (see Weisberg & Alba, 1981a, 1981b; 
Dominowski, 1981; Ellen, 1982). Where findings are not based on the nine-dot 
problem, or where this problem produces different data to other insight problems, 
this will be indicated. 
2.2.6.1. Problem difficulty 
Problem difficulty is one of the defining features of insight problems. In fact, they 
are so difficult that the majority of problem solvers do not reach problem solution 
even when given an extended period of time in which to work on them. For 
example, Weisberg and Alba (1981a) report that none of their subjects correctly 
solved the nine-dot problem within 20 attempts, while Lung and Dominowski 
(1985) report that 9,38% of their subjects correctly solved the problem within the 
same number of attempts. Kaplan and Simon (1990) present similar findings 
concerning the difficulty of the mutilated checkerboard problem4 • In particular, 
they report on a graduate student in chemical engineering who spent 18 hours 
working on the problem and still did not manage to solve it. 
4
The mutilated checkerboard problem involves presenting the problem solver with a checkerboard 
from which two opposing comers have been removed. The problem solver is infonned that there are 
62 squares remaining on the board, and that they must attempt to cover these squares with 31 
dominoes, where a domino can cover two adjacent squares, but cannot cover squares which are on 
diagonals. The problem solver is required to cover all of the remaining squares on the board with the 
dominoes, or to prove that it is impossible to do so. The solution to the problem is that it is impossible 
to cover all of the squares with the 31 dominoes and this rests on the recognition that a domino must 
cover one black and one white square and as the two opposite comers are the same colour, there are an 
uneven number of black and white squares left to cover. The reader is referred to appendix l for a 
copy of the problem and its solution. 
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It has been suggested (Weisberg & Alba, 1981a) that the nine-dot problem is 
distinct from other insight problems in that, even after the appropriate problem 
representation is obtained, the problem is still difficult. Indeed, they suggest that 
the problem is so difficult that even when problem solvers are familiar with the 
problem and its solution, they struggle to solve the problem. While it is true that 
there is still some work to do to solve the nine-dot problem (please refer to 
appendix 1 for a copy of the problem and its solution) once the problem solver 
realises that solution depends on extending the lines outside the square connoted by 
the dots, it has not been demonstrated that the processes involved in solving this 
problem are any different to other insight problems. It is particularly unlikely that 
this will be demonstrated when one considers that the ambiguous formulation and 
the need to realise a non-obvious solution, the defining features of an insight 
problem, are present in the nine-dot problem. 
2.2.6.2. Inappropriate problem conception 
Linked to the difficulty of insight problems, is the finding which most clearly 
distinguishes insight problems from non-insight problems - the consistency with 
which problem solvers adopt an initial conception of the problem which makes it 
difficult to solve. Indeed, Dominowski and Dallob (1995) stress the invariant 
nature of this feature of the nine-dot and other insight problems, in defining insight. 
Also, no studies could be found in the literature which contradicted this aspect of 
the empirical findings. 
2.2.6.3. Persistence 
Persistence refers to the tenacity with which problem solvers pursue a problem 
solution within their initial problem conception. The term persistence is preferred 
to the term fixation, as fixation implies the Gestalt notion that the problem solver is 
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perceptually stuck on the shape of the square connoted by the nine-dot problem, for. 
There is evidence that suggests it is not necessarily the shape of the square which 
impedes problem solution (see Weisberg & Alba, 1981a, 1981b). There is, 
however, ample evidence to support the notion of persistence, a substantial volume 
of which is reviewed by Seifert et al (1995). As an example of persistence, Kaplan 
and Simon (1990) report that in their experiments with the mutilated checkerboard 
problem, subjects would persist with their initial problem conception until they 
were told that it was impossible to solve the problem in this way. 
2.2.6.4. Appropriate problem conception 
In reaching problem solution, persistence is followed by the selection of an 
appropriate problem conception. It is consistently reported that problem solvers 
who solve insight problems do so by changing the manner in which they understand 
the problem requirements. This is seen in the nine-dot problem with the realisation 
that the space outside of the dots is also available for so-called line-extensions 
(Weisberg & Alba, 1981a; Lung & Dominowski, 1985). It is also evident with the 
mutilated checkerboard problem, where Kaplan and Simon (1990) manipulate the 
salience of the colour of the squares, encouraging subjects to shift their 
understanding of the problem from the number of squares in total to the number of 
squares of different colours. 
2.2.6.5. Incubation 
Problem solution, or appropriate problem conception, is often preceded by a period 
of incubation. Incubation has been defined as a period of inactivity between active 
work on the problem and achievement of resolution, during which progress is 
somehow made nonetheless (Perkins, 1995). The least consistent of the findings 
reported here are linked to incubation and insight. Dominowski and Jenrick (1972) 
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and Olton and Johnson (1976) failed to find laboratory evidence for an incubation 
effect, while Dreistadt (1969) and Smith and Blankenship (1991) did, a finding 
which supports anecdotal evidence (Smith, 1995). The contradictions in findings 
could be due to differences in method and Smith (1995) provides a strong case for 
this, while suggesting that incubation effects are very real in producing insight. 
2.2.6.6. Facilitation 
Research attention has been given to the means by which solution on insight 
problems can be facilitated. This has involved studying the effects of fairly specific 
hints for particular insight problems. For example, Weisberg and Alba (1981a) and 
Lung and Dominowski (1985) consider the effect of dot problems which encourage 
line extensions, on solution of the nine-dot problem. This involves presenting 
problem solvers with a problem that requires them to connect dots, but makes the 
need to draw lines beyond the dots on the page far more obvious than for the nine-
dot problem. The four dot problem is an example which places four dots in the 
shape of an incomplete triangle. Problem solvers are asked to connect the dots with 
four straight lines, and the triangular shape of the problem facilitates the realisation 
that the problem can only be solved by drawing lines beyond the dots. It was found 
that specific hints did facilitate solution of the nine-dot problem. Indeed, the 
percentage of problem solvers who correctly solved the nine-dot problem rose from 
0-9 %, to between 43% and 100%. Kaplan and Simon (1990) also found that 
drawing attention to the parity of the squares in the mutilated checkerboard problem 
significantly facilitated solution on that problem. 
While the effect of problem specific hints on facilitation of insight problem 
solutions has been studied, the effect of more general facilitation has not. No 
consideration has, for instance, been accorded the notion that making explicit the 
manner in which insight problems prompt an inappropriate problem 
conceptualisation could facilitate solution. In other words, would facilitation on 
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insight problems occur by telling problem solvers that insight problems are 
ambiguous and that they require a non-obvious solution? Also, no consideration has 
been given to the effect of presenting problems whose characteristics require a 
problem solution that might overcome the assumptions usually brought to bear on a 
particular insight problem, other than by providing an alternative form of a given 
problem. This would involve presenting problem solvers with a problem which 
demonstrates the possibility of using blank spaces on the page, but is not itself a dot 
problem. 
2.2.6.7. Transfer 
Linked to the concept of facilitation is the notion of transfer of information one 
problem to another solution attempt. Lockhart, Lamon and Gick (1988) state that 
most studies have found no effect of transfer for insight problems. Based on their 
experimental evidence, they conclude that transfer from one problem to a target 
problem can only be facilitated when puzzlement has been induced prior to 
presentation of solution for the transferable problem. They use this fmding to 
suggest that the mere presentation of information content is not significantly 
transferred, but that the conceptual processing involved in insight problem solving 
is. Again, there has been no clear study of the notion that the processing of one 
insight problem can be transferred to another insight problem. 
2.2.6.8. Expertise 
Linked to this are the findings concerning expertise in insight problem solving. 
Data is available on the effect of being an expert in a knowledge domain that might 
be activated by an insight problem. For instance, Kaplan and Simon (1990) found 
that individuals who were highly proficient in mathematics tended to take longer to 
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solve the mutilated checkerboard problem. This is because they spend more time 
considering the number of squares in total prior to recognising the implications of 
the colour of the squares. It is as if this expertise reinforces the initial, incorrect 
problem representation. What has not been considered, is the effect of expertise in 
the cognitive processing involved in solving insight problems. Perhaps it is possible 
to be an expert at solving insight problems, particularly if you are immediately 
looking for the non-obvious problem conception. 
2.2.6.9. Inability to predict success or failure 
In a convincing senes of studies Janet Metcalfe has found that while problem 
solvers can predict impending success or failure at solving non-insight problems, 
they cannot do so for insight problems (Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & 
Weihe, 1987). What has been found, is that predictions of imminent success 
usually predict failure. This has been used to provide clear support for the 
existence of insight as a process which is distinct from ordinary problem solving. 
2.2.6.10. Suppression of insight by verbalisation 
Two recent studies have provided substantial evidence that verbalising while 
attempting to solve an insight problem significantly inhibits the ability to achieve 
insight (Mathews, Buss & Kotler-Cope, 1989; Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks, 1993). 
This complements the evidence reported by Kaplan and Simon (1990) which 
suggests that the crucial cognitive steps taken to achieve insight are not present in 
the verbal protocol of subjects who solve the mutilated checkerboard problem. 
When verbal protocols produced by individuals who have solved non-insight 
problems are given to new problem solvers they can follow the protocol in a step by 
step fashion and solve the problem themselves. This cannot be accomplished with 
insight problems. The processes involved in attaining insight are somehow not 
verbalisable. 
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2.2.7. Some methodological considerations 
Now that the key empirical findings on insight have been outlined, it seems 
necessary to raise some methodological considerations with respect to the studies on 
which these findings are based. 
First of all, the empirical data comes from experimental studies. However, the data 
are often not interpreted strictly on the basis of the experimental findings. Protocol 
analysis is used to provide an over-riding interpretation of the data. Verbal 
protocols are taken to be a report of the subject's own mental states and mental 
processing. Their analysis is taken as a statement of the cognitive processing 
involved in tasks such as problem solving (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Given that 
the processes involved in insight are not verbalisable, these interpretations must be 
suspect. It is perhaps necessary to explore the phenomenon of insight without the 
use of protocol analysis. 
Secondly, findings are often based on a limited number of subjects. For example, 
Kaplan and Simon's (1990) conclusions are based on only 23 subjects and Weisberg 
and Alba's (1981a) strong contention concerning the lack of evidence for the 
existence of insight is partly based on the data from only 15 subjects who were 
required to solve the nine-dot problem in its original format. It seems to be 
necessary to increase the subject numbers used in studies on insight in problem 
solving. This will allow us not only to describe the features of insight in more 
depth. 
The limited subject numbers in research on insight seem to be due to the perceived 
necessity of testing subjects individually. This is most time consuming and costly, 
and it is therefore understandable that subject numbers for these studies are limited. 
This should not, however, allow us to ignore the need to base our conclusions on 
adequate subject numbers and perhaps it is viable to consider testing subjects in 
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groups, particularly if we consider the collection of verbal protocols to be 
unnecessary in furthering our understanding of insight. 
A final striking methodological feature of the empirical studies on insight is the 
focus on solution attempts to determine s..uccess at problem solving. How can one 
possibly define what constitutes one solution attempt? Surely the time taken to 
solve a problem, or the failure to solve a problem within an allotted time period, is 
a far more objective and useful measure to use in the study of insight problem 
solving. Indeed, many studies take this time in to consideration, but their data are 
still reported in terms of number of solution attempts. My solution attempt might 
constitute far more or far less processing than your solution attempt. 
Despite these methodological considerations, it must be acknowledged that the 
empirical findings on insight in problem solving are surprisingly clear and strikingly 
consistent, particularly when one considers the disparate nature of the conceptions 
of insight utilised by various researchers. These findings certainly beg the 
formulation of a theoretical account which hopes to explain the processing involved 
in insightful problem solution. 
2.2.8. Chapter conclusions 
This review of literature on insight in problem solving has demonstrated the 
disparate nature of the formulations of insight, as well as the poor theoretical 
explanations of insight, despite the clear and consistent nature of the empirical 
findings. This provides support for the notion that we have no adequate 
understanding of the processes involved in attaining insight. A tenable theory of 
insight would surely see researchers reaching some degree of agreement concerning 
a perspective on insight, such as we see in the literature on problem solving. This 
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should particularly be the case as it is not really possible to disagree widely on the 
empirical findings produced by research on insight in problem solving. 
It is therefore postulated that the important work still to be conducted on insight is 
to propose a theory of insight in problem solving which can account for the 
empirical findings detailed in this chapter. This theory should also incorporate 
important aspects of the general literature on problem solving which have not been 
clearly applied to insight in the past, such as the concept of expertise. 
Although no comprehensive theory of any aspect of cognition can be established in 
one piece of work5 and theories should always be open to critique and re-writing, 
this is the work which the rest of this thesis endeavours to tackle. This will by no 
means be put forward as the formulation of insight in problem solving, but it will 
be tentatively suggested that with this work we take one tiny step closer to the 
mark. 
It now becomes necessary to decide on a theory of cognition, within which to write 
a conceptual account of insight. After all, any aspect of cognition must fit within a 
general framework of cognitive processing. The selection of this general 
framework constitutes the agenda for chapter three. 
5It could also be suggested that no adequate theory of any aspect of cognition can be offered until we 




THE DIVIDE BETWEEN SYMBOLIC THEORY AND 
NEURAL NETWORK THEORY 
3 .1 Introduction 
Almost everyone who is discontent with contemporary cognitive 
psychology and current 'information processing' models of the 
mind has rushed to embrace 'the Connectionist alternative'. 
When taken as a way of modeling cognitive architecture, 
Connectionism really does represent an approach that is quite 
different from that of the Classical cognitive science that it seeks 
to replace. Classical models of the mind were derived from the 
structure of Turing and Von Neumann machines. . . . In contrast, 
Connectionists propose to design systems that can exhibit 
intelligent behaviour without storing, retrieving, or otherwise 
operating on structured symbolic expressions. The style of 
processing carried out in such models is thus strikingly unlike 
what goes on when conventional machines are computing some 
function. 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988, pp.4-5) 
The review of literature on insight in- problem solving which constituted chapter 
two, illustrated that the theoretical explication of insight is very poor despite both 
the long history which the study of insight has enjoyed and the clear and consistent 
nature of the empirical findings on insight. It therefore seems evident that the work 
still to be conducted in the study of insight in problem solving, is the writing of a 
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viable theoretical account of the processes that lead to insight. As this thesis 
endeavours to take a tiny step toward this goal by developing a possible theoretical 
explanation for the processes involved in insight, it becomes necessary to consider 
how the cognitive processing involved in insight might be explained. Thus, the 
purpose of this chapter is to outline a general theoretical framework of cognitive 
processing within which to write a conceptual account of the processes involved in 
attaining insight in problem solving. At the same time, by considering the current 
theoretical upheaval in cognitive theory, this work will be positioned within the 
endeavour of re-writing cognitive processes in neural network theoretical terms. 
The quotation with which this section opened clearly demonstrates that there are 
only two real contenders at present for the title of Most Viable Theory of 
Cognition. These are: the current title holder, "Classical cognitive science", 
which we have seen (in chapter one) constitutes Symbolic theory; and the number 
one contender, "Connectionism" or, in the terminology endorsed by this thesis, 
Neural Network theory. As this quotation also suggests, though rather less directly, 
there is a distinct degree of tension between adherents of these two approaches. 
This tension has led to a theoretical sparring match in cognitive science and 
cognitive psychology, between the dominant conception of cognition and the would-
be usurper. This tension must be examined before a theoretical account of insight 
can be written. 
It is proposed that a consideration of the literature which reflects the current 
sparring match in cognitive theorising reveals that the dominance of symbolic 
theory as a theory of cognition is the result of historical processes. Thus, the 
dominance of symbolic theory as an explanation of cognition can be seen as 
historically coincidental. This dominance has many theoretical assumptions 
associated with it which are carried over to the study of cognitive phenomena, and 
these assumptions have not been seriously questioned. It will also be suggested that 
the renewed interest which neural network theory is enjoying is not only a result of 
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more recent historical factors, but also reflects a recognition of the need to question 
the assumptions symbolic theory makes concerning cognition. This is over and 
above a recognition of the special characteristics of neural network theory. It is 
from a combination of these factors that the current tension between these two 
theories seems to emerge. 
Although neural network theory brings its own theoretical assumptions to bear on 
the study of cognitive phenomena, no resolution of this theoretical tension can be 
contemplated before the potential of neural network theory has been explored. It is 
therefore proposed that the re-writing of cognitive phenomena in neural network 
terms is necessary in the light of this theoretical tension, as well as offering the 
potential of advancing our understanding of phenomena which have been 
inadequately explained by symbolic theory. One of these phenomena is insight. 
3.2. The sparring match in cognitive science and cognitive psychology 
In order to propose that the re-writing of insight in neural network theoretical terms 
is necessary and that it will provide a viable account of insight, it is important to 
understand the source of the tension between symbolic theory and neural network 
theory. Insight has only really been explored in symbolic theoretical terms within 
cognitive theorising and an exploration of the tension between symbolic theory and 
neural network theory will provide some justification for the suggestion that insight 
can be profitably conceptualised in neural network terms. Examining the tension 
between these two theories will involve: 
1. a consideration of the histories of the two contenders in the cognitive 
science arena. 
2. An elaboration of the symbolic theoretical perspective on cognition and; 
3. an elaboration of the neural network theoretical perspective on cognition. 
4. A consideration of the differences between these two perspectives and; 
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5. motivation for the suggestion that neural network theory is an 
appropriate theoretical framework within which to write a viable account 
of insight. 
Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to suggest that one of these theories 
should be accepted as the account of cognition, it is impossible to remain neutral in 
the light of this tension. After all, an explanation of a cognitive phenomenon 
cannot be atheoretical, particularly if we accept Danziger's (1986) contention that 
we cast our theoretical net over everything we observe. This review of cognitive 
theorising will reflect this lack of theoretical neutrality, in such literal features as 
the space given to a consideration of each of the cognitive theories, as well as in the 
suggestion that neural network theory is an appropriate theoretical framework to 
conceptualise cognition. 
3.2.1. A brief historical account of the sparring match in cognitive science 
Examining the historical processes by means of which symbolic theory has become 
enthroned as the dominant conception of cognitive processing will render the 
theoretical assumptions which this dominance carries with it available for scrutiny. 
It will be suggested that the dominance of symbolic theory is a result of historical 
factors associated with the development of the digital computer, the paradigmatic 
shift from behaviourism to cognitivism and the development of symbolic theory at 
this time, and the rise and fall of neural network theory. The coincidental nature of 
these historical factors has gone largely unquestioned and it is, therefore, necessary 
to explicitly state these historical processes and the related theoretical assumptions 
symbolic theory inherited. It is only with the return of interest in neural network 
theory that these assumptions have been questioned, and this has contributed to the 
current tension in cognitive theory. 
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3. 2 .1.1. The dominance of symbolic theory 
A clear perspective on the recent historical developments in the study of cognition 
which led to cognitive science becoming synonymous with symbolic theory, is 
offered by Johnson-Laird (1988). It begins with the concurrent existence of 
Behaviourism and Gestalt psychology, with a clear strand being drawn from Gestalt 
psychology to symbolic theory. Gestalt psychology accorded prime importance to 
the structural relations in perception and sought laws to explain this structure, rather 
than conducting an exploration of mental processes. 
At the same time in linguistics, however, de Saussure developed the notion of the 
signifier and the signified. A sign or symbol, usually a word, signified an object in 
the real world. These two theoretical perspectives came together in the framework 
of Structuralism and within this framework, Piaget proposed that thought developed 
from internalising one's own actions. Structuralism, in these terms, was not formal 
enough to study mental processing. However, this was changed with the 
development of the digital computer and the rise of information processing theory 
which it was to herald. 
By the mid 1950's, researchers Herbert Simon and Allen Newell had developed 
programmes to run on digital computers which could conduct logical proofs, 
something that had been the province of the human mind until then. With the death 
knell being rung by Chomsky's attack on the behaviourist conception of learning in 
language acquisition and use, psychology returned once more to the study of the 
mind. The computer, with its newly developed programmes which could perform 
some of the functions of human cognition, provided an exciting new metaphor 
which tied mind and body together in computer hardware and software and which 
allowed the formal study of mental processes which structuralism had, until then, 
been unable to provide. The computer operated as a symbol processor, running 
programmes which provided instructions for locating symbol tokens in various 
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physical locations and processing them in a rule-based fashion. This metaphor was 
transferred directly to the operation of the brain and the mind, with the brain 
providing the physical locations upon which the mind could operate as a symbol 
processor. Therefore, symbolic theory and cognitive theory became one and the 
same with the development of the digital computer. 
This is only one historical perspective on the rise of cognitivism, one offered by a 
proponent of symbolic theory. Let us go beyond this account of the co-occurence 
of the invention of the digital computer and the rise of cognitive psychology and 
consider how these developments led to the theoretical assumptions of this 
conception of cognition. 
The fact that symbolic, computer based architectures could display some of the 
features of human cognition was taken to mean that this must provide an accurate 
account of the manner in which human cognitive processing occurs. It is entirely 
conceivable that, although computer and mind achieve similar end results, they do 
so in a very different fashion. This is a general criticism of the methods used in 
cognitive science and we will see that this criticism can also be levelled at neural 
network theory. However, add to this the fact that the structure of computer 
hardware is very unlike the structure of the brain and the assumption that cognitive 
processing must occur in the same fashion as the computer is rendered more open to 
question. Also, consider what would have happened within cognitive theorising if 
the computer had been developed in some fashion other than the von Neumann 
machine, or had not been developed at all. Cognitive theory could possibly have 
taken an entirely different shape and the supremacy of symbolic theory might never 
have occurred. 
49 
3.2.1.2. The rise. fall. and re-birth of neural network theory 
Given that the dominance of symbolic theory as the conception of cognition seems 
to be, to a large degree, due to historical factors which saw a re-birth of interest in 
cognition coincide with the development of the von Neumann computer, it is not 
surprising that there is currently considerable attention being offered to an 
alternative conception of cognition. There has also been widespread criticism of the 
biological and, more specifically, the neural implausibility of the symbolic 
conception ~of the mind (see for e.g. McClelland, Rumelhart & Hinton, 1986; 
Smolensky, 1988). This criticism has led to considerable interest in neural network 
theory. 
The intensive research which this interest sparked off in the second half of the 
1980's has led to the current theoretical debate in cognitive science, and proponents 
of symbolic theory have lined up against what Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) refer to 
as the Connectionist alternative. This recent challenge to the cognitive science 
establishment demands that the history of neural network theory be charted so that 
its theoretical assumptions are also laid bare for examination. This is necessary to 
illuminate the tension in cognitive theorising, and so that one theory is not blindly 
accepted in the place of another. 
A consideration of the historical background of neural network theory is offered by 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991). They suggest that, although the neural network 
theoretical perspective is not associationist, its roots can be traced back to 
associationism and thus, in some measure, to behaviourism. The perspective of 
associationism is based on contiguity: the notion that, because two ideas occur in 
close proximity, some sort of connection is forged between them and one idea will, 
in the future, bring to mind the other. Early neural networks based on 
associationism, were developed by researchers such as McCulloch and Pitts (1947, 
in Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991) during the early years of the cognitive revolution 
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to model pattern recognition (in particular recognition of patterns based on partial 
information) and memory . These networks were based on statistical rather than 
logical principles, employed representations, but not symbols, and were self-
training. These cognitive models were eschewed, not because their basis in 
associationism undermined the ground gained by cognitivism as Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988) suggest, but rather because of the absence of powerful 
mathematical and processing tools upon which to implement them. The combined 
force of logic, linguistics, and the symbolic, serial processing platform afforded by 
the digital computer led a focus on symbolic theory at the expense of development 
in neural network theory. 
It seems rather interesting then that interest in neural networks should re-surface 
with such vigour during the 1980's and Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) offer 
several reasons for this. First of all, they suggest that powerful new approaches to 
network modelling were developed including new architectures, new training 
techniques and advances in mathematical descriptions. Secondly, researchers 
attracted to neural network theory were highly credible and amongst them was a 
distinguished physicist, John Hopfield. Third, neural network theory offered the 
opportunity to bring cognitive science closer to neuroscience with a model of 
cognition which was inspired by the neural structure of the brain. Fourth, this 
interest in neuroscience was related to a more general concern with parsimony -
symbol systems were becoming more diverse, more complex, and more ad hoc. 
Finally, a number of cognitive science researchers had become concerned with the 
limitations of symbolic theory in particular their limitations in accounting for 
human behaviour. Rule-based systems were seen to be hampered by their 
brittleness, inflexibility, difficulty, learning from experience, inadequate 
generalisation, domain specificity, and inefficiency due to serial searches through 
large systems. 
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This criticism of symbolic systems heralds the contrasts between symbolic theory 
and neural network theory which we will explore in sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5., but 
will suffice for now to illustrate some of the reasons for the sudden rise in interest 
in neural network models. This renewed interest, then, has led to the current 
sparring match within cognitive science.~ 
Before moving on to a further consideration of the sparring match in cognitive 
science and thus to the proposal that neural network theory is an appropriate 
theoretical model of cognitive processing within which to write a viable account of 
insight, let us examine the theoretical assumptions which this brief historical 
account of the development of neural network theory has revealed. 
The most obvious theoretical assumption is the one accorded by the interest in 
bringing cognitive science and neuroscience closer together. This suggests that 
cognitive processing operates in a fashion which is similar to the operation of the 
brain at the neural level and this is not necessarily the case. It does, however, seem 
easier to envision cognition following the principles of brain processing rather than 
following the operation of computer processing. 
Another theoretical assumption lies in the notion that neural network theory is an 
elaboration of associationism. This suggests that the proximity of objects, events, 
and ideas is enough to establish a learnt relationship between them, a perspective 
which has clear roots in behaviourism and the concept of essences. Whether we do 
indeed learn in this manner is open to question and this assumption must therefore 
merely be acknowledged. To place this in perspective, consider that symbolic 
theory seems not to have offered an adequate explanation of the manner in which 
humans learn and that an extension of the principles of associationism seems to 
have the potential to do so. 
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A final theoretical assumption can be seen in the use of mathematical and statistical 
theory to explain behaviour. This is common throughout most of the history of 
psychology and has, in particular, influenced the nature of traditional research 
methods used to study human behaviour1• It must, therefore, merely be 
acknowledged as a possible source of criticism of any theoretical conception of 
psychological phenomena advanced within a neural network theoretical explanation. 
Now that a brief historical account of the tension between symbolic theory and 
neural network theory has been offered, it is necessary to continue our examination 
of the current sparring match in cognitive science and cognitive psychology by 
outlining the theoretical conceptions provided by these two approaches to the study 
of cognition. We begin with a consideration of symbolic theory. 
3.2.2. An outline of symbolic theory 
In this attempt at defining the symbolic theoretical conception of cognition and 
cognitive processing, the lack of theoretical neutrality in our presentation of 
cognitive theory will be evident. Less space will be accorded to the outline of 
symbolic theory, than to the outline of neural network theory, or to the examination 
of the differences between the two. 
There are several reasons for this. First, symbolic theory is traditionally established 
within cognitive science and cognitive psychology and thus its tenets are better 
known and more clearly established. This extensive research tradition and 
theoretical dominance within cognitive theorising (as has already been established in 
section 3.2.1.) means that it is not necessary to give an elaborate outline of 
symbolic theory in order to argue the merits of its case as a viable cognitive theory. 
1 See Kurt Danziger ( 1986) for a convincing argument concerning the manner in which psychological 
theories have been shaped by a reliance on statistical methodologies. 
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Second, as the title of this chapter suggests, the focus here is on the differences 
between symbolic and neural network theory as a means of establishing that neural 
network theory could provide a more viable framework for conceptualising insight, 
as well as highlighting the current theoretical debate in cognitive theorising. 
Finally, neural network theory will be utilised as the theoretical framework within 
which to write a conceptual account of insight, a decision which will be clearly 
motivated in sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5 and which falls within the enterprise of re-
writing cognitive phenomena in neural network terms. It is therefore necessary to 
provide a far fuller exposition of the neural network theoretical position than the 
symbolic position. Now that the bias in the structure of this theoretical review has 
been made evident, let us move on to outlining the symbolic account of cognition. 
A broad definition of symbolic theory is offered by Hatfield (1990). He suggests 
that symbolic theory views representations as symbols in an internal representational 
system or language of thought. Psychological processes are thus computations 
defined over these representations. From Bechtel (1988) we can add to this that the 
traditional computer is used as a model for this conception of the mind and its 
cognitive functioning. In other words, the operation of the traditional computer is 
the same as the operation of the mind, both of which use symbols as representations 
of thoughts, ideas, objects, events and behaviours (to name a few) which can be 
manipulated by means of computations in an internal language of thought. Both 
mind and computer employ rules to direct the manipulation of these representations, 
and both mind and computer are physical devices which store knowledge at physical 
locations (Bechtel, 1988). 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) note that there are some, slight differences in 
conceptions of symbolic theory due to the existence of two strands leading from two 
of the disciplines contributing toward cognitive science. One strand leads directly 
from the philosophy of logic to cognitive science and the other strand leads from 
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linguistics, through cognitive psychology to cognitive science. The strand 
originating in logic views computers as symbol manipulation devices, while the 
strand from linguistics and cognitive psychology sees human cognition as consisting 
in symbol manipulation. These two strands are most often brought together to 
conceptualise human cognition in terms of the operation of the traditional computer, 
and as our purpose is to reflect on human cognitive processing, this unified position 
is the one which will be presented here. 
According to Newell (1990), symbolic theory assumes that the mind is a universal 
computational system and, as symbol systems are universal computational systems, 
humans are assumed to be symbol systems. The human symbol system is made up 
of various components which constitute its defining features. It has memory, which 
is made up of a structure which contains symbol tokens and which is independently 
modifiable at some grain size, or some level of the cognitive processing system. 
The system is made up of symbols which are patterns that provide access to distal 
structures, or structures elsewhere in memory. Symbol tokens are the occurrence 
of a pattern in such a structure. Newell, Rosenbloom and Laird (1989) explain the 
need for symbols. This need arises because it is not possible for all of the structure 
involved in computation to be assembled ahead of time at the physical site of 
computation. (To understand this one needs to remember that cognition is symbol 
manipulation in a physical computational device and that knowledge is therefore 
stored at physical locations.) Thus, it is necessary to travel out to other (distal) 
parts of the memory to obtain the additional memory I knowledge structure. 
Further components of the symbol system are its operations, interpretations, and 
capacities. Operations are processes that take symbol structures as input and 
produce symbol structures as output. These operations need interpretations, which 
are processes that take symbol structures as input and execute the relevant 
operations. The symbol system cannot function without certain capacities. These 
include sufficient memory and sufficient symbols, complete composability (so that 
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operators can construct any symbol structure), and complete interpretability (so that 
interpretable symbol structures are available for any arrangement of operations). 
These symbol systems are intelligent and are built up of multiple levels which are 
hierarchical and interactive. Posner's (1986) much critiqued modularity theory is a 
more extreme example of this. 
Now that the symbol system has been described and the centrality of symbols has 
been highlighted, let us consider in a little more detail how the rule-based 
manipulation of symbols functions as cognition. Basically, cognition is seen to 
operate as a language of thought in which mental representations have a 
combinatorial syntax and semantics (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Thus, the semantic 
content of a representation is a function of the semantic contents of its syntactic 
parts, together with its constituent structure. The manipulation of these symbols is 
rule based and, as Bechtel and Abrahamsen (1991) point out, a representational role 
is assigned to a particular symbol by virtue of the manner in which it is treated by 
the rules of the system. Rules are usually applied in a serial fashion. Therefore, to 
have a conscious thought involves the rule based retrieval of the symbol tokens, 
from various physical locations, that will make up the thought and combining them 
in a manner which is sensitive to their semantics and syntax. The representational 
function of these symbols is granted by the fact that they are selected and combined 
in this way. 
This is a brief outline of symbolic theory and critique of this conception of 
cognition and cognitive processing will be reserved for section 3.2.4. It is 
necessary, however, to add that this theory has been posed as the only viable 
framework from which to understand human cognition (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988) 
and that it has seen great success in accounting for such cognitive processes as 
language acquisition and use (Hatfield, 1990), reasoning (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
1991; Frensch, 1991; Nakamura, Kleiber and Kim, 1992) and problem solving 
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(Newell, Rosenbloom & Laird, 1989; Newell, 1990 for a discussion of the SOAR 
architecture; Quinn, 1991). 
3.2.3. An outline of neural network theory 
Neural network theory presents a radically different conception of cognition and 
cognitive processing to the one offered by symbolic theory. Extensive use will be 
made of the texts by Rumelhart, McClelland and the PDP Research Group (1986}, 
McClelland, Rumelhart and the PDP Research Group (1986}, and Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen (1991}, as well as personal experience with neural network simulations 
in order to present the neural network theoretical position outlined here. Where 
other sources are included, this will be indicated. 
Neural network theory is based on a model of the mind which is brain inspired. At 
the neural level, the brain is made up of massively interconnected neurons which 
form neuronal nets that are believed to fire in parallel (Bechtel, 1988). Thus, this 
conception of the mind suggests that cognitive processing can be approximated by a 
type of neural network structure that is made up of massively connected, simple 
processing units ("neurons") that operate in parallel. Cognition can be understood 
in terms of the operation of many neural networks, each made up of individual 
units, which operate together. 
Two features which neural network theory shares with symbolic theory, are the 
notion that cognition can be modelled in a computer and the idea that cognitive 
models should be representational models. However, the perspective offered by 
neural network theory on both of these counts is quite different to the symbolic 
account. Although neural network theoretical simulations can be run on a 
traditional, serial processor, this is not considered to be ideal. It is the realisation 
of parallel processing in a serial processing environment and until parallel hardware 
on the scale of the human brain is developed, neural network cognitive simulations 
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can never be fully realised. On the issue of representation, neural network theory 
does not make use of symbols as a representational device in cognition. 
Within neural network theory representation can be either local or distributed. In 
local representation individual units are assigned a representational function within 
the interconnected array. Their representational function must usually be supplied 
by an interpretation on the part of the network designer (Diederich, 1992) and is 
not a feature of the structure of the cognitive architecture - the same unit can be 
supplied with more than one representational meaning. To make this more 
concrete, let us consider an example. Within a network architecture, one unit can 
be supplied with the representational function CUP. Whenever that unit displays 
activity above its threshold (this will be explained in due course) the concept CUP 
is signified, and is only signified by interpretation on the part of the network 
designer who decided that this particular unit stood for CUP. The very same unit 
can signify the concept BIRD in another simulation (although the manner in which 
this unit now responds to input will probably be quite different), if that is the 
representational function which the network designer has assigned to activity of this 
unit at that time. Thus, representation is local when an individual unit is equated 
with a single concept. Distributed representation is very different. 
Representations are distributed across a network architecture when more than one 
unit is used to signify a concept. Let us use the CUP example once more. To 
convey the concept of a cup we may use one unit to represent HANDLE, one unit 
to represent PORCELAIN, one unit to represent ROUND, and another unit to 
represent CONTAINER. Thus, there is no one unit which can signify the concept 
of a cup. All, or some, of these units are used to represent the concept. 
Distributed representation in the absence of symbols is one of the features which 
makes neural network theory so different from symbolic theory. This allows a 
network architecture to display some of the features which are characteristic of 
human cognition and which a symbolic system cannot convey (see for e.g., Stone & 
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van Orden, 1989). This will be explored when we contrast the two theories in 
section 3. 2.4. 
The terms activity and threshold have already been mentioned in relation to these 
units and it therefore seems fitting that these features of the theory now be 
elaborated on. Cognitive processes are approximated by the flow of activation 
across the connections between units in a neural network simulation. Thus, an 
initial activation is applied to the units, which represents the stimulation of thought, 
perception, or some other sensory input, for example, and this activation is then 
spread to other units by means of connections. The manner in which the activation 
is spread, as well as the resultant pattern of activity across all of the units, is taken 
to represent the result of cognitive processing (O'Brien, 1991). 
The connections between units are either excitatory or inhibitory - initial activation 
is either spread over units to increase their resting activation or it actually leads to a 
decrease in activation below resting point. Activation is spread by means of various 
learning and updating procedures of a mathematical nature, which we will consider 
a little later on. These interconnected units can also have certain thresholds. This 
means that units will only contribute to the representational function of the network 
when their current activation exceeds a certain minimum level. 
Not all units that make up the network architecture are the same, and not all 
connections within the architecture are the same. There are input units, which are 
specialised to receive input from an external source (either the external world, 
sensory organs, or other networks). There are also output units which represent the 
external output, or result of cognitive processing within the network structure. 
Hidden units occur between input and output units, and fulfil the major 
representational function of the network. 
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An example of the representational function of a simple network will make this 




Figure 3.1. Diagrammatic representation of a simple neural network architecture 
The above network has a layer of two input units, four hidden units, and one output 
unit. The hidden units could be assigned the representational function of the 
components of the CUP concept referred to earlier. The frrst unit in the hidden 
layer could represent HANDLE, the second unit could represent PORCELAIN, the 
third ROUND, and the fourth CONTAINER. When the input units receive 
stimulation from the sensory system, when the individual has viewed a cup for 
instance, activation will be spread from these units to the hidden units in the next 
layer. The increase in activation which these units experience corresponds to the 
recognition of the features of the concept CUP. This activation is fed to the output 
unit and if this unit climbs in activation to the level required for recognition, CUP 
will be represented and the individual who has viewed the cup will recognise it as 
such. 
With respect to the connections between units, these can either be feedforward or 
continuous. Feedforward connections can only spread activation in one direction 
through the network, from the input units, through the hidden units, to the output 
units, whereas continuous connections can feed activation both forwards and 
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backwards through the network. Our example above could make use of either type 
of connection. The units in the hidden layer could also be connected to each other 
so that spreading activation between the different features of the CUP concept could 
occur. 
Connections also have different strengths which can either be set at the outset, or 
which can be allowed to modify themselves during processing. The activation that 
will therefore be passed along to any unit depends on the type of connection leading 
to that unit, the strength of the connection, and the threshold activation level of that 
unit. Different network designs can be achieved by means of various combinations 
of these features of network architecture (see for e.g. Lippmann, 1987). 
Mathematical and statistical principles enter into the network architecture by means 
of different equations for propagating activation and different equations for 
determining learning. Various equations which specify the manner in which 
activation is spread between units in the network are available. They specify 
different contributions of activation depending on the net input to a unit, the weight 
of the connection, the position of the unit in the network and thus what other units 
it receives activation from, and a decay rate which specifies the decrease in 
activation which can be expected across time. Activation equations can either be 
applied asynchronously, in which each unit decides randomly when to update its 
activation, or synchronously, where activations are updated during each processing 
sweep. A stochastic activation function can also be applied in updating activation 
levels and this is usually used in conjunction with simulated annealing. 
The pattern of activation that the network settles into is taken as supplying a 
representation at the cognitive level. Sometimes, networks settle into activation 
patterns for purely statistical reasons which do not best represent the cognitive state 
of affairs the network is being used to portray. Simulated annealing involves 
overcoming these local minima by adding more variability to the activation levels in 
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terms of a temperature function. Thus, activation equations can be very different 
across network architectures. 
One of the most exciting features of neural network theory is that its cognitive 
architectures are self-teaching and that learning is viewed as a central part of the 
cognitive system (Estes, 1991). It has also been suggested that neural network 
theory is particularly important because it allows the systematic examination of the 
interaction between learning and representation (Hanson & Burr, 1990). Cognitive 
learning can be simulated at the network level without the intervention of the 
network designer and under entirely local control at the level of information 
available to individual units (Roitblat & von Fersen, 1992). 
Learning occurs by adjusting the weighted connections between units and thus 
changing the activation patterns across the network, which performs the 
representational function of the network. Thus, the network can demonstrate the 
learning that occurs when an individual learns that a cup is made up of a round 
container with a handle, by modifying the weights between these signifying units so 
that their activation levels will be higher when the concept CUP is presented to the 
network. This usually happens by means of association, so that a cup is more 
readily recognised in the future when any one, or combination of, the cup signifiers 
are present. Learning equations can operate on the basis of strengthening 
connections between units that represent associated objects or concepts, by 
comparing the current activation of the network with the goal activations and 
feeding the difference back through the network, or by modifying those weights 
which are contributing most significantly to the failure in representational function 
(Shoemaker, Carlin & Shimabukuro, 1991). 
What has also been alluded to here, is a difference in control of the representational 
function of the network. Networks can be allowed to settle into a pattern of 
activation which conveys a cognitive representation, or they can have a desired 
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activation output imposed upon them. In either case, neural network theory has 
proved to offer a powerful account of learning (see for e.g., Doyle, 1990; Parks et 
al, 1991; Choi, McDaniel & Busemeyer, 1993; Elman, 1993; Quartz, 1993), as 
well as behaviour which forms an exception, two areas where symbolic theory has 
been particularly weak. 
Neural network theory has also proved quite powerful in other areas. Network 
models have offered an account of pattern recognition generally, which is accepted 
as being more accurate than symbolic theory (see for e.g., Navon, 1990; 
Treisman, 1990; Greenwood, 1991; Metcalfe, 1991; Shanks, 1991). They have 
also offered convincing accounts of category learning (see for e.g., Gluck & 
Bower, 1988,1990; Pazzani, 1991; Kruschke, 1992), word recognition (see for 
e.g., Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989; Allen & Madden, 1990; Besner, Twilley, 
McCann & Seergobin, 1990; van Orden, Pennington & Stone, 1990; Fera & 
Besner, 1992) and face recognition (Burton, Bruce & Johnston, 1990). 
Neural network models have been used to successfully simulate case-based 
reasoning (see for e.g., Hamden & Srinivas, 1992), automaticity (Cohen, Servan-
Schreiber & McClelland, 1992) and the cognitive functioning of an idiot savant 
(Norris, 1990). Neural network architectures have also been developed to offer a 
competitive account of language acquisition and use (see for e.g., Rumelhart & 
McClelland, 1986; Plunkett & Marchman, 1991, 1993), as well as semantic 
memory (Kroll & Klimesch, 1992). 
Perhaps most important for the purposes of this thesis, neural network models have 
been used to offer an account of the processes involved in problem solving (see for 
e.g., Ye & Salvendy, 1991; Zualkeman & Johnson, 1992), an account which 
seems to be superior to that proposed by symbolic theory. This is particularly the 
case with optimisation problems (see for e.g., Abe, Kawakami & Hirasawa, 1992), 
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such as the travelling salesman problem (see for e.g., Xu & Tsai, 1991) and 
diagnostic problem solving (see for e.g., Peng & Reggia, 1989; Lesser, 1991). 
This consideration of the successful application of neural network models to various 
aspects of cognition, heralds a consideration of the contrasts between symbolic 
theory and neural network theory, the purpose of the following section. 
3.2.4. Contrasting symbolic theocy and neural network theocy 
The discussion of some of the criticisms and special areas of application of 
symbolic theory and neural network theory which we saw in the previous section, 
precedes a review of the contrasts between these two theoretical approaches, as well 
as a consideration of their advantages and disadvantages for advancing our 
understanding of human cognition. It is necessary to explore these contrasts so that 
the theoretical sparring match in cognitive theory can be more fully understood. 
As has already been suggested, the dominance of symbolic theory can be seen as an 
emergent feature of certain historical processes, and a recognition of the theoretical 
assumptions which this dominance has bequeathed to the study of cognition begs the 
consideration of an alternative conception of human cognitive processing. This, 
together with the special characteristics which neural network theory provides, 
suggests that this framework for explaining human cognition must be evaluated. 
Hence, part of the work of this thesis is to re-write insight in neural network terms 
to see if this theory can account for the well known empirical features of insight in 
problem solving. Before moving on to chapter four and the work of writing a 
conceptual account of insight, it is necessary to contrast symbolic theory and neural 
network theory as explanations of cognitive processing and to consider how the 
special characteristics of neural network theory will make for a viable account of 
the processing involved in attaining insight in problem solving. 
One of the most widely discussed differences between symbolic theory and neural 
network theory can be found in their biological plausibility. Symbolic theory has 
been criticised for its biological implausibility (Bechtel, 1988; Rumelhart, 
McClelland & the PDP Research Group, 1986; Wolters & Phaf, 1990), while 
neural network theory is seen as possessing the distinct advantage of neural 
plausibility (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). Symbolic theory has also been 
criticised for its brittleness and inflexibility (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). This 
theory cannot account for graceful degradation2; if a rule-based system is damaged 
it tends to cease functioning completely. This is not what happens with human 
cognition, and the gradual decline in functioning is something which neural network 
theory explains particularly well (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). Part of the 
inflexibility of symbolic theory is that it cannot account for the manner in which 
humans deal with exceptions. Symbolic theory explains behaviour which follows 
the rule, but cannot account particularly well for behaviour which is unusual. 
Neural network theory, on the other hand, offers a highly plausible account of this 
satisfaction of soft constraints (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). 
Neural network theory also offers an account of content addressable memory, a 
feature of human cognition which symbolic theory struggles to explain (Wolters & 
Phaf, 1990). Spreading activation along learnt connections between characteristics 
accounts well for the sudden surfacing into memory of an item, on the basis of 
presentation of some (or even one) of its features3 . This also accounts for part of 
the resilience to damage which neural network theory can account for. Neural 
network theory can also offer an explanation for the distinctly human capacity to 
2Graceful degradation is a feature of the human cognitive system. When this system is damaged it 
does not cease functioning completely, but instead displays a gradual decline in the efficiency of its 
processing. 
3To understand this it is necessary to use a brief illustration of the neural network position on learning 
and memory. A cup might be defined by learnt associations between such features as handle, 
porcelain, round, and container. When a network is presented with the feature handle, for instance, 
the activity of this unit will spread along the connections to the other cup features learnt by 
association. The unit representing the concept cup is then likely to receive sufficient activation from 
these units to surface into awareness, without having been directly activated itself. 
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learn from expenence (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991). Symbolic theory has 
traditionally struggled to account for learning (Hanson & Burr, 1990) and, although 
it can offer some explanation for learning on the basis of experience, the 
establishment of different weighted connections between representations seems to 
offer a more plausible account of human cognitive learning. A cognitive property 
which links well to this is generalisation. 
These special characteristics have led Bechtel (1988) to suggest that this theory 
offers a more realistic account of human cognitive performance than symbolic 
theory, and that it has the potential to explain all cognitive phenomena. There are, 
however, theorists who would dispute this. Hatfield (1990) suggests that symbolic 
theory and neural network theory each have their own special sphere of application 
and that they should stick to offering an account of the cognitive processing 
associated with that sphere. He suggests that the special sphere of application for 
symbolic theory is linguistics, while for neural network theory it is pattern 
recognition and neural implementation of symbolic processing. Based on this he 
raises doubt concerning the ability of neural network theory to guide research in to 
higher cognition. Let us pursue the source of this doubt. 
What Hatfield (1990) is alluding to is one of three perspectives on the place of 
neural network theory in cognitive theorising and the doubt he expresses is common 
to two of these perspectives. The first of these is that symbolic theory is the only 
viable conception of human cognition and that the neural network enterprise is 
completely misguided (Pinker & Prince, 1988). The second of these perspectives, 
and the one which Hatfield (1990) alludes to, is that the place of neural network 
theory is as an implementation of a rule-based, higher cognitive system (Bechtel, 
1988; Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Anderson, 1990; Chater & Oaksford, 1990; 
Dawson & Schopflocher, 1992; Goodman, Higgins, Miller & Smyth, 1992). This 
perspective has received a lot of support in the literature, but has not been explored 
at a conceptual level or at the level of a simulation. The third perspective on the 
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place of neural network theory, is that it is a viable replacement for symbolic theory 
as a complete account of human cognition (Rumelhart, McClelland & the PDP 
Research Group, 1986; Smolensky, 1988). 
The source of these differences in opinion concerning the place of neural network 
theory in an account of cognition and cognitive processing lies in the debate 
concerning the character of thought. For proponents of the symbolic approach and 
the neural network implementation approach, the character of thought is 
linguistically based; in other words, cognition is fundamentally based on a 
language of thought. For proponents of the neural network approach cognition 
rests fundamentally on pattern mapping and, therefore, on pattern recognition. It is 
impossible, at present, to resolve this debate within cognitive science, never mind 
within the scope of one cognitive psychology thesis. It is necessary, though, to 
examine the foundations of this debate as they are presented in the literature, and it 
will be suggested that the nature of the symbolic criticism of neural network theory 
certainly does not render the neural network account of cognition unlikely. 
Bechtel ( 1988) provides a good overview of the nature of the defence utilised by the 
language of thought proponents. They argue that our cultural products, such as our 
linguistic expression of information, utilises a serial, rule-based structure of 
reasoning and that we acquire much of the information which we use in subsequent 
thought from these products. This supports the apparent seriality and logical 
character of conscious thought, in which we sometimes employ rule-based 
operations and sometimes teach people explicit rules for performing tasks. 
None of these points of argument can be taken to suggest that the cognitive activity 
performed by the mind must be in the form of a language of thought. The first 
point to consider is the apparent serial character of thought. The brain clearly does 
not process in serial, so why should we assume that the mind does? It seems 
entirely possible that we impose a serial character upon our cognitive activity in 
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relation to other people; that perhaps this character of thought is a social creation. 
Serial processing certainly cannot account for the processing which occurs during 
insight. The second point to consider is that what is being discussed here is 
conscious thought. If Clark's (1989) rather telling suggestion that the language of 
thought is merely the mind's commentary on the processing it has perfonned, a 
suggestion which likens symbolic theory to folk psychology, is to be taken 
seriously, it is entirely possible that this conscious mind talk does not employ the 
same character as the unconscious cognitive processing which supports thought. A 
third point to consider is the rule-based nature of thought. Rumelhart (1989) 
suggests that neural network systems can display the regularities captured by rule 
processing systems as an emergent feature of the processing within this system. 
Therefore, just because cognition looks as if it is governed by rules, does not mean 
that the underlying features of cognition are those of a rule processor. 
It is, therefore, clear that none of the features of cognition which are used to 
support the language of thought position convincingly suggest that cognitive 
processing must occur in this fashion. Once again, it can be suggested that it is 
only the dominance of symbolic theory which has prevented an alternative 
conception of cognition from gaining ground. The debate, however, does not stop 
there and symbolic theorists have suggested that there are aspects of cognition 
which neural network theory will never be able to offer an adequate account of. 
One of these is language processing. 
Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) provide an account of a neural network 
simulation which models the developmental phases children go through in learning 
the past tense of English verbs. This simulation was taken to offer a neural network 
theoretical account of language acquisition. This account was heavily criticised (see 
for e.g., Lachter & Bever, 1988; Pinker & Prince, 1988), but Miikkulainen and 
Dyer (1991) have once again produced data which suggests that neural network 
systems can model language processing. Thus, there has been no conclusion 
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concerning the ability of neural network theory to account for language acquisition 
and use, and it is entirely possible that the development of powerful parallel 
hardware and improved learning algorithms will see neural network theory offering 
a highly competitive account of this aspect of cognitive processing. Also, this 
debate has rested on computer simulations, a method which has already been 
criticised (see section 3.2.1.1.), and it seems necessary that predictions made by 
neural network theory be tested with human participants before any conclusions are 
drawn. 
The challenge of an incomplete account of cognitive functioning does not begin and 
end with language processing. There are other aspects of human cognition 
concerning which symbolic theorists have asserted neural network theory is 
inadequate. These are the features of recursion, systematicity, inferential 
coherence, and productivity. Some researchers (see for e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988; Fodor & McLaughlin, 1990) have asserted that these features of cognition 
are only displayed by symbolic systems and that architectures which do not utilise 
the rule-based manipulation of symbols cannot account for these aspects of 
cognitive processing. This has been countered by Smolensky (1988) and by 
Macdonald (1995), who state that the debate focuses around whether neural 
network architectures can display compositionally structured representations which 
are genuinely non-classical (i.e. not symbolic) and that the likelihood is that they 
can. 
Although no resolution can be reached concerning the debate between these two 
theoretical approaches to cognition, what is clear is that symbolic theory has not 
succeeded in squashing the challenge offered by neural network theory in 
accounting for cognitive processing. Given the special characteristics which neural 
network theory lends to the account of cognition, it seems necessary that this 
account be advanced and that important features on the face of cognition be re-
written in neural network terms. The viability of this theory can then be tested. It 
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also seems very important that predictions made by neural network conceptions of 
cognitive phenomena be closely linked to human data, particularly as most of the 
debate centres around data produced by computer simulations of cognitive 
functioning. 
Before moving on to chapter four and the task of re-writing insight in neural 
network theoretical terms, and chapters five, six and seven, the report of a human 
test of some of the predictions made by this conceptual account, it seems important 
to address one further question. If the debate concerning which is the most suitable 
theoretical account of cognition is unresolved, why write and test a neural network 
account of insight and not a symbolic account of insight? The answer to this is that 
neural network theory seems to offer a more viable account of insight than symbolic 
theory does. Let us briefly consider why this answer is made. 
3.2.5. Neural network theory and a viable account of insight 
The most obvious reason for considering a neural network theoretical account of 
insight is only indirectly related to the viability of this account, and that is that 
symbolic theory has so far been unable to offer a conceptual account of the 
empirical findings associated with attaining insight in problem solving. Symbolic 
theory has so far proved incapable of offering a processing explanation of insight. 
Neural network theory has the potential to offer precisely such a process level 
account. It could be suggested that a process level explanation of insight is 
unnecessary, that we should be focusing on cognition more globally. How can we 
reflect on insight at all, demonstrate insight, or teach people to think insightfully 
without understanding the processes involved in attaining insight? It does, 
therefore, seem necessary to understand such things as why insight is so difficult, 
how it happens so suddenly, and what people do to attain insight. 
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Neural network theory has had particular success in conceptualising problem 
solving and, as insight is a particular feature of some problem solving, it seems 
conceivable that this theory may be able to successfully account for insight as well. 
This approach has also provided a good account of the manner in which new 
problems are learned or negotiated (Hanson and Burr, 1990) and insight problems 
are certainly not familiar problems. It is also striking that people who display 
insight cannot verbalise the processes involved in solving insight problems. This 
suggests that insight may not employ the same processing that language use does 
and neural network theory certainly offers the potential to account for processing 
which is not linguistically based. Neural network theory is also fully equipped to 
explain some of the puzzling features of insight, such as its difficulty, the 
propensity to select the wrong approach to the problem, and the incubation which 
precedes correct problem solution. Finally, van Leeuwen (1989) has suggested that 
neural network theory and Gestalt psychology are highly compatible and, as Gestalt 
psychology originated interest in insight, pursuing a neural network theoretical 
account of insight seems promising. It is therefore high time that we consider what 




A NEURAL NETWORK THEORETICAL MODEL OF 
INSIGHT IN PROBLEM SOLVING 
4.1 Introduction 
From the review of literature on insight in problem solving (which constituted 
chapter two), it was suggested that a conceptual account of the processing necessary 
to attain insight still needs to be formulated. This is because insight has only really 
been defined in operational terms despite the relatively clear and consistent nature 
of the empirical findings that have been reported. In chapter three (with its 
consideration of the sparring match in cognitive science and cognitive psychology) 
we saw that there are really only two conceptual frameworks for cognitive 
processing within which a conceptual account of insight can be written. The choice 
of neural network theory not only seems particularly beneficial for advancing our 
understanding of insight, but will also reflect on the theoretical debate between 
symbolic theory and neural network theory. 
It is, therefore, now the work of this chapter to write a conceptual account of 
insight in neural network terms. Central features of this model, which can tested in 
order to provide some illumination on the viability of this account of the processing 
involved in insight, will be highlighted. It will be suggested that the operational 
definition of, and empirical data on insight, are consistent with this conceptual 
account of insight written in neural network terms. 
4.2 A conceptual account of insight 
This model of insight will suggest that insightful problem solution consists of a 
recognition of the pattern which characterises insight problems. Insight problems 
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present the problem solver with an ambiguous task, one in which the type of 
problem suggested by the manner in which the problem presented is unclear. Past 
learning on the part of the problem solver elicits the recognition that the current 
problem is characteristic of a particular problem type or task. This recognition also 
elicits the infonnation associated with that problem type. 
To illustrate this, consider an example. If you are presented with a task in which 
you are required to connect dots with lines this is likely to invoke the familiar task 
of drawing lines from one dot to another and not the task of drawing lines which 
start or end at blank spaces. The infonnation that lines can begin and end at blank 
spaces is not associated with the problem type which has been recognised. The 
recognition of this inappropriate problem type and the subsequent work on this 
problem within the structure which this type suggests, will not lead to solution. 
The problem solver needs to recognise that this problem belongs to a non-obvious 
problem type. This is the recognition that there is a pattern to insight problems, 
that they are a type of problem which require a non-obvious solution. 
Insight problems are a problem type or task which can be recognised and which, 
following appropriate recognition, elicit the infonnation that the problem solver 
must overcome past learning and look for a non-obvious solution to the problem. 
Insight problems are an exception and this is why it is difficult to correctly 
recognise them, to recognise the pattern to insight problems and thus to display 
insight. 
It will not only be demonstrated that this conception of insight in problem solving 
as a recognition of the pattern which characterises insightful problem solution is 
consistent with the literature, but that it also allows the well-researched notion of 
expertise in problem solving to be applied to insight. This will be used to suggest 
that insight can be facilitated by teaching people to become experts at recognising 
the pattern to insight problems and thus at insight processing. This is characterised 
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by the recognition of the ambiguous nature of the presented problem and thus 
applying the non-obvious solution. It will also be suggested that, if this conceptual 
account of insight in problem solving proves to be viable, important implications 
can be drawn to the theoretical debate in cognitive science and cognitive 
psychology. 
This conceptual account of insight will be advanced by: 
1. Utilising the operational definition of insight derived from the 
literature to frame insight in problem solving in neural 
network terms as a recognition of the pattern to insight 
problems. 
2. Explaining the empirical findings on insight in terms of neural 
network theory, and; 
3. Applying the notion of expertise to insight processing. 
4. Drawing implications from this to the debate in cognitive 
theory. 
5. Outlining some of the central tenets of this conceptual model 
of insight which can be subjected to an empirical test with 
human problem solvers to provide an initial evaluation of the 
viability of this model. 
6. Formulating the empirical testing which will address these 
research questions. 
Before moving on to an outline of this model it is important to address one issue. 
This neural network theoretical model will not be based on a computer simulation. 
This is particularly important to discuss as all of the successful applications of 
symbolic theory and neural network theory reported in the previous chapter were 
based on computer simulations of human cognitive functioning. The absence of a 
computer simulation may seem a little strange given the tradition in cognitive 
science of explaining cognitive phenomena by means of the results of a computer 
74 
model. Instead, the principles of neural network theory will be used to inform an 
explanation of the cognitive processing which might be involved in attaining insight 
and thus to write a conceptual account of insight. 
There are several reasons for eschewing a computer simulation and instead applying 
the principles of cognitive functioning which seem to lie behind the processing 
displayed by the computer programme to explain insight. First of all, as has been 
stressed before, this is a cognitive psychology thesis and not a cognitive science 
thesis. Thus, the aim is to determine whether a computer based account of 
cognition can explain insight, not to develop a computer model which displays 
insight. Much of the research in cognitive psychology does not rely on computer 
simulations. Instead, its aims are to apply the postulates of a theory to construct a 
conceptual account of some aspect of psychological functioning and then to subject 
this account to empirical testing. Given the rather arbitrary nature of simulation 
data this seems to be an approach worth considering and applying to neural network 
theory. 
In respect of the rather arbitrary nature of simulation data, it has already been 
suggested (in chapter three) that, just because a computer and a human produce the 
same results, does not mean that they do so by employing the same processes. 
Also, a computer simulation can be biased to produce whatever results the 
researcher expects in the name of discovering what constraints may apply to human 
cognition. Where does one draw the line between biasing the simulation to produce 
the expected results and imposing real constraints? Surely this is not particularly 
good methodology. 
Linked to this is the rather arbitrary decision concerning which architecture to use 
in the simulation. This applies particularly to neural network theory, where there 
are many different architectures to choose from based on the number of units, the 
number of layers, the type of connection, the type of learning algorithm, the type of 
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activation function, etc. Which of these architectures represents the manner in 
which human cognition functions? Do they all, and if so, which architecture best 
represents the manner in which humans process insight problems? Add to this the 
fact that most simulations are the instantiation of parallel processing on serial 
hardware, hardly what is meant by brain-style processing. It thus seems that the 
degree to which a simulation can provide information on human cognitive 
processing is somewhat limited, as it is quite unlikely that our artificial cognitive 
architectures resemble mind functioning. 
Many neural network researchers conduct simulations of cognitive phenomena 
despite these problems. Simulations remain an effective tool for explaining 
cognitive processing and they provide a tangible platform for the development of 
theoretical accounts and for theoretical debate. It is, therefore, clear that the claim 
concerning the benefits of eschewing a computer simulation is a contentious one. 
Despite the contentious nature of this claim, a simulation will not be conducted for 
the reasons outlined above, and the general principles of neural network theory will 
be used as a framework from which to understand cognitive processing and within 
which to construct a theoretical account of insight. This account will be subjected 
to empirical testing to attempt an initial evaluation of the viability of this account. 
And now, at last, we get to the real business of this chapter - formulating a 
conceptual account of insight. 
4.2.1. Insight as recognition of the pattern to insight problems 
To write a conceptual account of insight it is necessary to begin with the operational 
definition of insight derived from the literature. That was, that insight is the 
process by means of which a problem whose formulation is ambiguous, and for 
which only the non-obvious conceptualisation is appropriate, is solved. What is 
necessary, then, is to determine what this process is. The conceptual understanding 
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of this process which will be proposed here is that it involves the recognition of a 
pattern. 
This is not the same thing as pattern recognition. Pattern recognition is usually 
where an image, such as the number 3, is presented to an individual who then 
recognises the symbol as representing the concept three. However, it could be 
suggested that pattern recognition shares features with the processing that occurs 
when a problem is presented to an individual which they must recognise. This is 
recognition of a pattern at a different level of the cognitive system. Hence, insight 
will be described as the recognition of the pattern which characterises insight 
problems. 
Categorisation could be understood to characterise the first steps in insight problem 
solving. The problem is presented to an individual who must categorise the 
problem within a general class of problems so that a solution strategy can be 
selected and applied. The term categorisation was also considered as a description 
of the process of insight, but it was deemed to apply too strictly to concepts, such 
as bird, which have defining features, such as wings, flies, and has feathers (see for 
e.g., Shanks, 1991). A problem could be seen as a category with defining features, 
but this understanding cannot really be extended to a problem solution. 
Classification was also considered, but this seems to apply to the assignment of an 
object I problem to a particular class, with no further activity. Classification can be 
seen as a part of the recognition of a pattern (see for e.g., Lippmann, 1987). 
Within a neural network theoretical conception, however, there is no need to offer 
support for cognitive processing such as insight to rest on something akin to pattern 
recognition. All thought is believed to operate according to the recognition of 
patterns, just as symbolic theory suggests that all thought operates on the basis of 
language processing. This, however, seems like a rather blind acceptance, 
particularly given the current theoretical debate in cognitive theorising. Therefore, 
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the proposal that insight can be understood as the recognition of a pattern, will be 
explored in terms of the operational definition of insight above, before moving on 
to consider whether an explanation of the empirical findings are consistent with this 
account. To make this clearer, the nine-dot problem will be used as an example. 
Remember that the nine-dot problem involves presenting the problem solver with 
three rows of three dots and the instruction that all of the dots must be connected 
with four straight lines, without lifting pen or pencil from the paper. Most problem 
solvers fail to realise that the space on the page beyond the dots must be utilised to 
reach problem solution and that lines cannot begin and end on dots only. (Please 
refer to appendix 1 for a visual presentation of the nine-dot problem and its 
solution.) 
When a problem solver is presented with the nine-dot problem, a problem which is 
known to be solvable by the application of insight, he or she will generally attempt 
to solve the problem by drawing lines within the boundary suggested by the square 
shape of the problem presentation. As we saw in chapter two, the Gestalt 
psychologists understood this to mean that the problem solver was stuck on the 
properties of the visual field - the square shape of the problem. This makes little 
sense conceptually and information-processing theorists suggested that this tendency 
to stay within the boundaries of the square was due to the choice of a particular 
problem space, a suggestion which also proved to be conceptually weak. It was, 
however, suggested that the choice of problem space is based on past experience 
although the manner in which this experience is applied, was not explained. What 
seems highly appealing conceptually and what is informed by the principles of 
neural network theory, is that the problem is approached on the basis of past 
learning. 
What could this past learning be in the case of the nine-dot problem? Well, one 
source of past learning which would be immediately available when an individual is 
presented with dots to connect by drawing lines on paper, are the connect-the-dot 
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drawings most children (and some adults!) are exposed to. This problem could, 
therefore, be recognised as a member of this class of tasks and hence the tendency 
to connect dots within the boundary of the square. After all, if you are connecting 
dots you have to connect dots, not blank spaces on the paper. In this case, the 
square shape of the dots is irrelevant; the dots could be in a triangular shape or in a 
circular shape. 
Another source of past learning which springs quickly to mind, is the group of so-
called optimisation problems. We are all exposed, whether it be in mathematics or 
some other discipline, to the concept of taking the shortest possible number of steps 
to reach a specified goal. Indeed, there are a whole class of problems which 
require optimisation and the travelling salesman problem is an example of this. In 
this problem, a salesman has, for example, forty cities on his sales route and the 
problem solver must suggest how the salesman could visit all of these cities while 
covering the shortest possible distance. The specification in the nine-dot problem 
that four lines be used and the problem solver's first experience with the problem 
suggesting that it would take at least five lines to connect all of the dots, could lead 
the problem solver to recognise this problem as a member of the optimisation class. 
This would suggest that as many dots as possible must be covered by each line. 
Including blank spaces on the page does not count as covering a dot. Add to this 
the fact that by extending lines there are occasions when only two dots are covered 
by one line and utilising the additional space on the page seems even more unlikely. 
What we have seen here is that past learning can be applied inappropriately to the 
nine-dot problem and the problem is incorrectly recognised as belonging to a 
particular class of problem tasks. This is facilitated by the ambiguous nature of the 
problem presentation. It is possible to go one step further and suggest that the 
problem is only ambiguous because these sources of past learning are available. 
This sounds very much like the recognition of a pattern. Patterns which link tasks 
are established on the basis of past learning and new information is recognised as 
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being a member of a particular pattern class on the basis of its similarity to a 
familiar member of that class. The response which this class of patterns usually 
evokes is then applied to the new information. In other words, a new problem is 
classified on the basis of the recognition of the pattern which links this problem to 
connect-the-dot tasks, for instance. Once recognition of this pattern has occurred 
the information which has been associated with this task in the past is activated in 
memory. Information which has been associated with other tasks, is suppressed. 
Thus, the recognition of a problem type leads to the availability of information 
which has been associated with that problem type in the past. For example, that 
lines can be drawn between dots. The information that lines can begin and end in 
blank space, is suppressed. 
So, what happens when a problem is solved by insight? Well, remember that what 
is crucial, according to the operational definition of insight, is that only the non-
obvious conceptualisation of the problem is appropriate. Thus, the problem solver 
needs to recognise that the problem is not a member of the class of problems 
suggested by past learning, but that it is a member of a class of problems that 
require a non-obvious solution. 
It is then necessary to recognise that the problem is a member of tasks in which 
lines can be drawn on blank paper spaces. It is, of course, quite conceivable that 
the problem can be solved by the appropriate recognition of membership to some 
other class of problems, such as problems in which lines have to be extended 
beyond dots. This is not what is important. What is crucial to attaining insight, is 
that the problem is recognised as belonging to a class of insight problems, which 
display the pattern of requiring a non-obvious problem solution. Once problem 
solvers have recognised the pattern to insight problems, any new insight problems 
can be recognised as members of this group and the information that they require a 
non-obvious solution will be available. 
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Now that insight has been conceptualised according to the principles of neural 
network theory, as the recognition of a pattern which characterises insight 
problems, the empirical findings derived from the literature can be examined. It 
can be determined whether these findings are consistent with this account and are 
explainable in neural network terms. This will also allow for a description of the 
manner in which this recognition is achieved. If the empirical fmdings are 
consistent with this account, the explanation of these findings will advance our 
conceptual account of insight and will suggest that insight can be understood in 
neural network terms. 
4.2.2. Explaining the empirical findings 
To explain the empirical findings on insight in terms of the principles of neural 
network theory and to explore whether this data is consistent with a conceptual 
account of insight as the recognition of the pattern to insight problems, the features 
of insight outlined in chapter two will be explored. 
4.2.2.1. Problem difficulty 
It was determined that one of the defining features of insight problems is their 
difficulty. How can the fact that insight problems are so difficult that very few 
people manage to solve them, be accounted for conceptually? If we apply the 
concept of insight as a form of recognition this can be explained quite easily. 
Recall that insight consists of recognising the non-obvious nature of the required 
problem solution and that past learning leads to the problem being approached in an 
inappropriate manner. In neural network terms, learning consists of establishing 
heavily weighted connections between items that have occurred together in the past 
and by establishing inhibitory connections to other items. The more often these 
items occur together, the more heavily weighted the connections between these 
items and the more inhibitory the nature of the connections to other items. Thus, 
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the presentation of one of these items leads almost immediately to a response in 
terms of the item which has occurred with it often in the past and it is extremely 
difficult to bring to awareness a third item because of the suppression this third item 
experiences. 
Consider a simple example to make this clearer. If you look out of your bedroom 
window every morning for a year and on 364 mornings you see birds which are 
sparrows, and on only 1 morning do you see pigeons, it is extremely likely that you 
will think of sparrows when you hear the word bird and extremely unlikely that you 
will think of a pigeon. 
The same principles apply in making insight problems difficult. Because their 
formulation is ambiguous, they allow the application of a well-learnt response and it 
is extremely difficult to even consider an alternative response. If, as a child, you 
learnt repeatedly that being presented with dots and being asked to draw lines meant 
that you were dealing with a connect-the-dots problem, this will be the heavily 
biased response and all other responses will be inhibited. As the insight problem is 
attempted, the heavily biased responses surface more clearly into awareness (receive 
more positive activations) and the other responses are suppressed (receive more 
negative activations). Repeated attempts to solve the problem lead to more 
inhibitory activation being fed to other problem types. It will be difficult to even 
call to mind one of those other responses, because they are prevented from 
emerging into awareness based on the effects of past learning. As the solution to an 
insight problem requires just this, we have just accounted very nicely for the fact 
that very few people are able to solve insight problems and thus for the difficulty in 
attaining insight. 
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4.2.2.2. Inappropriate problem conception 
The adoption of an initial approach to the problem from which it is impossible to 
solve the problem, is exactly what we have been referring to when explaining the 
difficulty of insight problems. It is precisely the inappropriate recognition, the 
well-learnt one, which is heavily biased to emerge into awareness and stay there. 
4.2.2.3. Persistence 
Persistence refers to the extended period of time over which problem solvers 
attempt to solve the presented problem, as if it is a member of the class of problems 
which they have inappropriately recognised. Again, this is explainable by the 
mechanisms presented above. The connections between the presented problem and 
the chosen problem task are so strong, and the connections to non-obvious problem 
types are so heavily inhibited, that it is extremely difficult to change the problem 
classification. Activation is continually fed from the presented problem along the 
connections to familiar problems. The inappropriate problem types and their 
associated elements keep receiving the highest activation and other problem types 
are inhibited more and more. The problem solver is caught in a loop where their 
solution attempts are not going to be successful, but they cannot select an 
alternative approach. 
4.2.2.4. Appropriate problem conception 
This is only likely to have occurred if the problem has been solved; it is quite 
unlikely that someone would recognise the type of problem with which they are 
presented and not be able to solve the problem. Usually the only impediment to 
problem solution in insight problems, is the tendency to misrecognise the problem. 
It has been suggested in the literature (Weisberg & Alba, 1981a) that the nine-dot 
problem is different and that it is difficult even after the appropriate problem 
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conception is recognised. This does not seem particularly tenable, especially if it is 
remembered that there are two inappropriate problem types which can be applied to 
the nine-dot problem (connect-the-dot tasks and optimisation problems) and that 
moving from recognising the problem as an example of one of these, to the other, 
does not constitute appropriate recognition. It might be necessary to realise that 
one can utilise the space on the page outside of the dots, as well as to recognise that 
one can cover fewer than the maximum possible number of dots with a drawn line 
before the problem can be solved. Perhaps this does make the nine-dot problem 
slightly different from the other insight problems, but only in as far as there are two 
inappropriate problem types which are suggested by past learning instead of only 
one. 
What is of interest here, though, is what happens when the presented problem is 
recognised as being a member of the class of problems which require a non-obvious 
solution. This is usually accompanied by the realisation that the initial problem 
types applied to the insight problem were inappropriate. These two factors, and the 
fact that the recognition of the problem solution is almost immediately accompanied 
by a realisation of the problem solution, lead to the subjective a-ha! experience 
which is often thought to be the central feature of insight. 
It must be assumed that connections to problem types other than the ones biased by 
past learning do exist. After all, everybody knows that you can draw lines on blank 
pieces of paper and that problems do not always require optimisation. The 
difficulty is that the nature of these connections is highly inhibitory. This is what 
makes insight in problem solving so rare. So how do we explain the fact that these 
inhibitory connections are sometimes changed? 
Well, we know from our definition of insight that you have to recognise the need 
for a non-obvious solution. However, this surely only happens when the strongly 
inhibitory nature of the weights has already changed. More activation can then be 
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sent along these connections to make them less negative, until they eventually 
become positive. This is likely to be a very long and difficult process, though the 
recognition of the need to cast around for a non-obvious solution would certainly 
speed up the process of modifying these inhibitory weights. What could also 
happen, is something that will make these connections less inhibitory - the positive 
connections· to the problem types biased by past experience can gradually become 
less positive. 
It was illustrated in chapter three that some learning algorithms, back propagation 
for example, operate by comparing the obtained output from a processing cycle to 
the desired output and then feed the difference back through the network to adjust 
the weights on the connections. What also happens, is that the weights which are 
contributing most to the error of the network are the ones which are adjusted most. 
Now it is conceivable that the inhibitory connections to other problem types could 
be recognised as contributing most to the error in problem solution and that they 
could therefore receive the greatest adjustment, leading them to eventually become 
positive. What is far more likely, is that the positive connections to the 
inappropriate problem types are recognised as contributing most to the error and 
therefore receive the greatest adjustment, leading them to become less and less 
positive. As these weights become less positive, their inhibitory force on other 
connections becomes weaker. These weights could eventually become positive and 
activation can then be sent along them to other problem types. The newly available 
patterns of information could then climb to activation levels which lead them to 
enter into awareness. 
This will take a long time and it is quite possible that the problem solver will lose 
interest in the problem before this happens. However, this is consistent with the 
fact that insight problems are difficult, that very few people manage to solve them, 
and that if they do, this solution is slow. If solution were to occur, it would entail 
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appropriate recognition, in which the presented problem is appropriately recognised 
as being a member of the class of insight problems. This, then, is the essential 
processing involved in insight and it can be described as the recognition of the 
pattern to insight problems. 
4.2.2.5. Incubation 
Incubation seems to precede insight, if indeed insight does occur. Incubation is 
understood to be a period of inactivity, between active work on the problem and 
achievement of resolution. During this time progress is somehow made 
nonetheless. Incubation can be understood, in neural network theoretical terms, as 
below threshold processing. This is precisely what was discussed in the previous 
section, when activation levels are adjusted before the results of this processing are 
brought to awareness. The processing required to render the weights to the 
inappropriate problem types less positive and the processing which results in the 
connections to the appropriate problem types changing from inhibitory to positive, 
all occurs outside of awareness. It is dubbed below threshold processing, because , 
units are provided with a threshold level of activation below which they will not 
respond. 
This applies particularly to binary units, which are either on or off, and only 
activation above the threshold value can change their status. The principle does 
carry over to continuous units, where the threshold can be understood as an 
activation level which will bring the representation of the unit to awareness. This is 
a significantly positive state of the unit. Thus, the processing which is necessary to 
change the negative activation level of the appropriate problem type, to a positive 
activation level, occurs during the incubation process. The principles of neural 
network theory account rather nicely for this feature of insight in problem solving. 
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4.2.2.6. Facilitation 
The literature on insight has suggested that fairly specific hints can be used to 
encourage problem solution. As an example, providing practice on extending lines 
beyond dots, on to blank spaces of the page that contains the problem, increased the 
likelihood of correctly solving the nine-dot problem (Weisberg & Alba, 1981a). It 
is possible, within this neural network theoretical conception of insight, to 
understand why this facilitation would increase the likelihood of correct solution. It 
is past learning which has led the problem solver to incorrectly classify the 
presented problem and the effect of providing training on tasks which are similar to 
the required problem solution provides a competing source of learning. 
Information from the training tasks is especially available for application as these 
training sessions are usually presented in close temporal proximity to the target 
problem. Thus, when the target problem is presented to the problem solver the 
weights to the appropriate problem type may already have been adjusted to a 
positive level. Also, the activation of the associated units may still be at a higher 
level than resting activation as a result of the processing which has just occurred 
while solving these facilitation problems. Therefore, these specific hints could lead 
to a facilitation of insight. 
It has been suggested in the literature that less specific hints do not lead to a 
facilitation effect. This is consistent with our account of insight. The problem 
solver has to recognise the pattern which links the facilitation and target problems. 
If the hints are vague, they will not be sufficient to overcome the biasing effect of 
past learning and recognition will fail. 
What has not been considered in the literature, is something which this conceptual 
account of insight suggests might lead to insight - the explicit demonstration that 
there is a class of problems which are ambiguous and which prompt an 
inappropriate problem conception. In other words, there has been no investigation 
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of the effect of making explicit the nature of insight and the nature of the realisation 
which is essential in insight processing. The application of neural network theory 
to insight suggests that this could lead to a significant facilitation effect, if the target 
problem is recognised as being a member of this class. Appropriate recognition is 
still necessary. However, by explicitly stating the ambiguous nature of insight 
problems and highlighting the biasing effects of past learning on insight problem 
solving, the connection weights to problem types suggested by past learning can be 
weakened. The effect of this, as has already been suggested, is to decrease the 
inhibition associated with less obvious problem types, and casting around for a non-
obvious solution will add to the likelihood that activation will be sent along these 
connections. This notion of making explicit the nature of insight processing will be 
explored further when the concept of expert insight processing is discussed (section 
4.2.3.). 
4.2.2. 7. Transfer 
This perspective on facilitation is supported by the findings on transfer in insight. 
Transfer is the application of information from one problem to another. The 
literature suggests that there is no transfer of content for insight problems, whereas 
there is for other problems. This is understandable as it is not the content of the 
insight problem which is vital, but the necessity of recognising that the presented 
problem requires a non-obvious solution. This finding in the literature has been 
used to suggest that it is the conceptual processing involved in insight problem 
solving which is transferred to produce significant facilitation. This is precisely 
what was suggested in section 4.2.2.6. Over and above this, we saw how the 
application of knowledge concerning insight processing might lead to a facilitation 
of problem solution. 
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4.2.2.8. Expertise 
The expertise reported in the literature on problem solving is quite different to the 
expertise at insight processing alluded to above. What has been considered in the 
literature is the effect of being an expert in a knowledge domain that might be 
activated by an insight problem. The effect of this expertise is to retard insight. 
Once again, this is completely consistent with a neural network theoretical account 
of insight. The inhibiting effect of past learning on insight has already been 
explored. Imagine the far greater inhibiting effect of being an expert in a domain 
that is linked to an inappropriate problem type. The weights on the connections to 
that problem type are likely to be even more positively set, and the weights to the 
appropriate problem type will thus be highly inhibitory. Also, it is likely that the 
threshold activation associated with the problem types elicited by expertise will be 
quite low. 
Let us use the mutilated checkerboard problem as an example. Remember that in 
this problem the problem solver is presented with a checkerboard whose opposite 
comers have been removed, and the requirement is to cover the all of the remaining 
62 squares with 31 dominoes, or to prove that this is impossible. The most obvious 
problem type suggested by the problem presentation is a purely mathematical one, 
in which 31 multiplied by two, is 62. The problem solver is amazed when their 
attempts at covering the squares fail and they seek a mathematical proof for this 
failure based on the total number of squares. What is crucial, however, is the 
recognition that this problem requires a non-obvious solution and the subsequent 
realisation that the opposite corners of the checkerboard are the same colour. As 
any domino covers a black and a white square the covering is impossible, because 
there are an unequal number of squares of each colour remaining. 
Past experience heavily biases the mathematical problem type and insight is 
therefore unlikely. If the problem solver also happens to be a mathematician, the 
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biasing effects of this approach will be so great that no other problem type is likely 
to be considered. The persistence with which the problem solver is likely to pursue 
the mathematical conception will probably be daunting1• The positive weights 
between this problem and the mathematical problem type will be extremely high 
and the recognition of the colour of the squares will thus be heavily inhibited. It 
would appear that a conceptual account of insight in neural network terms can 
account for yet another feature of the empirical data on insight. 
4.2.2.9. Inability to predict success or failure 
This feature of the insight literature can be understood in very much the same terms 
as incubation. The processing which occurs below threshold, or before a problem 
type is brought to awareness, is not conscious. Before an item receives positive, or 
above threshold activation, the individual is not aware that any processing is 
occurring. The recognition of the appropriate problem type, and thus the 
realisation of the problem solution, seems to be sudden. Because the processing 
involved in this is below awareness, the emergence of the correct solution cannot be 
predicted. 
The failure to solve an insight problem which usually follows the prediction of 
imminent success can also be accounted for by this conceptual account. When a 
problem solver is working on an inappropriately recognised problem type, one 
biased by past experience, the consistently positive nature of the connection weights 
means that the processing occurs consciously or in awareness. The individual 
concerned also believes that the problem they are working on is a member of this 
likely problem type. Thus, if a problem solver states that they are about to 
successfully solve the problem they are working on they could be applying an 
inappropriate problem type. As the insight problem cannot be solved by the 
1 Recall, for instance, the engineering student who spent 18 hours attempting to provide mathematical 
prooffor the impossibility of the problem, based on the total number of squares (see section 2.2.6.1.). 
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application of this problem type, failure ·will follow the prediction of impending 
success. 
4.2.2.10. Suppression of insight by verbalisation 
It is quite easy to understand, in the terms of this conceptual account, why the 
crucial steps taken to achieve insight are not present in the verbal protocols of 
problem solvers. The cognitive processing involved in attaining insight occurs 
outside of awareness as we have seen. We can talk about the cognitive processing 
that we are aware of, but not the processing that we are unaware of. It is also 
entirely possible that the processing involved in insight occurs in a form which is 
very different from verbal expression. Perhaps we can talk about our thinking, but 
not how we think. This is Clark's (1989) understanding of the language of thought. 
It is also possible that, due to the suddenness of insight, problem solvers just do not 
have time between the recognition of the appropriate problem type and the problem 
solution to reflect on the manner in which they reached that point. This is the least 
likely explanation, however, because there would certainly be time for some 
discussion of the processes by means of which the appropriate problem type is 
selected. 
What is more difficult to explain, is the finding that verbalisation during problem 
solving suppresses insight. The most likely explanation for this is that verbalising 
while working on a problem focuses attention. If a problem solver is discussing the 
solution attempt which they are working on, their attention is probably more fully 
focused on the problem type they are employing. This could heighten awareness of 
the problem type which has been recognised and thus suppress awareness of an 
alternative type. Information which is not associated with the well-learnt pattern 
will be suppressed. 
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4.2.3. Expert insight processing 
We now move on to a consideration of the manner in which being an expert at 
insight processing could facilitate insight problem solving. It is important to recall 
that what is important in the attainment of insight during problem solving, is the 
processing that is necessary to produce insight. Therefore, if features of the 
literature on problem solving in general are to be applied to insight problem 
solving, they should be applied to the processing involved. It has been noted (in 
chapter two) that the concept of expertise has been inadequately applied to insight. 
We have seen that some consideration has been given to the effect of expertise in a 
knowledge domain related to the insight problem, but no application has been made 
to insight itself. The suggestion which this conceptual account has already made 
regarding the application of expertise to insight is that individuals can become 
experts at insight processing. It is necessary to examine what this means. 
It is quite conceivable that people can become experts at displaying insight in 
problem solving, at recognising the ambiguous nature of the problem presentation, 
at recognising the inappropriate problem types which are suggested by past 
learning, and at recognising the pattern which suggests a non-obvious solution. 
This would involve an explicit awareness of the manner in which insight problems 
function and practice at the types of solutions which are required. Thus, expertise 
can be developed at recognising insight problems. 
This would mean that, either the effects of past learning must be circumvented in 
the existing weighted connections, or that recognition of the insight problem leads 
to an immediate change in the weights to problem types that are potentially 
associated with the current problem. It is perhaps also necessary that information 
which is not usually associated with the recognised pattern is not heavily inhibited. 
The immediate activation of other information would involve the evaluation that 
there is a far greater difference between the current problem solution attempt and 
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the desired solution than most people make. This would lead to a more substantial 
change in the existing weights. In either case, the notion of expert insight 
processing is entirely consistent with a neural network theoretical conception of 
insight and is a fascinating result of the application of general problem solving data 
to insight problem solving. 
4.2.4. Reflecting on the sparring match in cognitive theory 
It is now necessary to consider what this neural network theoretical account of 
insight implies for the debate in cognitive science and cognitive psychology. If this 
account proves to be a viable conception of the processes involved in attaining 
insight during problem solving, and insight is taken to be a higher cognitive 
process, there are grounds for suggesting that the neural network account may have 
application as a general theory of cognition. Insight is only one small feature of 
cognitive processing and strong conclusions cannot be drawn on the basis of one 
account. As has been stressed before, however, it is only by re-writing cognitive 
phenomena in neural network terms that we can begin to assess the strength of this 
theory. If this re-writing is successful for insight, there is little reason to believe 
that it will not prove to be successful for other features of cognition. We can then 
consider testing the supposition that some form of pattern recognition forms the 
basis of thought. 
Should a neural network theoretical account not prove to be viable (and this cannot 
be decided on the basis of one set of empirical tests, but only by open critique and 
substantial testing), the notion that the basic character of thought can be understood 
by the recognition of patterns is not supported. This does not reflect in any way, 
however, on the proposal that neural network theory is applicable at the 
implementation level. It would then be necessary to consider an account of insight 
which uses a neural network implementation of a rule-based, symbolic processor. 
However, as symbolic theory has not proved itself to be successful in explaining 
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insight to date, the potential of this approach would still be open to question. By 
positioning this work on insight within the divide between symbolic theory and 
neural network theory, no matter what the verdict concerning the viability of the 
account proves to be, some reflection on the debate in cognitive theory can be cast. 
It could be argued from the perspective of symbolic theory that this entire enterprise 
is not worth pursuing, that this explication of the processing involved in attaining 
insight is not necessary, and that we should only be interested in outlining the 
general principles of cognition. The reply to this could run as follows. It is 
impossible to teach people to think insightfully if we do not know how insight 
processing occurs. Insightful thinking has great application in creativity, in 
research, and in advancing knowledge generally. We should surely want to 
advance our knowledge by any means possible. Also, we have seen the result of a 
lack of explanation for phenomena such as insight - they are reduced to the sphere 
of the mystical. Finally, why should we not want to explain the processing 
involved in insight if the explanation is available? The explanation must, however, 
be viable, and it is the task of the rest of this chapter to outline some of the central 
tenets of this theoretical model of insight which can be subjected to empirical 
testing. The formulation of this empirical test will also be outlined. This will 
constitute the first step toward establishing the potential of this conceptual account 
of insight. These central tenets will be posed as research questions, to render them 
amenable to testing. 
4.2.5. Some research questions 
The main contention which this account of insight has made, is obviously that 
insight is a form of recognition. This is not particularly amenable to direct testing. 
How do you decide experimentally, whether someone is recognising a the pattern to 
insight problems or not? However, it is indirectly testable on the basis of the 
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predictions which this account of insight has generated. If these predictions hold, 
some credence is lent to this conceptual explanation of insight. 
The first of these predictions concerns past learning. It was suggested (in section 
4.2.1.) that insight only occurs when the biasing effects of past learning are 
overcome. Until this happens, the problem is recognised as an example of an 
inappropriate type and information which is associated with an insightful solution 
will not be applied to the problem. The prediction concerning past learning thus 
generates three related questions. Is information associated with the insightful 
solution applied to an insight problem without facilitation? Is insight facilitated by 
conditions which overcome the effects of past learning? Does the attempt to 
overcome past learning lead to the application of information related to the 
insightful solution? 
A second prediction of this neural network theoretical account of insight is the 
notion of conceptual transfer. It was suggested (in section 4.2.2.4.) that making 
explicit the nature of insight, as well as making explicit the need to recognise the 
non-obvious problem type, will lead to significant facilitation of insight. This 
generates a clear question. Will making explicit knowledge concerning insight 
problems and the realisation which is necessary to solve them lead to a significant 
facilitation of insight? 
A third and final prediction generated by the conceptual account of insight which is 
amenable to empirical testing, concerns expertise at insight processing. The 
suggestion was made (in section 4.2.3.) that if insight consists of a necessary 
recognition, it should be possible for people to be experts at recognising the pattern 
to insight problems. This produces the question: Is it possible to display expertise 
at insight processing? 
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Now that we have posed the research questions which can be addressed in order to 
begin an initial evaluation of the conceptual account of insight outlined in this 
chapter, it is necessary to move on to fonnulating the empirical testing of these 
questions. 
4.2.6. Fonnulating an empirical test 
The task of this final section of chapter four is to fonnulate the empirical method by 
means of which the research questions derived from the conceptual account of 
insight will be tested. The results of this study will provide an initial evaluation of 
the viability of this account of insight. 
Data from the study will be produced in tenns of number of problem solutions and, 
where problems are solved, time taken to solution. Number of solution attempts 
will not be used, because of the difficulty in defining what constitutes one solution 
attempt. This was discussed in chapter two (section 2.2.7.). The target problem 
will be the nine-dot problem. The results generated by problem solving with the 
nine-dot problem will be used to address the research questions posed in section 
4.2.5. This problem is selected for several reasons which have already been 
established (in chapters two and four). These reasons will be summarised here. 
There is a well-established tradition of using the nine-dot problem in research on 
insight. As a result of this, there is little question that it can be regarded as a 
classic insight problem. It is therefore safe to suggest that the processing which 
problem solvers display in solving this problem, constitutes insight. Most of the 
key empirical findings which were highlighted in chapter two, were based on the 
nine-dot problem. Finally, this problem was also used as a basis on which to 
construct the conceptual account of insight. 
However, as we saw in chapter two, there has been a suggestion that the nine-dot 
problem is atypical among insight problems. In particular, it has been suggested 
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that the nine-dot problem is more difficult than other insight problems (see section 
2.2.6.1.). Add to this the potential accusation that the use of one problem as the 
target for insight problem solving represents mono-operation bias and it is clearly 
necessary to address the issue of whether the nine-dot problem is similar to other 
insight problems. 
To consider whether the nine-dot problem is atypical it is necessary to ask two 
questions. Is the nine-dot problem more difficult than other problems? In other 
words, are people more likely to solve other insight problems than they are to solve 
the nine-dot problem? And, is the nine-dot problem still difficult to solve even 
after problem solvers realise that they can utilise blank spaces on the page? Recall 
that the failure to recognise this possibility was one of the two impediments that 
could prevent insightful solution and that most insight problems possess only one 
impediment to solution. Once these questions have been addressed, the research 
questions derived from predictions made by the neural network theoretical account 
of insight in problem solving can be tested. Before outlining the method by means 
of which these questions are operationalised it is necessary to address the issue of 
sampling in relation to a methodological consideration raised in chapter two. 
In chapter two (section 2.2. 7 .) the need to use a larger sample size and the 
feasibility of testing subjects in groups, were highlighted. When the opportunity 
arose to test an entire third year psychology class during the course of one cycle in 
their tutorial programme, this was considered an ideal opportunity to tackle the 
problem of sample size. This is due to the fact that approximately 180 students 
were registered for the course at that time. It was hoped that the use of this larger 
sample size would mean that sufficient numbers of participants would display 
insight, particularly following facilitation, so that the conditions which led to 
insightful problem solution could be more fully investigated than they have been in 
past studies. 
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As facilitation has increased the percentage of problem solvers who successfully 
solve the nine-dot problem from between zero and nine percent, to anywhere 
between forty three and one hundred percent, even if the sample is divided into 
different conditions there should still be sufficient correct solutions for meaningful 
comparisons. This would, in particular, allow the comparison of solution times. 
Given the detail concerning the processing necessary to reach insight which the 
neural network theoretical account provides, such comparisons could be especially 
meaningful. Quicker solution times could, for instance, suggest conditions which 
facilitate significant negation of past learning and the immediate availability of 
information associated with the insightful solution. It would be most interesting to 
compare conditions which produce slower solution times, to conditions which 
produce quicker solution times. The use of this larger sample size should make 
these comparisons possible. It does, however, present several other problems. 
Participants would have to be assigned to conditions at the level of a tutorial group 
(approximately 12 people). It would be impossible to run different conditions 
within one group, particularly given the differences in procedure which would be 
necessary for various conditions. The methodological problem posed by this is that 
students had elected to be members of particular tutorial groups and that this would 
render these groups potentially non-equivalent. This can be partially overcome by 
randomly assigning entire tutorial groups to conditions, reducing the potential 
methodological problem and thus allowing the larger sample size to be utilised. 
Another problem posed by the use of this class is the time limit imposed on tutorial 
sessions and thus on the length of time for an experimental condition. This places 
limits on the length of time which can be given to work on a problem. This is 
particularly important with the nine-dot problem which can take some time to solve. 
The length of problem solving time usually utilised by studies on insight, varies 
between ten and twenty minutes. Fifteen minutes would seem to be long enough to 
provide participants with the opportunity to solve the problem without prompting 
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people to give up. It is, however, possible that this could reduce the number of 
participants who reach a solution to this problem. More time cannot be provided as 
this would not allow enough time to introduce other manipulations within the course 
of a session. Allowing fifteen minutes to solve the nine-dot problem means that the 
time which can be allotted to solve other problems is severely limited. For some 
problems, this time must be reduced to five minutes. However, as the nine-dot 
problem is the target problem, a minimum of fifteen minutes must be given to the 
solution of this problem. The limits which this places on solutions of other 
problems must be borne in mind. A second session at a later time cannot be 
considered, because it is far too likely that participants would discover the solution 
to the nine-dot problem before then, or that they would become familiar with other 
insight problems during this time. 
The questions concerning the nine-dot problem can, therefore, be addressed by 
means of an experiment conducted with this larger sample size. The question of 
whether the nine-dot problem is more difficult than other problems can be answered 
by requiring participants to attempt to solve the nine-dot and other insight problems 
and then comparing the number of correct solutions across these problems. It is not 
expected that the nine-dot problem will prove to be more difficult than other insight 
problems. We have seen from the theoretical conception of insight that it is 
difficult in any form, because of the heavily biasing effects of past learning. Also, 
the model predicts that an individual who can solve one insight problem is likely to 
be able to solve others. This is due to the similarity of processing required to 
display insight across different types of problems. The content of the problem is 
not relevant, but the conceptual processing is. 
The other insight problems selected for comparison to the nine-dot problem are the 
mutilated checkerboard problem, the horse and rider problem, the card problem, 
and the tower problem. These have all been clearly identified in the literature as 
classic insight problems. Kaplan and Simon (1990) make extensive use of the 
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mutilated checkerboard problem, Scheerer (1963) uses the horse and rider problem 
as typical of insight problems, and Metcalfe and Weibe (1987) include the card 
problem and the tower problem as clear examples of insight problems in their 
studies. Also, these problems meet the operational definition of insight endorsed by 
this thesis. In particular, they all require a non-obvious solution. Please refer to 
appendix 1 for an example of these problems and their solutions. 
The second question relating to the possible atypical nature of the nine-dot problem, 
asks whether this problem is still difficult after problem solvers have recognised 
that they can utilise blank spaces on the page. This question will be addressed by 
providing problem solvers with problems which overcome the effects of this source 
of past learning and which then lead to the application of information not associated 
with connect-the-dot problems. These problems will also make available 
information which would not usually be brought to bear on the nine-dot problem, 
because of the biasing effects of past experience. Recall that a possible source of 
the particular difficulty of the nine-dot problem might lie in the need to negate two 
sources of past learning. This will be addressed by considering whether people who 
extend the lines they draw as a result of facilitation are more likely to solve the 
nine-dot problem than people who have not displayed line extensions. No 
prediction is made concerning this finding. The problems selected for this 
facilitation are an adaptation of Weisberg and Alba's (1981a) problem facilitating 
line extensions, and a problem based on the Necker cube. 
The facilitation problem used by Weisberg and Alba (1981a) consists of four dots 
positioned to suggest a triangle. Connecting the dots requires problem solvers to 
extend lines they draw so that a line will begin and end on a blank space of the 
page. The triangular shape of the problem makes it quite likely that they will 
produce line extensions. This effect is likely to be transferred to the nine-dot 
problem and forty three percent of the problem solvers in Weisberg and Alba's 
(1981a) study who solved the facilitation problem, solved the nine-dot problem. 
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This was in companson to the zero percent who solved the nine-dot problem 
without facilitation. This facilitation problem does not require the problem solver 
to extend lines back through the problem in a fashion similar to the nine-dot 
problem. To accomplish this an adapted problem is designed which involves 
turning the problem on its side and adding an additional line of dots which will 
require the extension of lines back through the dot presentation. This should also 
help to reinforce the beginning and ending of lines at points beyond dots. 
Therefore, the problem is adapted for this study to provide a clearer facilitation of 
the nine-dot problem. Please refer to appendix 3 for a copy of the problem. 
The second problem chosen to address the difficulty of the nine-dot problem is a 
version of the Necker cube. It presents problem solvers with a two dimensional 
square and asks them to make the square three dimensional (a copy of the problem 
is provided in appendix 3). This problem should encourage problem solvers to 
specifically draw lines beyond the square shape suggested by the dots of the nine-
dot problem. It not only suggests that lines can begin and end in blank spaces, but 
also demonstrates transcending the shape of the initial problem presentation. 
Now that we have outlined the manner in which the typicality of the target problem 
as an insight problem can be addressed, it is necessary to set out the manner in 
which the research questions can be tested. Let us first consider the research 
questions relating to the effects of past learning. The two questions dealing with 
the application of information associated with the insightful solution can easily be 
addressed by considering the features of the problem attempts which participants 
demonstrate. In particular, the number of problem solvers who attempt line 
extensions can be considered. It is expected that problem solvers will not extend 
lines into blank spaces of the page during without facilitation, because of the 
biasing effects of past learning, but that the removal of this bias will lead to a 
significant increase in the number of line extensions displayed. 
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The question relating to past learning which asks whether insight is facilitated by 
conditions which overcome the effects of past learning, is essentially the same as 
the question which asked whether solution of the nine-dot problem is significantly 
facilitated when problem solvers realise that they can use blank spaces on the page. 
A response to this question can also take the fonn of a consideration of the solution 
times following the presentation of facilitation problems designed to overcome the 
effects of past learning. These problems are the adapted line extension problem and 
the adapted Necker cube problem. Participants will be required to solve both of 
these problems to ensure that the effects of this source of past learning have been 
overcome. As it is possible that the effect these problems have in overcoming past 
learning will be different based on their order of presentation, this must be 
counterbalanced. In other words, some participants must receive the line extension 
problem first and some participants must receive the adapted Necker cube problem 
first. If there is no difference between these two groups, the data can be combined. 
It is predicted that solution times which follow either combination will be far 
quicker than solution times produced by subjects who receive no cues for negating 
past learning. 
The mutilated checkerboard, horse and rider, tower, and card problems will be used 
to test the question concerning conceptual transfer. This question asked whether 
making explicit, knowledge concerning insight problems and the realisations which 
are necessary to solve them, will facilitate insight. The theoretical account of 
insight which generates this question predicts that merely providing a solution to an 
insight problem will not promote transfer, but that knowledge concerning the 
processing necessary to attain insight will be transferred and will facilitate problem 
solution. Problem solvers thus need to be provided with either an explanation of 
insight solutions to various insight problems before they are asked to solve the 
target problem, or they need to be given an explicit statement concerning the 
recognition which is necessary to achieve insight, together with the problem 
solution, before attempting the target problem. Problem solvers will be required to 
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work on the example insight problems, before the solutions are presented in order 
to produce puzzlement. It was noted in chapter two that significant facilitation of 
insight only occurs after an initial attempt at problem solution. This will 
demonstrate to the problem solver that they are misrecognising-recognising the 
problem and will make the enhance the effect of the conceptual facilitation. It can 
also be predicted that the solution times for subjects who receive an explicit 
statement concerning the nature of insight problems will be far quicker than the 
solution times for subjects who are provided with only the problem solutions. 
To provide a clearer picture of the facilitation effect lent by making explicit the 
nature of insight processing, solution times for the nine-dot problem following all 
facilitation problems can be compared. 
The final research question generated by this conceptual account of insight which 
will be tested empirically, asks whether it is possible to display expertise at insight 
processing. If this is possible, the explicit statement of the manner in which insight 
problems operate should facilitate solution of the nine-dot problem. Also, those 
people who are able to solve one insight problem, should be able to solve others. 
In this case, participants should tend to solve none of the insight problems or all of 
them. 
Now that the empirical testing of the research questions generated by the neural 
network conceptual account of insight has been formulated, it is necessary to outline 





The participants for this study were 152 students at the University of Cape Town. 
These students were all registered for the third year course in psychology at that 
university. Both biological sexes were included in the sample, though the sample is 
predominantly female. This reflects the fact that more female students choose to 
major in psychology than do male students. It was not deemed necessary to 
ascertain how many individuals belonged to each sex as this was not expected to 
influence the results in any way. Participants also belonged to different so-called 
race groups. Race was also not expected to influence the results in any way and 
therefore no information was collected on the racial composition of the sample. 
The participants also ranged quite considerably in age, but as they were all students 
majoring in psychology this was not expected to have any significant effect on the 
results. 
Participants were required to take part in the study during the course of one of their 
regular tutorial sessions. Of the 180 students who were registered for the course at 
the time of the study, 28 did not attend their tutorial meeting in the week during 
which the study was conducted and therefore did not form part of the sample. 
Individual participants were not assigned to different conditions. Assignment took 
place at the level of the tutorial groups and was random. Each tutorial group 
consists of approximately 12 people, though some tutorial groups were slightly 
smaller due to student withdrawals from the course and absence from sessions. The 
number of students who would be attending each tutorial group could not be 
predicted as absence from groups is never uniform. As tutorial groups were tested 
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as a whole, the number of participants tested together ranged from 6 to 12. This 
also meant that the number of participants in different conditions was not equal. 
The study was divided into two parts and 4 tutorial groups were assigned to part 
one of the study. Due to absence from tutorial sessions, 34 participants in total 
provided data for this part of the study. Part two of the study collected data from 
12 tutorial groups and this produced data for 118 participants. Part one of the study 
was divided into two conditions, with two tutorial groups assigned to each 
condition. Data was produced for 20 participants in condition one and 14 
participants in condition two. Part two of the study was divided into four 
conditions, with 3 tutorial groups assigned to each condition. Data was contributed 
by 31 participants in condition one, 29 participants in condition two, 31 participants 
in condition three, and 27 participants in condition four. 
5. 2 Experimental design 
The study was a post-test only control group design, to use Campbell's (1957) 
classification. There was one independent variable with 6 levels. The need to 
address different research questions led to the inclusion of independent groups 
design features, as well as the generation of frequency and categorical data. The 
design meets Kies and Bloomquist's (1985) criteria for a true experiment, having an 
active independent variable and equivalent groups created by randomisation. 
Part one of the study followed an independent groups design, with position of the 
nine-dot problem as the independent variable. Both groups were required to solve 
the nine-dot, mutilated checkerboard, horse and rider, card, and tower problems. 
However, one group received the target problem (the nine-dot problem) first, and 
one group received the target problem last. The dependent variable for this design 
was time taken to solve the nine-dot problem. Data was also gathered on a second 
dependent variable, namely number of insightful solutions. Descriptive data on the 
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features of the nine-dot solution attempts was also generated by both groups. These 
included the number of individuals who incorrectly claimed to have reached a 
solution, number of individuals who attempted to extend lines beyond dots, number 
of individuals who were near a solution, number of individuals who had seen the 
problem before, and number of individuals who had remembered the solution to the 
problem. 
Part two of the study followed a post-test only design with one independent variable 
made up of four levels. The independent variable was type of facilitation provided. 
In the first facilitation condition, problem solvers were provided with the four 
insight problems (the mutilated checkerboard, horse and rider, card, and tower 
problems) and their solutions. In the second facilitation condition, problem solvers 
were provided with the same four insight problems and their solutions, but were 
also provided with an explicit statement of the nature of the processing required to 
solve each of these problems. The third facilitation condition involved presentation 
of the nine-dot problem, followed by the line extension problem, and then the 
adapted Necker cube problem. The fourth facilitation condition involved 
presentation of the nine-dot problem, followed by the adapted Necker cube 
problem, and then the line extension problem. Both groups from part one of the 
study were added to these four groups to provide two further levels of the 
independent variable. The group of participants who received the nine-dot problem 
first acted as a control group, while those who attempted solution of the mutilated 
checkerboard, horse and rider, tower, and card problems first served as a further 
type of facilitation. The logic behind including this as an additional facilitation 
condition rests on the possibility that participants who solve one of these problems 
may recognise the process which underlies their insightful solution, and apply this 
information to solution of the target problem. 
Although conditions three and four of part two of the study look as though they 
should constitute a dependent groups design, this is not the case. Although 
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participants received the nine-dot problem in the position of a pre-test, it is obvious 
that comparison of solution times between this first testing and the post-test would 
be meaningless. If participants solve the problem on the initial presentation, their 
second solution "attempt" is of no interest. The initial presentation of the nine-dot 
problem constitutes part of the facilitation c~ondition, as well as an opportunity to 
gather more data concerning the nine-dot problem. The use of pre-testing, in a 
study on problem solving, is often rather pointless. Instead, solution times on the 
nine-dot problem, the dependent variable for this design, must be compared 
between participants. 
Data was also gathered on a second dependent variable, namely number of 
insightful solutions of the nine-dot problem. This frequency data was gathered on 
the basis of a classification variable, namely, type of facilitation provided for 
solution of the nine-dot problem. Descriptive data was also generated from solution 
attempts made on the nine-dot problem. These included the number of individuals 
who incorrectly claimed to have reached a solution, number of individuals who 
attempted to extend lines beyond dots, number of individuals who were near a 
solution, number of individuals who had seen the problem before, and number of 
individuals who had remembered the solution to the problem. 
5. 3 Materials 
Part one of the study used the nine-dot, mutilated checkerboard , horse and rider, 
card, and tower problems. These are all considered to be classic insight problems. 
(The problems only were presented to the participants in part one of the study. The 
nature of the insight required to solve the problem is provided for the reader's 
benefit and to demonstrate why these problems are all considered to be insight 
problems. Copies of the problems and their solutions can be found in appendix 1, 
while a complete collection of the materials for the study can be found in appendix 
3.) 
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The nine-dot problem consists of three rows of three dots, which must be connected 
by drawing four straight lines without lifting the pen or pencil from the page. The 
insight required to reach problem solution is that the lines must be extended beyond 
the dots forming the square shape of the problem presentation, so that lines begin 
and end on blank pieces of the page 
The mutilated checkerboard problem consists of presenting the problem solver with 
a checkerboard that has two of its opposite comers removed. The problem 
instructions state that there are 62 squares remaining on the board and that the 
problem solver must cover these squares with 31 dominoes, or prove that a 
complete covering is impossible. Each domino must cover two squares which are 
horizontally or vertically, but not diagonally adjacent. The insight required to 
reach problem solution is that the two opposite comers are the same colour. 
Therefore, there are an unequal number of squares of each colour left. As each 
domino must cover a black and a white square, a complete covering is impossible. 
The horse and rider problem consists of two pictures. One picture shows two 
horses, one upside down on top of the other. The second picture shows two riders 
in an orientation opposite to the picture with the horses. The problem instruction 
requires the problem solver to place the riders on the horses so that two complete 
horses and riders are formed. The insight necessary to reach problem solution is 
that each of the new horses must be made up of parts from both of the original 
horses. The original horses cannot be used in their initial form. 
The card problem consists only of an instruction. The problem solver is required to 
describe how to cut a hole in an 8X13 centimetre card that is big enough to put his 
or her head through. Obviously this card is not big enough to fit over the problem 
solver's head and the insight necessary to reach problem solution is that the word 
hole must not be understood in its usual sense. The problem solver needs to realise 
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that a spiral can be cut out of the card which, when unfolded, will provide a "hole" 
big enough to fit his or her head through 
The tower problem also consists only of a problem instruction. The problem solver 
is told that a prisoner is attempting to escape from a tower. He finds a rope in his 
cell which is half long enough to permit him to reach the ground. He divides the 
rope in half, ties the two halves together, and escapes. The problem solver is asked 
to suggest how he could have done this. The insight required to reach problem 
solution is that the rope can be cut in half vertically, not horizontally, and that two 
halves will be produced which are each half long enough to reach the ground. They 
can be tied together to permit escape. 
Part two of the study also used these problems. Several other materials were used 
in addition to these problems. The solutions to these problems were used, as well 
as these solutions combined with a statement which made explicit the nature of the 
realisation necessary for insightful problem solution. Use was also made of two 
facilitation problems and their solutions. These were a line extension problem 
adapted for the study, and a version of the Necker cube problem adapted for the 
study. 
The line extension problem presented the problem solver with three rows of three 
dots positioned in a zigzag. The instruction required the problem solver to connect 
these nine dots by means of three straight lines, without lifting pen or pencil from 
the paper. The solution requires that the lines be extended beyond the dots so that 
lines begin and end on blank spaces of the page 
The adapted version of the Necker cube problem presented the problem solver with 
a two dimensional square which they were required to tum into a three dimensional 
square. The solution is to draw a version of the Necker cube 
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The materials used in the study were presented to participants on photocopied sheets 
of paper, either as individual sheets or as a stapled collection of sheets. Features 
such as the size of the problems or the typeface used were not considered to be 
particularly important for studying insightful problem solution and it was decided 
that they should just be reasonable. The mutilated checkerboard problem, for 
instance, had to be of sufficient size for participants to count the number of squares 
and distinguish the colour of the squares with ease. There is no reason to suspect 
that detailed features of the problem layout would have any effect on the attainment 
of insight. 
5.4 Procedure 
The description of the conduct of the study will be fairly detailed, given the rather 
unusual procedure of testing participants in groups on insight problem tasks. 
Sixteen tutorial groups of approximately twelve students each were available during 
one week of the third year psychology tutorial programme, for inclusion in the 
study. The tutorial groups were randomly assigned to the different conditions and 
the tutors for the groups served as experimenters. The writer was one of the tutors. 
Experimenters were provided with a sheet of instructions for each of the conditions, 
a copy of the information sheet that was designed for the participants, a scoring 
sheet that was marked for each tutorial session (all of which can be found in 
appendix 2}, and the prepared package of problems ready for distribution to the 
participants for each tutorial session. Each experimenter would note down time at 
solution of a problem, for participants who solved problems, in hours, minutes and 
seconds. 
As students arrived for their tutorial session they were assigned a participant 
number. Once all participants were seated, experimenters began the experimental 
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session m accordance with the appropriate procedural instructions. For each 
condition participants received the first batch of problems prefaced by the 
participant instructions. Participants were asked to read the instructions, but not to 
tum to the next page until they were told to do so. 
These instructions informed participants that they would be taking part in a study on 
problem solving and that they would be contributing data toward a research project. 
They were told that the time taken for them to solve the problems would be 
recorded, but that this was not a test and would not reflect on their abilities. 
Participants were asked not to look at what other members of the group were doing 
and not talk to other psychology students concerning the tasks they completed 
during the session. They were also asked to write on the problem sheets as much as 
they wanted to and, in particular, to write down the solution to the problem if they 
could. Participants were also instructed to clearly indicate to the experimenter that 
they had completed a problem so that the time at their solution could be noted. 
Experimenters emphasised the need not to talk to other students about the study, as 
well as the importance of indicating to them when they had solved a problem. 
Participants turned to the next sheet in front of them and the start time for the 
experimental session was noted. 
For part one of the study, the next sheet contained an insight problem. In condition 
one participants had only the nine-dot problem in front of them and were given 15 
minutes to work on the problem. If a participant indicated that they had solved the 
problem within this time, the time at their solution was noted. Any participant who 
solved the problem within 15 minutes waited until the entire time period for work 
on this problem had elapsed. All participants were stopped after 15 minutes and the 
nine-dot problem was removed. 
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Participants were given four additional insight problems to solve. Participants 
indicated when they had solved a problem so that their solution time could be 
recorded, and they were free to move on to the next problem as soon as they had 
solved the problem they were working on. Participants were instructed to move on 
to the next problem every 5 minutes, regardless of whether they had solved the 
problem they were busy with, to ensure that each participant attempted all of the 
problems within the time available for the experimental session. Therefore, the 
second part of the experiment involved 20 minutes problem solving time in total. 
The problems participants were given to solve during this 20 minute session, were 
the mutilated checkerboard, horse and rider, card, and tower problems. The order 
of these problems was random as it was felt that an order effect might otherwise 
occur. This could particularly be the case if a participant solved the first or second 
problem they received. It is conceivable that the ability to solve this problem 
would lead the participant to recognise the non-obvious nature of the required 
solution and apply this recognition to subsequent problems. As there were not 
enough participants available to counter-balance the order of all of these problems, 
it was decided to randomise the order to control for the order effect across 
participants. The consideration of order effects led to the addition of a second 
condition for part one of the study. 
Although the possible order effects for all of the problems used for part one of the 
study could not be counterbalanced, there were enough participants available to 
counterbalance the order of the target problem, the nine-dot problem, if one 
considered the tasks for the experiment to be divided at the level of the nine-dot 
problem and other insight problems. It was particularly important to consider the 
order of the nine-dot problem as, to assess the difficulty and typicality of the nine-
dot problem, it was necessary to have a group of participants working on this 
problem without having attempted another insight problem prior to this in the 
experimental session. However, it was also necessary, in order to address one of 
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the research questions, to assess solution of the nine-dot problem after attempts with 
the other insight problems. This could best be addressed by positioning the nine-
dot problem last in the sequence. In this way, the order effect for the nine-dot 
problem could effectively be counter-balanced. The positioning of the nine-dot 
problem after the other problems constituted condition two for part one of the 
study. 
The procedure for condition two was exactly the same as the procedure for 
condition one, except that the order of problems presented to participants was 
different. Participants were given the randomly ordered collection of four insight 
problems, followed by the nine-dot problem. 
Following completion of both of the conditions for part one of the study, 
participants were asked whether they had seen the nine-dot problem before, and 
whether they had remembered the solution to the problem. Participants were also 
asked whether they had seen any of the other problems before, if so which one(s), 
and once again whether they had remembered the solution(s). This completed the 
experimental session. 
The procedure for conditions one and two of part two of the study was somewhat 
similar to the procedure for part one. Following the initial instructions from the 
experimenter, participants were presented with the mutilated checkerboard problem. 
They were given 5 minutes to work on the problem and were told that they could 
move on to the next problem as soon as they had solved the problem and had 
indicated that they had done so. The experimenter noted down the time at which 
any participant indicated they had solved a problem and, after 5 minutes, instructed 
participants who had not solved the mutilated checkerboard problem to tum the 
sheet and read the solution to the problem. 
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For condition one, this contained a statement of the problem solution only. For 
condition two, this contained the same solution statement as well as a statement 
which detailed the nature of the recognition which was necessary to solve the 
problem. Participants were given one minute to view this solution and were then 
asked to turn to the next problem. This was the card problem, followed by a 
statement of the solution (condition one) or a statement of the solution as well as an 
explicit statement of the recognition necessary to solve the problem (condition two). 
The same procedure applied for this problem, as well as for the two problems 
which followed it, namely the horse and rider problem and the tower problem. 
The order of these problems was the same for all participants, though that order had 
been selected randomly. It was felt that the order of presentation of the problems 
and their solutions could effect transfer of the conceptual processing to the target 
problem (the nine-dot problem). As there was no interest in the ability of the 
participants to solve the four problems for which they would be given solutions, 
and participants were only required to work on the problems to induce the 
puzzlement which would facilitate conceptual transfer, it was felt that the order of 
these problems should be the same for all participants. In this way, the cumulative 
effect of conceptual transfer which would then be applied to the nine-dot problem 
would not be different as a result of the methodology of the study. 
After 24 minutes of work on these problems and their solutions participants were 
instructed to move on to the final sheet in the batch of problems they had been 
provided with, if they had not already done so. This sheet contained the nine-dot 
problem. The procedure with respect to this problem was the same as that 
employed in part one of the study. Participants were given 15 minutes to work on 
the problem, were requested to indicate when they had solved the problem so that 
their time at solution could be noted, and were asked whether they had seen the 
problems before and remembered the solutions. 
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The procedure for conditions three and four of part two of the study were somewhat 
different. The participants received the same experimental instructions and began 
their problem solving work on the nine-dot problem. They were given 15 minutes 
to work on the problem and were allowed to move on to the next sheet in front of 
them as soon as they had completed the problem they were busy with and had 
indicated their solution of the problem. 
The 15 minutes of problem solving time on the nine-dot problem was used to rule 
out participants who could solve the problem without facilitation and to induce 
puzzlement for those participants who would require facilitation. The use of 15 
minutes might seem a little lengthy for this, but it was felt that these participants 
could also be used to provide information on the characteristics of problem solving 
with the nine-dot problem, without any intervention. These participants could be 
added to the participants in condition one, part one of the study, which would 
significantly increase the number of participants from whom this information could 
be derived. For this reason, the length of time given for problem solving on the 
nine-dot problem had to be the same for these participants. 
At the end of the 15 minutes work on the nine-dot problem, participants who had 
not indicated that they had solved the problem were asked to move on to the next 
problem in the batch in front of them. This contained either the adapted line 
extension problem (condition three) or the adapted Necker cube problem (condition 
four). Participants were given 5 minutes to work on this problem. This was 
merely to induce puzzlement and, although participants were asked to indicate when 
they had solved a problem in order to maintain procedural consistency, there was 
no real interest in this time. After 5 minutes, those participants who had not 
indicated that they had solved the problem were instructed to move on to the next 
sheet. This contained either the solution to the adapted line extension problem 
(condition three) or the solution to the adapted Necker cube problem (condition 
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four). After 1 minute of viewing time for this solution, participants were instructed 
to move on to the next sheet. 
This contained the adapted Necker cube problem (condition three) or the adapted 
line extension problem (condition four). The same procedure applied and the 
corresponding solutions were viewed. The order of these problems was counter-
balanced even though there was no interest in solution of these problem per se. 
These problems were included in an attempt to overcome a feature of the past 
learning associated with the nine-dot problem and it was felt that the cumulative 
effect of these cues might differ based on order of presentation 
Once the procedure with both the adapted line extension and the adapted Necker 
cube problems was complete, participants who had not moved on to the fmal 
problem were instructed to do so. This was the nine-dot problem once more and 15 
minutes problem solving time was allowed to enable an assessment concerning the 
effects of these facilitation problems. This would also make the final problem 
solving work on the nine-dot problem comparable across all four conditions of part 
two of the study. Participants were once more asked to indicate to the experimenter 
that they had solved the problem. The experimental session was completed by 
questioning participants concerning prior knowledge with any of the problems they 
had just seen. 
This concludes the description of the experimental procedure for the study and it 
just remains to outline the scoring procedure for the main aspects of the data which 
was collected. As experimenters had as many as 12 participants to run in any one 
experimental session, they merely noted down the time at which the experimental 
session started and the time ar wbith the participant solved a problem. The time to 
solution could then be calculated by working back to the start time, on the basis of 
how much time was allowed per problem and whether the participant had solved the 
problem prior to the one for which a solution time was noted. Solutions were 
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judged to be correct against the standard insightful solutions used for these 
problems. These solutions are the ones which are included in appendix 1, and 
which participants received in the respective facilitation conditions. Solution times 
were not given to participants who indicated that they had solved a problem when in 
fact they had not. 
Features of the problem solving attempts were judged according to the problem 
attempts participants had drawn on the problem sheets. Where participants had not 
written or drawn anything on the problem sheet, the problem was scored as 
unattempted. This happened very infrequently. Features of the participants 
problem solving attempts on all problems were scored according to whether they 
violated the problem instructions. In addition to this, features of the problem 
solving attempts on the target problem (the nine-dot problem) were scored on the 
following criteria: whether the problem solver had retraced a line, whether they 
had attempted line extensions beyond dots, whether their attempt was near a 
solution, and whether they had missed a dot. 
For part one of the study, participants also received a score for the total number of 
correct problem solutions they produced. Following an interesting finding 
concerning the tower problem, all participants were re-scored on the tower problem 
for the numerical position in which they had received this problem within the batch 
of insight problems. We now move on to a consideration of this interesting 
finding, as well as the other findings of the study, in chapter six. 
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6 .1. Introduction 
CHAPTER6 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the fmdings of the empirical study described in chapter five. The 
study was designed to test predictions derived from the central tenets of the neural 
network theoretical account of insight in problem solving, developed in chapter four. 
This chapter will begin with a brief summary of the fmdings of the study, before moving 
on to a more detailed presentation of the results. 
Of the 152 participants in total who produced data for the study, 14 participants were 
familiar with the nine-dot problem and were thus excluded from the main analyses. Of 
the 92 participants who produced problem solving attempts with no facilitation on the 
nine-dot problem, 83 were unfamiliar with the nine-dot problem and 8,43% of them 
were able to solve the nine-dot problem in the time allotted. Of the 118 participants 
who produced problem solving attempts on the nine-dot problem following facilitation, 
107 were unfamiliar with the nine-dot problem and 14,02% of them were able to solve 
the nine-dot problem within the time provided. (Recall that the total number of problem 
solving attempts with the nine-dot problem does not equal the number of participants, as 
58 participants - those in conditions three and four of part two of the study - produced 
problem solving attempts on the nine-dot problem prior to and following facilitation, 
where the initial attempt served as an unfacilitated attempt as well as forming part of the 
facilitation intervention.) The unexpectedly small number of participants who managed 
to solve the nine-dot problem meant that the research questions could not be addressed 
in terms of differences in solution times. Instead, differences in number of solutions 
had to be considered. 
In terms of the typicality of the nine-dot problem, familiarity with the problem did 
decrease solution time and findings for the nine-dot problem were no different to 
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findings for the mutilated checkerboard, horse and rider, and card problems. The tower 
problem, however, produced significantly more correct solutions. 
The facilitation provided to overcome past learning did not produce a significantly 
greater number of solutions on the nine-dot problem. There was also no effect of 
facilitation on the nine-dot problem on the basis of conceptual transfer. There was no 
evidence to suggest that it is possible to display expertise at insight processing and only 
solution of the horse and rider problem was significantly correlated to solution of the 
nine-dot problem. The presentation of the results for the study is concluded with a 
description of two of the main features of attempts to solve the nine-dot problem. Alpha 
was set at oc = 0,05 for all statistical tests of significance. 
6.2. Typicality of the nine-dot problem 
In chapter four, the contention that the nine-dot problem is atypical was explored and it 
was suggested that the typicality of the nine-dot problem as an insight problem would 
have to be explored. This section reports the fmdings concerning the issue of typicality 
and the questions which this generated. 
We will begin the presentation of the results of the study by considering the findings 
based on the 14 participants who were familiar with the nine-dot problem. They will 
then be excluded from the rest of the analyses. Of the 14 participants who were familiar 
with the nine-dot problem, 9 correctly solved the problem within the time available for 
problem solution. It was decided to conduct a comparison of the solution times for 
participants who were familiar with the solution to the nine-dot problem and participants 
who solved the nine-dot problem without facilitation. If solution times for participants 
familiar with the problem are no different to solution times for participants who were 
unfamiliar with the problem, and solved it without facilitation, the problem is so 
difficult that prior familiarity with it does not decrease solution time. This would reflect 
on the typicality of the nine-dot problem, as insight problems are generally easier to 
solve following prior exposure to the solution. 
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However, of the 9 participants who correctly solved the nine-dot problem, 3 belonged to 
groups who had received the nine-dot problem after facilitation while 6 had received the 
nine-dot problem without, or prior to, facilitation. It is important to address any 
possible difference between these two groups in terms of solution time, reported in 
seconds. 
Table 6.1: Mean time to solution for problem solvers familiar with the nine-dot 
problem, with and without facilitation 
Mean Time 
Standard Deviation 
9-dot After Facilitation 9-dot No Facilitation 
1168,556 
146,057 
A two-tailed independent t-test revealed no significant difference in solution times 
between these two groups: ~7) = 2,038, p>0,05. However, given that the power of 
the test is unacceptably low (8 = 0,896, with a medium effect size selected on the basis 
that the effect of insight facilitation on recall was unknown), the highly unequal 
variances, and the proximity of the t-value to the critical t-value for this test (lent = 
2,365), it does not seem safe to combine these groups. Although it cannot be concluded 
that prior facilitation has any effect on recall of solution for the nine-dot problem, it will 
not be stated that groups which have had facilitation on insight are the same as groups 
which have had no facilitation on insight problem solving. Participants who recalled the 
nine-dot solution after facilitation at insight problem solving will therefore not be used 
in further analysis. 
For the comparison of solution times for the 6 problem solvers who were familiar with 
the nine-dot problem, with those for the 7 problem solvers who were unfamiliar with 
the nine-dot problem, the following descriptive statistics were obtained. 
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Table 6.2: Mean times to solution for problem solvers familiar and tp1familiar 









A two-tailed independent t-test revealed a significant difference in solution times 
between these two groups: ~11 > = -4,797, p<O,OOl. As the sample size was very 
small, based on the fact that very few people were able to solve the nine-dot problem, 
consideration was given to the power of the test. Power was 0,36 (o = 1 ,587, oc = 
0,05). A large effect size was selected for the determination of power, as it was 
expected that familiarity with the nine-dot problem would have a significant impact on 
solution time. Following this decision, the calculated power of the test was considered 
to be acceptably high. It can therefore be concluded that familiarity with the nine-dot 
problem does significantly decrease time needed for solution. This would suggest that 
the nine-dot problem is not atypical as an insight problem. 
However, this comparison of solution times would be deceiving if a significant number 
of participants who were familiar with the nine-dot problem failed to recall the solution. 
Thus, a further reflection on the typicality of the nine-dot problem, which familiarity 
with this problem could provide, is based on a comparison of the nwnber of individuals 
who are familiar with the problem and manage to recall the solution, with the number of 
individuals who are unfamiliar with the problem and manage to reach a solution. The 
14 participants who were familiar with the nine-dot problem will therefore be compared 
to the 78 participants who, of the 92 participants who produced unfacilitated problem 
solving attempts on the nine-dot problem, were unfamiliar with the problem. 
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Table 6.3: Number of solutions for problem solvers familiar and unfamiliar with 





9-dot Not Solved 
Analysis of the above Table revealed x(l)2 = 21,573, p<0,005. Therefore, a 
significantly greater number of problem solvers who are unfamiliar with the nine-dot 
problem, fail to solve the problem than do problem solvers who are familiar with the 
problem. This suggests that the nine-dot problem is not atypical and is significantly 
easier following familiarity with the problem. 
Now that those individuals familiar with the nine-dot problem have been excluded from 
the analysis, we can continue. We begin with a consideration of the typicality of the 
nine-dot problem. 
Before addressing the issue of typicality directly, it is necessary to answer an initial 
question which concerns the position of presentation of the nine-dot problem in the 
unfacilitated conditions. Recall that the problem was either the first problem 
participants saw, or the last in a sequence of insight problems. Although solution 
attempts on other insight problems cannot be considered a form of facilitation, it is 
conceivable that, where problem solvers reach an insightful solution, this recognition 
could carry over to subsequent problem solving attempts and act as facilitation. 
Although very few people managed to solve any of the insight problems, as can be seen 
from Table 6.4, it still seems prudent to assess possible differences in frequencies of 
solutions for position of the nine-dot problem. Of the 78 participants who atttempted to 
solve the nine-dot problem prior to any other problem solving attempts ( participants in 
condition one of part one of the study, and conditions three and four of part two of the 
study), 71 were unfamiliar with the nine-dot problem. Of the 14 participants in 
condition two of part one of the study who attempted to solve the nine-dot problem 
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following problem solving attempts with the other insight problems, 11 of them were 
unfamiliar with the nine-dot problem. 





9-dot Not Solved 
Analysis of table 6.4 revealed Xo>2 = 0,2592, p>0,05. Therefore, no significant 
difference exists for number of solutions on the nine-dot problem in terms of position of 
the problem. These two groups will, therefore, be combined. This means that 
consideration of the nine-dot problem will be made in terms of those participants who 
attempted the problem without facilitation, and this includes those problem solvers who 
saw the nine-dot problem after working on other insight problems, and those 
participants who attempted the problem after facilitation. The problem solvers who 
received different types of facilitation can be divided according to the three types of 
facilitation. 
Question 1: Is the nine-dot problem more difficult than other insight problems? 
This question was addressed by a consideration of the number of correct solutions across 
the different insight problems to ascertain whether there were more correct solutions for 
other insight problems than there were for the nine-dot problem. 
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Table 6.5: Number of problem solutions across insight problems in study part one 
9-Dot Mutilated Horse and Card Tower 




I ~7 I ~7 I ~6 I ~5 I ~I Not Solved 
The 28 participants in part one of the study who were unfamiliar with the nine-dot 
problem as well as the other insight problems (6 of the 34 participants in part one of the 
study were familiar with at least one of the problems), have been included in table 6.5. 
Given the fact that so few people were able to solve the nine-dot, mutilated 
checkerboard, horse and rider, and card problems, a consideration of solution times 
across problems is impossible. We must, therefore, restrict our consideration of the 
difficulty of the nine-dot problem relative to other insight problems, to frequency and 
categorical data in terms of number of solutions and whether a problem is solved or not. 
It is obvious from Table 6.5 that the mutilated checkerboard, horse and rider, and card 
problems are as difficult as the nine-dot problem and that there are not significantly 
more solutions on one of these problems than on the nine-dot problem. There is, 
therefore, no point in conducting a statistical test of significance of this question. 
The tests which are conducted must be chosen with care to avoid conducting multiple x2 
comparisons on the same data. The only result of conducting statistical tests on data 
such as that in Table 6.5, would be to increase the Type I error rate. The only insight 
problem which shows a substantial number of solutions is the tower problem. This 
raises the question of whether the nine-dot problem is substantially more difficult than 
the tower problem. The performance on the nine-dot problem for the 11 participants in 
condition two of part one of the study who were unfamiliar with the insight problems, 






participants in condition one of part one of the study who were unfamiliar -with the 
insight problems. 
Table 6.6: Number of solutions for the nine-dot problem presented last, and the 
tower problem when the nine-dot problem was presented frrst 
Solved 
Not solved 
9-Dot Problem Tower Problem 
Analysis of Table 6.6 revealed 'X(1)
2 = 8,516, p<0,005. Therefore, there is a significant 
difference in the number of problems solvers who were able to solve the nine-dot and 
tower problems. More participants were able to solve the tower problem than the nine-
dot problem and it would appear that the nine-dot problem is significantly more difficult 
than the tower problem. The data for this analysis came from the two different 
conditions in part one of the study to avoid the problem of comparing frequency data 
from the same participants. We saw in the analysis of Table 6.4 that there was no 
difference in the ability to solve the nine-dot problem based on the position of the 
problem, and the tower problem occurred in random order across both conditions. The 
two conditions can therefore be considered to be equivalent for this comparison. 
Question 2: Is the nine-dot problem still difficult to solve even after problem solvers 
realise that they can use blank spaces on the page? 
This question essentially asks whether the nine-dot problem is still difficult even after 
one source of past learning has been removed as an impediment to solution. This will 
be addressed by considering the number of people who extended lines and then solved 
the nine-dot problem following facilitation in the form of the adapted line and Necker 
cube problems. Of the 58 participants in conditions three and four of part two of the 
study, 26 extended lines in attempting to solve the nine-dot problem. However, 2 of the 
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participants extended lines prior to facilitation, and will therefore be excluded~ from the 
consideration of this question. 
Table 6. 7: Number of solutions for the nine-dot problem following facilitated 
extension of a line 
9-Dot Solved 9-Dot Not Solved 
Extended Line 
Analysis of Table 6.7 revealed Xo>2 = 0,375, p>0,05. Therefore, there was no 
significant difference in the number of solutions on the nine-dot problem for participants 
who extended a line. It would seem that the nine-dot problem is still difficult even after 
participants realise that they can use the blank spaces on the page. This is supported by 
the fact that only 2 people who extended lines during the first presentation of the nine-
dot problem went on to solve the problem following facilitation with the adapted line 
and Necker cube problems. 
6. 3. Effects of past learning 
The question of whether overcoming the effects of past learning will facilitate insight, 
can be considered by addressing three subsidiary questions. 
Question 1: Is information associated with the insightful solution applied to an insight 
problem without facilitation? 
Table 6.8: Number of problem solvers who extended a line for the nine-dot 
problem without facilitation 
Line Extensions No Line Extension 
No Facilitation 
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Only 4 of the 83 people who attempted to solve the nine-dot problem without 
faciliation, and who were unfamiliar with the problem, extended lines in their problem 
solving attempts with the nine-dot problem without any facilitation for line extensions. 
It is therefore obvious that the information that it is possible to extend lines into blank 
space, which is associated with the insightful solution, is not applied to the nine-dot 
problem without any facilitation. Again, a test for significant differences is not really 
necessary here to address the question posed, and would only serve to increase the 
chances of making a type I error, because of multiple chi-square tests on the same data. 
Question 2: Does the attempt to overcome past learning lead to the application of 
infonnation which is associated with the insightful solution? 
This question can be addressed by comparing the number of people who extend a line in 
their problem solving attempt with the nine-dot problem following presentation of the 
adapted line and Necker cube problems, with those who extend a line without 
facilitation. The facilitation condition is made up of the 58 participants in conditions 
three and four of part two of the study, excluding the two participants who extended 
lines prior to faciliation and the 6 participants who were familiar with the nine-dot 
problem. The condition without facilitation consists of the 34 participants in part one of 
the study, excluding the four who were familiar with the nine-dot problem. 
Table 6.9: Nwnber of problem solvers extending lines for the nine-dot problem 
following facilitation to overcome past learning, and no facilitation 
Line Extensions 
No Line Extension 
Facilitation No Facilitation 
I~ 
Analysis of Table 6.9 revealed Xol2 = 2,56, p > 0,05. Therefore, there is no significant 
increase in the number of participants extending a line in their problem solving attempts 
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with the nine-dot problem following presentation of the adapted line and Necker cube 
problems. This would suggest that these problems do not overcome the effects of past 
learning which inhibits the use of blank spaces on the page, and which is brought to 
bear on the nine-dot problem. 
The power of this test is obviously quite low. The test of interest is based on only 20 
people who extended lines in their problem solving attempts, and it is highly unlikely 
that significant differences would be detected on the basis of such limited participant 
numbers. As Blalock (1960) argues, the power of the chi-square test to detect 
significant differences doubles with the number of participants in the test. Although the 
measure of power is based on observed frequencies in all cells, it is apparent that the 
limited subject numbers for subjects who extended lines would be a problem here. The 
low power, combined with an apparent trend in the data toward extending lines 
following facilitation, suggests that the no difference fmding could be a result of the 
sample size for this test. Strong conclusions to the effect that attempts to overcome past 
learning do not lead to the application of information associated with the insightful 
solution can thus not be made. 
Question 3: Is insight facilitated by conditions which overcome past learning? 
This question can be addressed by comparing the number of participants who solve the 
nine-dot problem following facilitation designed to overcome past learning, with the 
number who do not solve the problem following this facilitation. Before conducting this 
comparison, it is important to consider whether there is any order effect for the adapted 
line and Necker cube problems. Recall that the adapted line problem appeared first in 
condition three and that the adapted Necker cube problem appeared first in condition 
four of part two of the study. The 47 participants who were unfamiliar with the nine-dot 
problem (11 participants were familiar with the problem) will be used to address this 
question. 
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Table 6.10: Number of solutions for nine-dot problem in condition 3 and condition 
4 
9-Dot Solved 




Analysis of Table 6.10 revealed X(l)2 = 2,1696, p>0,05. Therefore, there was no 
significant difference in the number of solutions based on order of the facilitation 
problems. These two groups can therefore be combined, and these participants can be 
compared to those participants in part one of the study. 
Table 6.11: Number of solutions for the nine-dot problem following facilitation 
designed to overcome past learning, and no facilitation 
9-Dot Solved 




Analysis of Table 6.11 revealed x0 / = 2,087, p>0,05. Therefore, there was no 
significant increase in the number of participants who solved the nine-dot problem 
following presentation of the adapted line and Necker cube problems. This would 
suggest that there is no significant increase in the number of participants displaying 
insightful problem solving following conditions which attempt to overcome past 
learning. 
However, a trend can once again be detected in the data, with more people tending to 
solve the nine-dot problem following facilitation designed to overcome past learning. 
Once more, the power of the test is expected to be low, based as it is on only 10 
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participants who were able to solve the problem. This suggests that strong -statistical 
conclusions concerning no effect of facilitation cannot be drawn. If the facilitation 
designed to overcome past learning does indeed have a significant effect, there is very 
little chance that this test would have detected the effect. 
6.4. Conceptual transfer 
One of the predictions generated by the theoretical model, was that making explicit the 
nature of the processing necessary to reach insight would significantly facilitate insight. 
Question 1: Is there a significant facilitation of insight by conceptual transfer? 
This was answered by comparing the number of participants who solved the nine-dot 
problem following conditions which facilitated conceptual transfer, with the number of 
participants who solved the nine-dot problem in the other facilitation conditions, and the 
no facilitation conditions. Of particular interest was the comparison between the 
number of participants who solved the problem following conceptual transfer and the 
number of participants who solved the problem following presentation of insight 
problems and their solutions. The 26 participants in condition two of part two of the 
study who were unfamiliar with the nine-dot problem, will be compared to the 29 
participants in condition one of part two of the study who were unfamiliar with the nine-
dot problem, to address this particular question. 
Table 6.12: Number of participants solving the nine-dot problem across all 
facilitation conditions 
No Insight Insight Line and 
Facilitation Solution Solution and Necker cube 
Statement facilitation 
Solved 
I ~7 I ~6 I :2 I :8 Not Solved 
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Analysis of Table 6.12 revealed 'X(J)2 = 3,542; p>0,05. Therefore, there is no 
significant difference in the number of participants who solved the nine-dot problem in 
any of the conditions. Facilitation had no effect on number of participants solving the 
problem and, in particular, there was no effect for conceptual transfer over presentation 
of insight problems and their solutions. Once again, this question could have been more 
clearly addressed by a comparison of solution times, but the very limited number of 
participants who were able to solve the nine-dot problem in any condition, renders this 
comparison pointless. This contributes to the apparent lack of power of the test once 
more. It is not possible to determine whether an apparent trend revealed by the data is 
significant or not. 
6. 5 Expertise at insight processing 
The prediction generated by the theoretical account of insight in terms of expertise, was 
that it should be possible to exhibit expertise at insight processing, as displayed in insight 
problem solving. 
Question 1: Is it possible to display expertise at insighl problem solving? 
This question could be addressed by considering the percentage of participants who 
solved the nine-dot problem following the condition for conceptual transfer (based on 
the four participants who solved the nine-dot problem in condition two of part two of the 
study), with the percentage of participants who solved the nine-dot problem following 
presentation of insight problems and their solutions (based on the 3 participants who 
solved the nine-dot problem in condition one of th part two of the study). The 
conceptual transfer condition should make explicit the nature of the processing necessary 
to solve an insight problem. 
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Table 6.13: Percentage of participants solving the nine-dot problem following 
conceptual transfer, and presentation of insight solutions 
Conceptual transfer Insight Solutions 
% Solved 9-Dot 118,18 111,54 
As we saw from the analysis of Table 6.12, there was no significant difference in the 
number of people who solved the nine-dot problem across the different conditions (X(3)
2 
= 3,542, p > 0,05), and therefore no significant difference between the conditions 
presented in Table 6.13. There is thus no evidence to suggest that it is possible to 
display expertise at insight processing following conceptual transfer. 
Question 2: Is there a relationship between ability to solve one insight problem and 
ability to solve another? 
If participants display a consistent ability to solve or not solve insight problems, this 
suggests that people are able to develop expertise at insight processing. This question 
was addressed by correlating solutions across all of the problems in part one of the 
study, namely the nine-dot, mutilated checkerboard, horse and rider, card, and tower 
problems, where solution on each problem was coded dichotomously. 
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l = 1,235 
Phi coefficients are reported in each case in table 6.14, and are then converted to chi-
square values for the test of significance1. A consideration of the correlation matrix 
reveals that only the nine-dot and horse and rider problems are significantly correlated 
(Xol
2 = 13,486, p<0,005). This would suggest that those people who are able to solve 
the nine-dot problem, are also able to solve the horse and rider problem, and vice versa. 
However, this is not enough to suggest that there is a relationship in ability to solve 
insight problems. Though the correlation was based on 28 people, only 1 person had 
solved the nine-dot problem, and 2 people had solved the horse and rider problem. This 
finding can therefore not be used to support the statistical claim that there is a 
1 This was considered more expedient than drawing up 10 two-by-two chi-square tables to adress this 
question. The use of chi-square to test the phi coefficients was deemed to be equivalent to the use of 
two-by-two tables with chi-square. 
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relationship in ability to solve these two problems. Rather, it demonstrates a correlation 
in not solving the nine-dot and horse and rider problems. This just confirms that these 
problems are both very difficult to solve. 
Question 3: Is a person who solves one insight problem more likely to solve another? 
The notion of expertise at insight processing suggests that an individual who is able to 
solve one insight problem should be able to solve another insight problem as well. This 
can be addressed by considering how many insight problems participants are able to 
solve across the problems in part one of the study. If participants display expertise at 
insight processing they should be clustered, according to the number of insight problems 
they solve, at either 0 or close to 5. 













0 2 3 4 
Problems Solved 
5 
As can be seen from the figure above, it is clear that there is an overall low ability to 
solve the insight problems in the study. Number of problems solved tends to cluster 
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close to one, because a substantial number of participants were able to solve -the tower 
problem, but they tended not to solve any of the other problems. 
6.6 Descriptive data 
This presentation of the findings for the study will close with a presentation of some 
descriptive data for solution attempts on the nine-dot problem. 
Table 6.15: Percentage of participants incorrectly claiming solution on an insight 
problem 
9-Dot Mutilated Horse and Card Tower 
Problem Checker- Rider Problem Problem 
board Problem 
Problem 
18,57 129,41 161,18 167,65 114,71 
It was therefore quite likely, particularly on the horse and rider and card problems, tor 
participants to claim that they had solved a problem when in fact they had not. 
Table 6.16: Number of participants near solution on the nine-dot problem, relative 
to the number who solved the problem 
Near Solution 
Solved 
9-Dot Unfacilitated 9-Dot Facilitated 
[: 
It would appear that few of the participants approached a solution to the nine-dot 
problem, without managing to solve the problem. Now that the fmdings for the study 
have been presented, we move on to the discussion and an interpretation of these 
findings in terms of the theoretical account of insight generated in chapter four. 
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7 .1. Introduction 
CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
In the final chapter of this thesis, an attempt will be made to understand the 
findings reported in chapter six and to explore the implications they pose for the 
neural network theoretical account of insight proposed in chapter four. This 
perspective on insight suggested that the processing involved in reaching insight 
during problem solving can be understood as a recognition of the pattern to insight 
problems. This proposal generated several predictions which were empirically 
testable. The results of this test (the findings reported in chapter six) then reflect on 
the viability of this account of insight. Although they cannot offer a definitive 
conclusion concerning the viability of this neural network account of the processing 
involved in insight, the conclusions which can be drawn from the study will be 
explored. This will entail an attempt to understand the findings in terms of the 
theoretical predictions which were made by this account of insight, as well as in 
terms of a methodological evaluation of the empirical test, and a statement of the 
conclusions which can be drawn concerning the viability of the neural network 
theoretical account of insight. As it is difficult to separate the exploration of the 
findings in theoretical and methodological terms, this will be conducted 
simultaneously. 
7 .2. Understanding the findings 
Before considering what implications the findings reported in chapter six might hold 
for the theoretical predictions concerning insight, it is important to consider that the 
findings do perhaps not represent a precise test of these predictions. This is because 
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the effect of any of the conditions which the theoretical model suggested should 
significantly facilitate insight, could not be judged in terms of a comparison of 
solution times. This was the result of a very limited number of participants who 
were able to solve the nine-dot problem. It seems important, then, to begin with a 
consideration of this most surprising finding. 
The 8,43% of the sample who were able to solve the nine-dot problem unaided is 
comparable with previous studies. The 14,02% who were able to solve the problem 
following facilitation is extremely surprising, being far lower than the smallest 
percentage of correct solutions (43%) reported in the literature. The absence of a 
significant facilitation effect held across all facilitation conditions. As the findings 
concerning the unfacilitated condition are not dissimilar to results in the literature, 
this would suggest that the surprising finding in respect of facilitation is not a 
consequence of sample characteristics, particularly as participants were randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions at the level of a tutorial group (approximately 
12 people). Although it is still possible that there are some minimal effects of pre-
selection bias to these tutorial groups, this should be small and it is extremely 
unlikely that it could account for the substantial difference to past findings in terms 
of facilitation which this study reports. 
It also suggests that differences in experimenters and in experimenter conduct 
cannot be used to explain the insignificant effect of facilitation. Experimenters 
were assigned along with participants at the level of the tutorial group. Although 
this could introduce some effects on the basis of pre-selection, once again, as 
tutorial groups were randomly assigned to experimental conditions it is highly 
unlikely that these effects could have been systematic enough to account for the 
consistent lack of effect of facilitation. It can therefore be suggested that the small 
percentage of participants who solved the nine-dot problem following facilitation in 
this study, was 'a consequence of the facilitation conditions although there is no 
direct evidence for this . Whether the absence of a facilitation effect suggests that 
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the predictions derived from the theoretical account of insight are inaccurate, and 
thus that the theoretical account of insight is not viable, or whether this finding is 
the consequence of methodological factors will be explored next. 
There were essentially three main predictions generated by the neural network 
theoretical account of insight and they all suggested conditions which would 
facilitate insight in problem solving. It is therefore necessary to consider each of 
these predictions and their associated findings in tum, to establish whether the lack 
of significant facilitation has major theoretical or methodological implications. We 
begin by considering the prediction that overcoming the effect of past learning will 
significantly facilitate insight. 
The absence of a significant facilitation effect was the result of testing the 
prediction concerning the effects of past learning. This was based on the 
presentation of two problems designed to overcome a source of past learning 
thought to impede insight on the nine-dot problem. This was the familiar group of 
connect-the-dot tasks which were thought to teach problem solvers that lines drawn 
for the nine-dot problem should begin and end on dots. It was therefore suggested 
that problem solvers do not realise that they can use blank spaces on the page and 
that providing them with problems which would require them to do so, would 
overcome this source of past learning. The adapted line and Necker cube problems 
were chosen for this, but showed no significant effect. This could be due to the 
fact that the nine-dot problem is thought to elicit a second source of past learning 
which would serve as an impediment to solution - the group of optimisation 
problems. This would be consistent with the theoretical account of insight 
presented in this thesis. As there was no intervention to overcome the impediment 
posed by optimisation, this question cannot be addressed and no clear conclusions 
can be drawn concerning the viability of the account on the basis of the predictions 
made concerning past learning. 
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It is also conceivable that the adapted line and Necker cube problems used in this 
study were not successful in demonstrating to participants that they could extend 
lines beyond dots. This is supported by the finding that there was no significant 
increase in the number of line extensions produced during problem solving attempts 
with the nine-dot problem following presentation of these problems. However, as 
the line problem is merely a slightly adapted version, one which more closely 
resembles the nine-dot problem, of the four dot problem which was used 
successfully by Weisberg and Alba (1981a) to facilitate line extensions, it seems 
unlikely that this finding is a consequence of the adapted line problem. 
It is possible that the Necker cube problem suppressed line extensions. This seems 
unlikely, however, especially as one would expect that the effect of suppression 
might be greater when this problem is presented last, a fmding which did not hold 
as there was no effect of order of the two facilitation problems. What is possible, 
methodologically speaking, is that the limited number of individuals who extended 
lines when attempting to solve the nine-dot problem, bequeaths a lack of power to 
the statistical test of the effects of overcoming past learning. Therefore, if the 
attempt to overcome the learning derived from tasks such as connect-the-dot 
drawings does have a significant facilitation effect, this could not be detected by the 
statistical testing conducted by this study 
The findings concerning the effects of past learning neither support nor refute the 
theoretical model. From a methodological point of view, it is possible that 
participants were frustrated by being presented with the nine-dot problem a second 
time after they had failed to solve it initially, and therefore did not concentrate on 
the attempt to solve the problem. The risk of producing frustration was justified by 
using the initial presentation of the nine-dot problem to induce puzzlement and to 
provide a larger number of subjects who attempted the nine-dot problem without 
facilitation. 
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From a theoretical point of view, although the absence of a facilitation effect 
suggests that the contention that insight is pattern recognition does not hold, there 
are two interpretations of the findings which are consistent with the model. These 
are that solution on the nine-dot problem is impeded by a second source of past 
learning, and that overcoming the effects of past learning and thus fostering the 
recognition of the pattern which links two problems is extremely hard. It must be, 
because even inducing puzzlement on top of the presentation of facilitation 
problems had no effect on ability to solve the problem. This is despite the fact that 
the research literature reports that inducing puzzlement prior to facilitation leads to 
significant facilitation of insight problem solving. The findings concerning the lack 
of a significant effect of facilitation designed to overcome past learning could 
therefore be interpreted as consistent with the theoretical account of insight in 
neural network terms. The statement that displaying the recognition necessary for 
insight is difficult, can certainly be applied to the understanding of the findings 
concerning conceptual transfer. 
These findings demonstrated no significant facilitation as a result of making explicit 
the nature of the recognition necessary to reach insight. Again, this could be 
understood methodologically or theoretically. The methodological question here, 
however, seems to be only one of operationalisation. Does the statement 
concerning the solution to the problems, the impediments based on past learning 
which people usually bring to bear on the problem, and the fact that insight 
problems cannot be solved on the basis of the most obvious solution, make explicit 
the recognition necessary to reach insight? Possibly not, especially as there is no 
clear evidence to suggest exactly what insight processing is. 
The theoretical perspective on the findings concerning conceptual transfer has a lot 
more to offer. Even if the nature of the intervention does make explicit the 
recognition necessary to reach insight the problem solver still has to make that 
recognition. This will be difficult to do especially as their past experience will be 
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inhibitory and they will be recognising a new pattern. Insight problems are, after 
all, exceptional. This generates a more fundamental theoretical question, one which 
questions the assumption that the pattern requiring recognition is the one which 
links all insight problems. In other words, is it necessary to recognise that insight 
patterns are linked by the fact that they require a non-obvious solution, or is there a 
pattern to each individual insight problem? If so, this could account for the 
difficulty of insight problems. It would render them all unique. Linked to this is 
the possibility that recognition of the pattern that links insight problems cannot be 
learnt on the basis of an instruction, but only on the basis of experience with the 
pattern. Thus, an individual would have to solve an insight problem to be able to 
recognise the pattern to insight problems. This is essentially the prediction 
concerning expertise. 
Although the findings did not support the prediction that it is possible to display 
expert insight processing, the data available did not constitute a fair test of this 
prediction. This was a result of the very limited number of participants who were 
able to solve the nine-dot problem without facilitation. For this reason it was not 
possible to draw any real conclusions concerning the significant correlation between 
ability to solve the nine-dot problem and ability to solve the horse and rider 
problem. It was also not possible to accept at face value the finding that there was 
no significant correlation between solutions of the other insight problems, a finding 
which would otherwise suggest that there was no demonstration of expertise at 
insight processing. 
This was probably the strongest prediction of the neural network account of insight, 
and it is unfortunate that it did not receive a fair test. The ceiling effect which 
seems to occur in the number of people who are able to solve the nine-dot, and 
most of the other insight problems used in this study, must be addressed by 
increasing the initial sample size. Although the sample size employed by this study 
was substantially higher than is usually used to study insight in problem solving, it 
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was obviously not large enough. It would seem fair to estimate, given the fact that 
this study has reasonable external validity to insight in problem solving in terms of 
its sample size, that approximately 8-9% of any sample will solve the nine-dot or 
similar insight problems. The number of participants needed for a sufficiently 
powerful test of hypotheses concerning insight can be calculated and the sample size 
necessary to provide this number of correct solutions can, therefore, be established. 
The characteristics which enable these individuals to achieve insight in problem 
solving can then be explored. 
Let us attempt the calculations to establish the required sample size for a valid test 
of hypotheses concerning insight in problem solving, making a few decisions 
regarding the required power and the effect size which may vary between 
researchers. Imagine that we wish to conduct a t-test on solution times for 
participants who solve the nine-dot problem unaided and participants who solve the 
nine-dot problem following an intervention designed to overcome the effects of past 
learning. If we set our required level of power at a moderate 50% and use a. = 
0,05, we will need 31 participants per sample who solve the nine-dot problem if we 
assume that the effect size for past learning is medium (0,5 -we are being moderate 
throughout). Based on the prediction that 9% of all participants will solve the nine-
dot problem without facilitation, we need at least 344 participants who attempt to 
solve the nine-dot problem without facilitation. 
Should we decide to use a more stringent, 80% level of power and on top of this 
decide that the effect of facilitation will be large (y = 0,8), we will need a 
minimum of 25 participants who solve the nine-dot problem unfacilitated to address 
our question concerning past learning. This represents an initial sample size of 278 
participants. Assuming that we will not want to run the study to address this 
question on the basis of one type of intervention and that we will therefore require 
additional participants who can be assigned to various facilitation conditions, the 
142 
size of the required pool of participants becomes extremely large for an 
experimental design. 
It could be argued that the external validity of this study is not sufficient to draw 
conclusions concerning the number of people in any sample who will solve the 
nine-dot problem, given the 0-9% range suggested by the literature and the fact that 
this study used students. The use of students was motivated by the notion that 
students are not substantially different to other possible participants in respect of 
problem solving, and therefore the external validity of the conclusion concerning 
the number of participants who will solve the nine-dot problem unfacilitated is not 
damaged. Students were also selected as the participants for the test of theoretical 
predictions in this thesis, because they represent a fairly stringent test of a theory by 
virtue of their homogeneity as a sample (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). A feature on 
which they are particularly homogenous is education. This would certainly imply a 
fairly uniform source of past learning, something which was particularly vital to 
this study. 
To round off our consideration of the findings relating to expertise at insight 
problem solving it is necessary to consider the result that problem solvers who 
solved one insight problem did not go on to solve many more. From the prediction 
that it was possible to be an expert insight problem solver it was expected that 
people would show a uniform ability to solve insight problems. The finding that 
most people tended to cluster around one insight problem solved did not support the 
notion of expertise. However, if we look at the results more closely it is possible to 
argue that participants did demonstrate a uniform ability at insight problem solving. 
Most of the participants solved one insight problem and the majority of participants 
solved the tower problem. This suggests that the tower problem is atypical among 
the insight problems included in the study. If we were to remove the tower 
problem from the data we would see that most people cluster around 0 problems 
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solved, a unifonn ability at insight processing. This is consistent with the 
theoretical model. It is still noticeable, however, that people who did manage to 
solve one insight problem did not solve more. In fact, if we were to remove the 
tower problem we would be left with no participants who solved more than one 
problem. There is, however, a possible methodological explanation for this. Due 
to the time limitations imposed by using experimental sessions with a fixed, 
maximum length, the solution times for problems other than the nine-dot problem 
had to be reduced to 5 minutes. It is possible that the limited number of solutions is 
due to this time restriction. A fair test of the prediction concerning expertise would 
have required more time. 
We have seen that the findings cannot be used to either support or refute the neural 
network theoretical account of insight. Consideration was given to the typicality of 
the nine-dot problem so that the external validity of any findings concerning the 
model based on this problem, could be assessed relative to insight in problem 
solving more generally. Although the finding that the nine-dot problem was not 
different to most of the insight problems included in the study is not useful in tenns 
of extending findings, the consideration of typicality did reveal the atypicality of the 
tower problem. Significantly more people were able to solve this problem than any 
of the other problems. This was not a result of the position of the tower problem in 
the sequence of problems, even though the random ordering happened to place most 
of the tower problems in position two or four in the sequence. The atypicality of 
the tower problem must, therefore, be due to the nature of the problem itself. 
The tower problem does meet the operational definition of insight - its solution is 
non-obvious. However, there are degrees of "non-obviousness". Most people 
have access to the infonnation that it is possible to cut things vertically. We do so 
often, think of fruit and vegetables for instance. These are objects that, even if we 
do not cut them ourselves, we encounter sliced in this fashion on a regular basis. It 
is also fairly easy to think of situations in which we unravel objects such as string. 
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Therefore, the past learning which would facilitate solution of the tower problem is 
readily available. The significant number of participants who solved this problem is 
therefore consistent with the theoretical account of insight offered by this thesis. 
However, as the empirical findings produced to test the theoretical model of insight 
did not support the predictions generated by this model, this finding alone cannot be 
used to support the model. It is also conceivable that this finding could be 
explained in alternate theoretical terms. 
7. 3. Viability of the neural network account of insight 
It has been established during the course of this discussion that the empirical 
findings reported in this thesis neither support nor refute the theoretical account of 
insight in neural network terms. This was established on a methodological and a 
theoretical basis. Although it was suggested (in chapter four) that one set of 
empirical tests were certainly not enough to test the viability of a theory and that the 
empirical testing in this thesis was merely an initial commentary on a newly written 
conceptual account of insight, it is now even more difficult to pronounce on the 
viability of the neural network account of insight. 
None of the empirical tests provided support for the theoretical account of insight in 
neural network terms. However, it has been argued that this lack of support can be 
explained on methodological and theoretical grounds. There are also many other 
questions which the empirical work of this thesis has raised, and which can be 
tested in order to provide further illumination on the viability of this account. 
These include questions such as whether the removal of optimisation as a source of 
past learning would facilitate solution on the nine-dot problem, whether it is 
possible to overcome the effects of past learning with more intensive interventions 
or longer time periods, and whether expertise at insight problem solving could be 
demonstrated if a sufficient number of correct solutions were available. This is, of 
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course, apart from an attempt to address the questions which the empirical work of 
this thesis did tackle, but which it could not pronounce on due to the very limited 
number of participants who were able to solve the nine-dot problem. Providing 
answers to these questions would require an initial sample size at least three times 
the size of the sample utilised by the empirical work of this thesis. Furnishing 
definitive answers was, however, never thought to be part of this work. 
What is still of prime importance, however, is the question of whether insight is 
best understood in neural network terms. It is clearly evident that the neural 
network account of the key empirical findings from the literature on insight in 
problem solving is superior to any of the explanations offered so far from a 
competing theoretical standpoint. Phenomena such as incubation and facilitation 
which have not been accounted for by previous theoretical explanations, are clearly 
explainable by the neural network perspective. This perspective has also allowed 
the notion of expertise to be transferred from the general literature on problem 
solving and incorporated into the realm of insight in a most intriguing fashion. 
Arguably superior accounts are offered for the phenomena of insight which 
symbolic theory has attempted to explain in the past, such as problem difficulty, 
initial problem conception, persistence, and selection of the appropriate conception. 
The neural network account has certainly offered a richer and more consistent 
description of these key findings. 
The only point on which the neural network account of insight written in this thesis 
can be seriously challenged, is on the interpretation of insight as the recognition of 
the pattern to insight problems. This is a particular understanding of the processing 
which might be involved in insight, which was informed by the neural network 
account of insight. It is not necessary to postulate that this recognition is what 
characterises insight for the neural network account to be viable. Indeed, if we 
were to adopt the stance of a simulation researcher, an over-arching conceptual 
account of the processing involved in displaying findings which characterise insight 
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would not be necessary. This account is provided by the operation of the neural 
network, and hence by neural network theory itself. 
It would seem that the only means of determining whether the neural network 
account is the most viable option currently available for conceptualising insight, 
would be to write an account of insight in symbolic terms, and in neural network 
implementation terms, which are of similar scope to this neural network account. 
All three accounts would have to be empirically tested with adequate sample sizes 
to render statistical tests of hypotheses internally valid. Despite this contention, 
however, the consistency with which the neural network account explains insight in 
problem solving cannot be denied. A small set of empirical tests which were 
rendered inconclusive by virtue of the limited number of people who were able to 
solve the target insight problem, cannot be used to refute this account which it was 
the major work of this thesis to provide. 
7 .4. Conclusion 
This thesis reviewed literature on insight in problem solving and argued that the 
conceptual explanation of insight in the literature is poor. This was despite the 
existence of a clear operational definition of insight in problem solving and a body 
of consistent key empirical findings amongst the research on insight. The 
conceptual explanation of insight has clearly been hampered by claims that it is a 
mystical phenomenon, that it does not exist, as well as by its primary association 
with Gestalt psychology and the historical fortunes which this theoretical orientation 
experienced. As a result, the study of insight in problem solving has only 
resurfaced on the fringes of the cognitivist revolution. The dominance of symbolic 
theory in cognitive science and cognitive psychology, a theoretical orientation 
which seems limited in its ability to provide a conceptual explanation of the 
processing which leads to insight in problem solving, only contributed to the 
marginal interest which insight received. 
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As a result, it was decided to undertake the work of writing a conceptual account of 
insight in neural network terms. This would not only provide scope for advancing 
our understanding of insight, but would also provide commentary on the current 
debate in cognitive theory which sees symbolic theory lined up against the would-be 
usurper in the form of neural network theory. The dominance of symbolic theory 
and the current tension in cognitive science and cognitive psychology was also 
traced to historical factors. This was used to suggest that there is a need to re-write 
cognitive phenomena in neural network terms, to assess whether the assumptions 
which symbolic theory applies to cognitive functioning are indeed necessary to 
explain cognition. Insight seemed to be a prime candidate for this re-writing, given 
its association with problem solving and the poor conceptual explication which it 
has suffered in the past. 
The key empirical findings which were identified in the research literature on 
insight in problem solving proved to be easily, clearly, and consistently explained 
by neural network theory. In fact, it was clear that an argument could be made for 
suggesting that neural network theory offered a superior account of these key 
findings and therefore of insight. The neural network theoretical position was used 
to develop a conceptual understanding of insight which suggested that insight in 
problem solving requires a recognition of the pattern which links insight problems. 
The conceptual explanation of insight in neural network terms was used to derive 
predictions which would reflect on the central tenets of the neural network account 
of insight and which could be subjected to empirical testing. These predictions 
suggested experimental manipulations which could be used to facilitate insightful 
problem solution. 
The experimental testing of these predictions revealed the surprising finding that 
there was no effect for any of the facilitations expected to produce a significant 
increase in the number of correct solutions produced on the target nine-dot 
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problem. The consideration of solution times had to be abandoned due to the 
limited number of participants who were able to solve the nine-dot problem. A 
consideration of the number of participants who solved the nine-dot problem 
revealed no significant effect for attempts to overcome past learning, conceptual 
transfer, or expertise at insight processing. 
These results were understood to be the result of a lack of power for the statistical 
tests conducted, bequeathed by the low sample size for correct solutions. They 
could therefore not be used to support or refute the viability of the neural network 
account of insight. It was also possible to interpret these findings in a manner 
which was conceptually consistent with the neural network account of insight. A 
surprising finding concerning the atypicality of the tower problem among the other 
insight problems, offered some support for the conceptual understanding of insight 
in neural network terms. The only means by which the neural network account of 
insight which it was the task of this thesis to write can be assessed, is by extensive 
additional empirical testing with considerably larger sample sizes. Some 
commentary can then be offered on the viability of the neural network account of 
cognition. 
As the end of this thesis is reached, the viability of a neural network account of 
insight remains an open question. It is necessary to submit the account to further 
testing and possibly to develop and test symbolic and neural network 
implementation theories of insight before any clear conclusions can be drawn. 
What is evident from the work of this thesis, however, is that it is possible to 
account for the key empirical findings concerning insight in conceptual terms within 
a comprehensive theoretical account. This is something which has not been 
accomplished to date. The fact that a neural network theoretical framework was 
used to write an account of a phenomenon which must be seen as a higher cognitive 
process, has offered some reflection on the sparring match in cognitive science and 
cognitive psychology. 
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This thesis can be concluded by offering some commentary on the future of 
research on insight. The neural network account of insight written in this thesis has 
the conceptual tools to account convincingly for the fact that insight is difficult to 
achieve, even though the facilitations for insight which were based on this account 
did not prove to be effective. However, we still do not know why some people are 
better at displaying insight than others. Once more, the neural network account of 
insight has the potential to offer an explanation for this, but this needs to be more 
fully investigated. When this investigation has taken place, perhaps we can isolate 
the factors which lead some people to think insightfully and which prevent other 
people from doing so. This seems to be the future of research on insight. When 
we know what underlies insightful thinking, we can begin to teach people to think 
insightfully. Insightful thinking defies the norm. It does not rely on what has 
already been learnt, but makes use of a non-obvious perspective to reach unusual 
and insightful conclusions. It is possible that if we can teach people the techniques 
which will allow them to think insightfully, the Kuhnian shift in paradigm will 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE INSIGHT PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS 
The Nine-dot Problem 
The Mutilated Checkerboard Problem 
The Horse and Rider Problem 
The Card Problem 
The Tower Problem 
Below you will see three rows of three dots. Connect the nine dots with four straight 
lines without lifting your pen or pencil from the paper . 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Below you will see three rows of three dots. Connect the nine dots with four straight 
lines without lifting your pen or pencil from the paper. 
Below you will see a checkerboard whose diagonally opposite corners have been 
removed. Imagine placing dominos on the board so that one domino covers two 
horizontally or vertically (but not diagonally) adjacent squares. Show how 31 
dominos would cover the 62 squares remaining on the board, or prove logically that 
a complete covering is impossible. 
Solution to the Mutilated Checkerboard problem. 
You would have noticed that the problem instructions demanded that you cover two 
adjacent squares with each domino. Therefore, each domino covers a black and a white 
square. Diagonally opposite comers on a checkerboard are the same colour. Thus it is 
not possible to cover the 62 remaining squares with 31 dominos, given that a domino 
must cover a black and a white square, and there are not 31 white and 31 black squares 
left. 
Below you will see two drawings, one labelled A and one labelled B. Mentally place 
the drawing labelled B over the drawing labelled A, so as to create two complete 




Describe how to cut a hole in an 8 X 13 em. card that is big enough for you to put 
your head through. 
Solution to the Card Cutting problem 
There are several possible solutions to the card cutting problem. The most common one, 
however, is the notion of cutting a circle out of the card in a spiral fashion, thus creating a 
"hole" more than large enough to put your head through. 
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found in his cell a rope which 
was half long enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. He divided the rope 
in half and tied the two parts together and escaped. How could he have done this? 
Solution to the Tower problem. 
You would have noticed that the problem instructions stated that the prisoner cut the rope 
in half. If he cuts the rope down the middle (in half down its length), the prisoner will 
have two pieces of rope each half of the length to the ground. By tieing these together, he 
will be able to escape. 
APPENDIX 2 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERIMENTERS 
Participant Instructions 
Experimenter Instructions 
Experimenter Scoring Sheet 1 (Part 1, Part 2 Conditions 1 & 2) 
Experimenter Scoring Sheet 2 (Part 2 Conditions 3 & 4) 
STUDY ON PROBLEM SOLVING 
During today' s tutorial you will be taking part in a study concerned with problem 
solving, and you will be asked to solve a number of problems. 
The aim of this exercise is two-fold. Firstly, some of the data which you contribute 
today will be used to illustrate some of the statistical and methodological principles you 
are currently learning. Perhaps by applying these principles to a study which you have 
taken part in, they will become somewhat clearer than they are in the abstract. To this 
end, you will be provided with data and worked examples from this study in a couple 
of weeks time. 
Secondly, the data which is gathered today will be used as part of a research project 
which hopes to contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms of problem solving. 
The findings of this research project will be made availble to anyone who wishes to see 
them. 
Your tutors will be presenting problems to you and timing how long you take to solve 
these problems. This is not a test and the length of time it takes you to solve these 
problems does not reflect on your abilities. We would, however, ask you to take this 
exercise seriously and not to look at what other people are doing - it is quite likely that 
they have different problems to solve than the ones you are working on. We would 
also ask that you not tell any other psychology student what you did during the 
course of this tutorial. If your classmates know what to expect before they have their 
tutorial, it will invalidate the research fmdings. 
You will now be given problem sheets to work on. Write on these sheets as much as 
you want to and, in particular, write down the problem solution where you can. 
Indicate decisively to your tutor each time you solve a problem, so that your solution 
time can be noted. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation, and happy problem solving. 
STUDY 1 CONDITION 1 
- Hand out instructions and 9-dot problem. 
- Tell students to read the instructions but not to turn to the next page until instructed. 
- Emphasise the feedback they will be receiving, the need not to tell other students 
about the study, and the importance of indicating when they have solved a problem. 
- Tell them to tum to the next sheet and then you can note down the start time on the 
subjects' sheet. 
- Allow 15 minutes of problem solving on the 9 dot problem. 
- Students will be letting you know when they have solved the problem (decide 
whether you would like them to raise a hand or whatever). Note down the time on the 
sheet under problem 1. Any student who has reached a solution will have to wait for 
the end of the 15 minutes. 
- After 15 minutes, stop everyone and take in the sheets. 
- Hand out the next batch of problems. 
- Tell students that they now have four problems to solve - they can move on to the 
next problem as soon as they have completed a problem (indicating their completion to 
you), but after 5 minutes you will be instructing them to move on to the next problem 
even if they have not completed the one they are busy with. 
- After each 5 minute block (there will be 20 minutes total problem solving) tell 
students to move on to the next problem if they have not reached a solution on the 
current problem. i.e. After 5 minutes "if you have not solved your first problem, 
move on to the second one", after 10 minutes "if you have not solved your second 
problem, move on to the third one now", etc. 
- After 20 minutes, stop everyone and take in the sheets. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen the 9 dot problem and its solution before, and note 
down those subjects who had on your subject sheet. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen any of the other problems and their solution before, 
and note down which ones they had seen on the subject sheet. 
P.S. There is no problem with you showing people how the 9 dot problem is solved at 
the end of the session. 
STUDY 1 CONDITION 2 
Hand out instructions and the batch of problems. 
- Tell students to read the instructions but not to tum to the next page until instructed. 
- Emphasise the feedback they will be receiving, the need not to tell other students 
about the study, and the importance of indicating when they have solved a problem. 
- Tell them to tum to the next sheet and then you can note down the start time on the 
subjects' sheet. 
- Tell students that they now have four problems to solve - they can move on to the 
next problem as soon as they have completed a problem (indicating their completion to 
you), but after 5 minutes you will be instructing them to move on to the next problem 
even if they have not completed the one they are busy with. 
- Students will be letting you know when they have solved the problem (decide 
whether you would like them to raise a hand or whatever). Note down the time on the 
sheet under problem 1. 
- After each 5 minute block (there will be 20 minutes total problem solving) tell 
students to move on to the next problem if they have not reached a solution on the 
current problem. i.e. After 5 minutes "if you have not solved your first problem, 
move on to the second one", after 10 minutes "if you have not solved your second 
problem, move on to the third one now", etc. 
- After 20 minutes, stop everyone and take in the sheets. 
- Hand out the 9 dot problem. 
- Allow 15 minutes of problem solving on the 9 dot problem. 
- Students will be letting you know when they have solved the problem. Note down 
the time on the sheet under problem 5. Any student who has reached a solution will 
have to wait for the end of the 15 minutes. 
- After 15 minutes, stop everyone and take in the sheets. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen the 9 dot problem and its solution before, and note 
down those subjects who had on your subject sheet. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen any of the other problems and their solution before, 
and note down which ones they had seen on the subject sheet. 
P.S. There is no problem with you showing people how the 9 dot problem is solved at 
the end of the session. 
STUDY 2 CONDITION 1a and 1b 
- Hand out instructions and the batch of problems. 
- Tell students to read the instructions but not to tum to the next page until instructed. 
- Emphasise the feedback they will be receiving, the need not to tell other students 
about the study, and the importance of indicating when they have solved a problem. 
- Tell them that they have four problems in front of them to solve, and that they must 
not tum to the following sheet until they have solved the problem on the present sheet, 
or until they are instructed to tum the sheet. 
- Tell them to tum to the next sheet and then you can note down the start time on the 
subjects' sheet. 
- Allow 5 minutes of problem solving. 
- Instruct anyone who has not solved the flrst problem to stop solving that problem and 
to tum the sheet. 
- Allow 1 minute viewing time and then instruct them to tum the sheet to the next 
problem. 
- Repeat this until they have been through all four problems. 
- After 24 minutes stop all problem solving and take in the sheets. 
- Hand out the 9 dot problem and allow 15 minutes of problem solving, asking 
students to indicate to you when they have solved the problem. 
- After 15 minutes, stop problem solving and take in the sheets. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen the 9 dot problem and its solution before, and note 
down those subjects who had on your subject sheet. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen any of the other problems and their solution before, 
and note down which ones they had seen on the subject sheet. 
P.S. There is no problem with you showing people how the 9 dot problem is solved at 
the end of the session. 
STUDY 2 CONDITION 2a and 2b 
- Hand out instructions and the batch of problems. 
- Tell students to read the instructions but not to turn to the next page until instructed. 
- Emphasise the feedback they will be receiving, the need not to tell other students 
about the study, and the importance of indicating when they have solved a problem. 
- Tell them that they have several problems in front of them, but that they are not to 
tum to the following sheet until they have completed the problem on the current sheet, 
or until they are instructed to tum to the next sheet. 
- Allow 15 minutes problem solving on the 9 dot problem, timing when a student 
completes the problem. 
- After 15 minutes, tell anyone who has not completed the problem to tum to the next 
sheet. 
- Allow 5 minutes problem solving, then instruct anyone who has not solved the 
problem to tum to the next sheet. 
- Allow 1 minute viewing and then instruct anyone currently viewing the solution to 
tum to the next sheet. 
- Allow 5 minutes problem solving and then instruct anyone who has not solved the 
problem to tum to the next sheet. 
- Allow 1 minute to view the solution and then instruct people to turn to the next 
sheet. 
- Allow 10 minutes problem solving on the final presentation of the 9 dot problem and 
then take in the sheets. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen the 9 dot problem and its solution before, and note 
down those subjects who had on your subject sheet. 
- Ask whether anyone had seen any of the other problems and their solution before, 
and note down which ones they had seen on the subject sheet. 
P.S. There is no problem with you showing people how the 9 dot problem is solved at 
the end of the session. 
Start time: 
Subject 1: Problem 1 ............................. .. 
Problem 2 ............................. .. 
Problem 3 .... : ........................ .. 
Problem 4 ............................. .. 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot.. ...................... .. 
Familiar other ......................... . 
Subject 2 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 ............................. .. 
Problem 4 ............................. .. 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot.. ...................... .. 
Familiar other ........................ .. 
Subject 3 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 ............................. .. 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot.. ...................... .. 
Familiar other ........................ .. 
Subject 4 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot.. ...................... .. 
Familiar other ........................ .. 
Subject 5 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 ............................. .. 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot.. ...................... .. 
Familiar other.. ...................... .. 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot. ........................ . 
Familiar other ......................... . 
Subject 7 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot. ........................ . 
Familiar other. ........................ . 
Subject 8 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot ......................... . 
Familiar other ......................... . 
Subject 9 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot. ........................ . 
Familiar other ......................... . 
Subject 10 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 ............................. .. 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot. ........................ . 
Familiar other. ........................ . 
Subject 11 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 .............................. . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot. ........................ . 
Familiar other ......................... . 
Subject 12 Problem 1 .............................. . 
Problem 2 .............................. . 
Problem 3 .............................. . 
Problem 4 ................... ·~· ......... . 
Problem 5 .............................. . 
Familiar 9 dot. ........................ . 
Familiar other ......................... . 
Start Time ....................................... . 
Subject 1 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 2 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 3 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 4 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 5 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 6 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 7 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 8 problem! ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 9 problem 1 ...................... . 
problem 2 ..................... .. 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 10 problem 1 ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ................... ; .. . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 11 problem 1 ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
Subject 12 problem 1 ...................... . 
problem 2 ...................... . 
problem 3 ...................... . 
problem 4 ...................... . 
APPENDIX 3 
ALL MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY 
The Insight Problems 
The Standard Solutions to the Insight Problems 
The Solutions to the Insight Problems for Conceptual Transfer 
The Adapted Line Problem and its Solution 
The Adapted Necker Cube Problem and its Solution 
Below you will see three rows of three dots. Connect the nine dots with four straight 
lines without lifting your pen or pencil from the paper . 
• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
Below you will see a checkerboard whose diagonally opposite corners have been 
removed. Imagine placing dominos on the board so that one domino covers two 
horizontally or vertically (but not diagonally) adjacent squares. Show how 31 
dominos would cover the 62 squares remaining on the board, or prove logically that 
a complete covering is impossible. 
Below you will see two drawings, one labelled A and one labelled B. Mentally place 
the drawing labelled B over the drawing labelled A, so as to create two complete 
horses and riders. 
A 
A 
Describe how to cut a hole in an 8 X 13 em. card that is big enough for you to put 
your head through. 
A prisoner was attempting to escape from a tower. He found in his cell a rope which 
was halflong enough to permit him to reach the ground safely. He divided the rope 
in half and tied the two parts together and escaped. How could he have done this? 
Solution to the Mutilated Checkerboard problem. 
You would have noticed that the problem instructions demanded that you cover two 
adjacent squares with each domino. Therefore, each domino covers a black and a white 
square. Diagonally opposite comers on a checkerboard are the same colour. Thus it is 
not possible to cover the 62 remaining squares with 31 dominos, given that a domino 
must cover a black and a white square, and there are not 31 white and 31 black squares 
left. 
Solution to the Horse and Rider problem. 
B 
Solution to the Card Cutting problem 
There are several possible solutions to the card cutting problem. The most common one, 
however, is the notion of cutting a circle out of the card in a spiral fashion, thus creating a 
"hole" more than large enough to put your head through. 
Solution to the Tower problem. 
You would have noticed that the problem instructions stated that the prisoner cut the rope 
in half. If he cuts the rope down the middle (in half down its length), the prisoner will 
have two pieces of rope each half of the length to the ground. By tieing these together, he 
will be able to escape. 
Solution to the Mutilated Checkerboard problem. 
You would have noticed that the problem instructions demanded that you cover two 
adjacent squares with each domino. Therefore, each domino covers a black and a white 
square. Diagonally opposite comers on a checkerboard are the same colour. Thus it is 
not possible to cover the 62 remaining squares with 31 dominos, given that a domino 
must cover a black and a white square, and there are not 31 white and 31 black squares 
left. 
Most people do not pay attention to the colour of the squares on the checkerboard. 
Instead, they attempt to work out mathematically whether it is possible to cover 62 
squares with 31 dominos. It is only when people notice the colour of the squares on the 
checkerboard and realise that the opposite comers are the same colour, that they are able 
to solve the problem. There are a group of problems, known as insight problems, for 
which the most obvious solutions do not work. The mutilated checkerboard is one of 
these problems. 
Solution to the Horse and Rider problem. 
B 
Most people attempt to solve this problem by placing part B over the existing horses in 
part A. This solution will not work, and it is only after rotating part A and using the 
existing horses as pieces of the horse and rider problem, that the problem can be solved. 
This problem is another insight problem, for which an obvious solution will not work. 
Solution to the Card Cutting problem 
There are several possible solutions to the card cutting problem. The most common one, 
however, is the notion of cutting a circle out of the card in a spiral fashion, thus creating a 
"hole" more than large enough to put your head through. 
Most people approach this problem with the obvious definition of a hole, and it is not 
possible to cut one hole out of an 8 X 13 em card which is large enough to put your head 
through. It is only when people take a less obvious definition of a "hole" that they are 
able to solve this problem. The card cutting problem is also an insight problem for which 
the most obvious solution will not work. 
Solution to the Tower problem. 
You would have noticed that the problem instructions stated that the prisoner cut the rope 
in half. If he cuts the rope down the middle (in half down its length), the prisoner will 
have two pieces of rope each half of the length to the ground. By tieing these together, he 
will be able to escape. 
The obvious approach to this problem is to take the rope and cut it in half across its 
length, thus providing two pieces of rope one quarter of the necessary length. This 
approach will not work, and it is only by taking a less obvious definition of cutting a rope 
in half, that the problem can be solved. The tower problem is also an insight problem for 
which the most obvious approach will not work. 
Below you will see three rows of three dots. Connect the nine dots with three 










Below you will see the solution to the three line dot problem. 
Below you will see a two dimensional square. Change this square in to a three 
dimensional figure, using any space available on the page. 
Below you will see one possible solution to the three dimensional square problem. 
There are many variations on this problem. 
APPENDIX 4 
A COPY OF THE RAW DATA IS AVAILABLE FROM THE AUTHOR ON 
REQUEST 
